Commentary

VOLUME NINETY-FIVE • NUMBER ONE • JANUARY 1993

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Joshua Muravchik

Is Police Brutality the Problem?
William Tucker

The Crown Heights Riot & Its Aftermath
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Islam vs. Democracy
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A Postscript on Finlandization
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Books in Review: Laurie Mylroie / Evelyn Toynton / Sam Tanenhaus / Peter Shaw / Kenneth Silber

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Letters from Readers

Anti-Semitism Without Jews

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his excellent article, "Once Again, Anti-Semitism Without Jews" [August 1992], Robert S. Wistrich notes that Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia, has not only regurgitated the lies of the Holocaust deniers but "even labels Israel a 'Judeo-Nazi' state." Surely Mr. Wistrich knows that when Tudjman was reproached for this particular calumny he had the exquisite pleasure of pointing out that he had learned it from Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Israel's aging *enfant terrible* (and Mr. Wistrich's colleague at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

Actually, Leibowitz cannot claim credit for inventing the Judeo-Nazi epithet, which seems to have originated in the British Foreign Office in the 1930's; but his use of it during the Lebanon war made him an instant celebrity in Europe and a hero of large segments of the Israeli Left (including people who now sit in that country's cabinet). Why, the Tudjmans of the world may well ask, should they be blamed for repeating the slander that goes forth from Zion itself?

EDWARD ALEXANDER
Seattle, Washington

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his article on the reemergence of open anti-Semitism in Central and Eastern Europe, Robert S. Wistrich asserts that "today, popular anti-Semitism . . . is no longer a government policy." In Slovakia, this may no longer be assured.

In Bratislava last fall during the run-up to elections I saw anti-Semitic slogans and swastikas on many walls—including a swastika on the building which houses the offices of the Bratislava and Slovakian Jewish community organizations. I learned that the scrawls were Slovak nationalist *political* slogans. I was told that the leader of the opposition to Slovak separatism was Jewish, and that he had been forced to flee Slovakia for his safety.

A leader of the Bratislava community told me that a new edition of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was published there in April 1991. When his office attempted to file a protest with Slovakian authorities, they were told that nothing could be done because of freedom of the press. And indeed, there was not even an official denunciation or repudiation of the publication. The community has been similarly stonewalled when it protested other anti-Semitic activities.

Immediately after my arrival, I was approached by representatives of the Slovakian nationalist/separatist movement who mistakenly hoped to gain my support and assistance for their cause. I got quite an earful. Although one was a member of the staff of the weekly *Redakcia Zmena*, which, I later learned, regularly publishes anti-Semitic materials, they dismissed reports of anti-Semitism as "Prague propaganda." They declined to repudiate the "rehabilitation" last summer of Joseph Tiso, the Slovakian leader (later hanged as a war criminal) who paid the Germans to take Jews to the death camps, nor would they reject his elevation to the ranks of Slovak national heroes. . . .

Slovakia's staggering economy is dependent on its sole significant export, arms, which it continues to produce and sell, sometimes clandestinely. Its chief customers now are in the Arab world and it is unlikely to refuse to accommodate Arab interests. An independent Slovakia could well become a center for anti-Semitic activities in Europe.

While the major pre-Holocaust communities may be gone, . . . 6,000 Jews live in Slovakia, and, without being unduly alarmist, one can conclude that current developments are not good news for them. At the very least, the situation calls for close and continuing attention.

Moreover, the unembarrassed Serbian use of the term "ethnic cleansing" to justify the appalling persecution of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzogovina, and the identification of this by Serbian officials as "a religious war without rules," reveals that racism as policy and even the religious passions of the Thirty Years' War are not, after

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all, outside the realm of possibility in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century. Mr. Wistrich has done well to raise a judicious alarm.

ROSANNE KLASS
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As Robert S. Wistrich depressingly concludes, life in Central and Eastern Europe "cannot go on without the *Judaeus ex machina*" . . . to solve the problem of an angry and frustrated public caught up in the current chaos of political breakup and economic hardship.

It was too much to hope that the Christian world's conscience would remain long stricken over the Holocaust, and it certainly did not take long for the revisionists to devise a means of mitigation. Any student of the bloody history of Jewish-Christian relations could have predicted the inevitable . . . rise of anti-Semitism, particularly in that part of the world. Its roots are so deep and so firm, and were planted so long ago.

Although most of Christianity's official bodies have outwardly condemned this ancient curse, it is futile to expect a permanent change at the parish or local . . . level, where it counts. . . .

STANLEY P. KESSEL
Hollywood, Florida

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . At the risk of incurring the wrath of the world Roman Catholic community and that of the Eastern Orthodox Church, I submit that it is the Jews versus the Catholics in whatever country that is at issue. We Jews have little or no difficulty with the Protestants; it is always the Catholics who are against the Jews.

I am seventy years old, and in my time I have witnessed a change in the Catholic catechism, deleting all references to anti-Jewish dogma. Nevertheless, it was (and is) the older generation which carries on this anti-Jewish propaganda, and instills this dogma of hate in its progeny. Only in America are we generally free from "castigating the Jew" as the villain unto eternity. . . .

[Rabbi] ROBERT CHERNOFF
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In connection with Robert S. Wistrich's article, it is fitting to note that, according to anti-Semitism, Jews are responsible on the one hand for . . . Communism, and, on the other, for the exploitations of capitalism. When people seek order in chaotic times, a scapegoat is an easy answer to the complexity with which they are faced. . . .

FREDERIC WILE
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I very much enjoyed Robert S. Wistrich's article. In trying to explain the antagonism against Jews, Mr. Wistrich blamed the perceived "'Judeo-Bolshevik' amalgam." Despite the fact that there were Jewish revolutionaries and that Marx himself was of Jewish origin, it cannot be ignored that Marx's Communism itself was blatantly anti-Jewish.

The most notable example of Marx's anti-Semitism was his essay, "On the Jewish Question." This essay was his response to Bruno Bauer's argument that the Jews can only be emancipated when religion is eliminated from society. Marx believed that Jewish emancipation *per se* was only a part of the question of how man could be emancipated from civil society. . . . Marx stated:

> As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism—huckstering and its conditions—the Jew becomes impossible. . . . The subjective basis of Judaism—practical need—assumes a human form, and the conflict between the individual, sensuous existence of man and his species-existence, is abolished.

In other words, human emancipation, the *goal* of Communism, can occur only with the destruction of the Jew. In these terms, Marxism is the precursor to Nazism. Just as Marx called for the extermination of the practical Jews, Hitler called for the elimination of the Sabbath Jews.

It is no wonder, therefore, that anti-Semitism flourished both because of Communism and despite its demise.

NICOLE SEGAL
Davis, California

ROBERT S. WISTRICH writes:

I am grateful to all those who have written in response to my article in COMMENTARY and for the important points they have raised.

Edward Alexander is, of course, quite right about the damage done to Israel by the kind of unrestrained rhetoric indulged in by its own critics from within. However, is Yeshayahu Leibowitz's folly an excuse for President Tudjman? The Croatian President's agenda is quite different and his motives for rewriting history have to be seen in their own national context. Unfortunately, all over Eastern Europe, radical nationalism and anti-Semitism appear once more to have become inseparable, as they were before and during the Holocaust.

This is very well brought out in Rosanne Klass's letter about the dangerous trends in Slovakia today. The examples she cites can only inspire the gravest apprehensions about the future of the small Jewish community living there. The Jews in Slovakia are once again the target of hate-mongers in the Slovak media, and similar phenomena can be found in the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian press. Indeed, since I wrote my article we have seen further outbursts from Istvan Curka, vice president of the Magyar Democratic Forum (which dominates the governing coalition in Hungary), attacking an alleged Jewish Zionist conspiracy against his country.

It is true, as Stanley Kessel writes, that the roots of anti-Semitism are deeply planted in Central and Eastern Europe, growing out of a longstanding "teaching of contempt" propagated by Church doctrines. I think, however, that it would be misleading to reduce this to an issue between Jews and Catholics, as Rabbi Chernoff does. There were, after all, few more rabid Jew-baiters than the great German Protestant reformer, Martin Luther. This fact contributed to the susceptibility of many German Protestants to Nazi anti-Semitism during the Third Reich. Admittedly, the Protestant tradition in Britain and America also contained important philo-Semitic elements, but it is by no means immune to the anti-Jewish virus.

Nicole Segal is undoubtedly right to point to Karl Marx's anti-Jewish utterances—a subject I have addressed in some of my other writings. But it is misleading to compare Marx with Adolf Hitler in the way she does. The young Marx used the Hegelian term *"aufheben"* (to abolish) in the sense of anticipating that general social processes would lead to the disappear-

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ance of "empirical" Jews (synonymous here with capitalism) in a classless society. He never called for their "extermination" ("*Vernichtung*" or "*Ausrottung*" in German) as Hitler did, already in his earliest political speeches. The Nazis did not merely talk about the "elimination of the Sabbath Jews," but implemented the mass murder of millions of Jews, whether they were observant or not. This is an important difference. On the other hand, there is no question that anti-Semitism flourished under Stalinist regimes, which must bear some of the responsibility for the resurgence of ethnic hatreds today in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Hayek & the Conservatives

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David Glasner is to be congratulated for his account of F.A. Hayek's positive influence on American conservatism ["Hayek and the Conservatives," October 1992]. I wish, however, to dispute three of Mr. Glasner's claims.

First, although Mr. Glasner is correct to compare Hayek's "cosmopolitan and humane impulses" with those of Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Michael Oakeshott, . . . Hayek's deepest philosophical affinities are with Hume. Hayek's skepticism—particularly about rationalistic schemes for wholesale social criticism and reform—is deeply Humean, as are his conceptions of social evolution, spontaneous social "order without design," the primacy of practical reason, the historical situatedness and social constitution of the human agent, and the possibility of harmony between a respect for tradition and social and political reform.

Second, . . . though Mr. Glasner is right to dispute the widespread perception of Hayek as a libertarian, . . . I disagree with his intimation that libertarians do not realize this. In my experience, most of them do *not* think that one can derive libertarian conclusions from Hayekian premises alone. Rather, an additional, specifically *moral*, argument is required: namely, that any political interference with given demands is immoral because it involves coercion, and nothing of value can be gained through coercion. An individual can value only what he freely chooses.

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It's twenty-five years, since Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, that the city of Jerusalem has been reunited under Israeli rule. But there is still much talk, and many people insist, that solution of the "Middle East Problem" will not be possible until Israeli Jews relinquish their "occupation" and restore the holy city—or, at the very minimum, its eastern part—to its "rightful owners", the Moslem Arabs.

What are the facts?

A city of many nationalities. Before the end of the 1967 Six-Day War, during which the Israeli Defense Forces reconquered Jerusalem from the Jordanians, claims to Jerusalem being a Moslem holy city were rarely, if ever asserted. Jerusalem had always been a city in which many religions and nationalities lived side by side. It was only after the old city was back in Jewish hands that the Moslem Arabs declared their willingness to wage "jihad" (holy war) to bring the city back into Arab possession.

The notion to call Jerusalem an Islamic holy city has only come about in modern times, especially after the Arabs lost the city in the Six-Day War. It now has gained currency by dint of constant repetition. The basis for the claim is that Jerusalem does indeed contain an Islamic holy site, namely the Temple Mount (sacred to both Moslems and Jews) with its two mosques. It is the place from which Mohammed is believed to have ascended to heaven. Mohammed never set foot in Jerusalem. But aware that it was the holy city of Christians and Jews, and wishing to convert them to his new religion, he commanded his followers to build a mosque in Jerusalem. But never in Moslem history did this mosque compare in significance to the Moslem holy cities of Mecca and Medina—cities that no " infidel" may visit.

"Jerusalem has been the center of Jewish life, of Jewish yearning, and of Jewish thinking for over 3000 years."

A tenuous Moslem claim. It's on the basis of this religious tradition that the Moslems designated the entire Jewish Temple Mount to be their holy site. The Israeli Government, in its constant spirit of accommodation to Moslem sensibilities, has largely acceded to this tradition and has put the area in and around the two mosques entirely under Moslem control. But how would Christians feel if, instead of from the Temple Mount, Moslem tradition had Mohammed ascend from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and if the Moslem Arabs were to claim that site as their property? The Christian world, often ready to consent to Moslem claims against Jews and Israelis, would be greatly astonished and would certainly resist such claim. But Moslem Arab assertiveness doesn't end there. On the tenuous claim to the Temple Mount, they have construed a claim to the entire city of Jerusalem (or at the very least to its eastern part), which they have declared to be their "third holiest city". And it would be an insult to all Moslems and all Arabs to leave the city in the hands of the "infidel Jews".

Jerusalem: never an Arab capital. But the city of Jerusalem—in contrast to Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus—has never played any major role in the political and religious lives of the Moslem Arabs. It was never a political center, never a national or even a provincial or sub-provincial capital of any country since biblical times. It was the site of one Moslem holy place, but otherwise a backwater to the Arabs. The passion for Jerusalem was not discovered by the Moslem Arabs until most recent history.

Jews are not the usurpers in Jerusalem. They have been living there since the Biblical era and have been the majority population since the 19th century. Jews have holy sites in most cities of the world. But do they claim sovereignty over those cities because of it? Of course not! It would be preposterous. And the Moslem Arab claim to Jerusalem, based on the mosques on the Temple Mount, is just as untenable. Jerusalem has been the center of Jewish life, of Jewish yearning, and of Jewish thinking for over 3000 years. That is the reason that the State of Israel has rededicated the Jewish holy city to be its indivisible capital.

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When pressed, most libertarians will appeal to this essentially Kantian—and ultimately Protestant—account of the relationship of freedom and value, and the most sophisticated among them will not defend it as . . . fact but rather as a fiction which can be shown to be socially useful. . . . Libertarians are, in short, capable of appropriating Hayek's ideas in more subtle ways than Mr. Glasner makes out. . . .

Third, Mr. Glasner claims that Hayek's "thoroughgoing philosophical skepticism" is "decidedly incompatible with the religious beliefs to which a large segment of the conservative movement subscribes." As stated, this is ambiguous. Hayek's skepticism *is* incompatible with any attempt to *found* politics upon revelation. His thought, like Hume's, is as much opposed to political providentialism as it is to political rationalism. He was an advocate of specifically secular foundations for the liberal order. But even though Hayek was a professed agnostic, he was—again like Hume—deeply appreciative of the *social* value of religion within the liberal order. . . .

The real issue at stake between Hayek and today's Christian Right is not, then, whether religious values are important to the liberal order—which Hayek grants—but whether or not the Bible can serve as an external foundation for the political order. The answer consistent with Hayek's views is "no," . . . for the Christian Bible itself is situated within the very institutions it is expected to shore up. It was created by the early Christian church, not vice versa. And, contrary to some Protestants, the Bible does not interpret itself, but must be interpreted within the ever-changing matrix of traditions, institutions, and social practices. It is these that are primary. They govern Scripture, not the other way around.

This, however, is a view to which, in their various ways, Catholics, Jews, and Protestant traditionalists can readily assent. It is, moreover, tacitly assented to even by Protestant fundamentalists, who can be relied upon never to interpret the Bible in a way that is opposed to American democracy, capitalism, the modern nuclear family, or football. In the end, tradition governs all, whether we choose to recognize it or not.

GREGORY R. JOHNSON
Athens, Georgia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I congratulate David Glasner on his fine article, . . . but I think he errs in trying to . . . drive a wedge between Hayek and contemporary libertarians. According to Glasner, Hayek had "no quarrel" with social-welfare policies, "as long as such measures did not obstruct the free determination of prices by market forces." But the caveat in that sentence swallows the substantive assertion.

The heart of Hayek's defense of capitalism, after all, is that prices bear information, that any statist interference with prices spreads misleading information throughout the productive system, and in that way generates inefficiencies and distortions which tempt the state to yet another intervention, with yet more misleading effects upon prices, etc. That is how the road to serfdom is paved and traveled.

How might Mr. Glasner go about having the state provide a "basic minimum level of support" to its poorer citizens *without* helping to smooth that road? Through price supports for farmers and the housing industry? Obviously not. Through controls on food and rent? Also out. Publicly built housing and publicly managed farms, which would either supplant or compete with private firms in those fields? Direct cash payments to those deemed sufficiently needy? Payments in some form of quasi-cash, as with voucher systems or food stamps? Such payments would have to be financed either by taxation or right off the printing press, and either possibility would interfere with the pricing mechanisms of the free market. . . .

I submit that if Mr. Glasner reviews the post-New Deal social-welfarist platform plank by plank, he will find that what he calls "wholesale opposition to the New Deal" is more Hayekian than the more piecemeal (or retail?) opposition he would prefer.

There are always, of course, differences between a father and his children. But Mr. Glasner's attempt to orphan us is unavailing.

CHRISTOPHER C. FAILLE
Enfield, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David Glasner turns a justified tribute to F.A. Hayek into a hysterical tirade against pre-1945 American conservatives based on a sloppy reading of the record. Mr. Glasner portrays conservatives of that era—with the mysterious "exception" of Robert A. Taft, their main leader—as nothing but fanatical Roosevelt-haters and bigots, hostile to involvement in world affairs, and bitterly opposed to resisting fascism. All these attitudes, we are told, "gave birth to the America First movement of the 1930's," which was anti-Semitic and even sometimes sympathetic to Nazism.

Contrary to Mr. Glasner's analysis, . . . there was no uniform or continuous conservative position in favor of isolationism, which cut across the boundaries between Left and Right. This has been amply documented by historians like Manfred Jonas. American politics, until recently, were not as ideologically strait-jacketed as Mr. Glasner imagines. Conservatives generally favored intervention in World War I even more strongly than the Wilson administration, while the political Left opposed the war. Isolationist sentiment was overwhelming on both Right and Left by the 1930's. Mr. Glasner seems to be under the mistaken impression that American liberals and leftists were champing at the bit to fight Nazi Germany in the 1930's, but that was far from the case. . . .

There was no America First movement in the 1930's—it would not have been needed at a time when most Americans were isolationist. It was created by *liberal* Republicans in *1940* precisely in order to fight the change in opinions then under way. The struggle against isolationism cut across, not between, Right and Left. Much of the Left opposed intervention in the war right up to Pearl Harbor, while conservatives formed the prominent interventionist Century Group. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox were anti-New Deal Republicans, while Southern Democrats were strongly interventionist.

Claims that America First was anti-Semitic, much less pro-Nazi, are smears. Strange as it may seem, there were Jews prominent in the organization, which was supported by liberals like Chester Bowles. Norman Thomas was associated with America First and spoke at its rallies. Does Mr. Glasner think that Norman Thomas was an anti-Semite, or would have associated with anti-Semites?

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I dislike "defending" prewar isolationists, who were dangerously wrong-headed. But why this monomaniacal insistence . . . on identifying conservatism with isolationism, and insisting that the isolationists were not merely wrong, but bigots and fascists? It is hardly surprising that, as Mr. Glasner puts it, "free-flowing anger" pervades some branches of the conservative movement, in response to such abuses of the facts. . . .

ALAN J. LEVINE
Kew Gardens Hills, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Try as he might, David Glasner fails to convert the late F.A. Hayek into a neoconservative. It would take a Herculean effort—if not dyslexia—to read Hayek's voluminous work and find, as Mr. Glasner does, a "Hayekian agenda" consisting of global military activism, a rejection of "wholesale opposition to the New Deal," and a wish to focus "government efforts on helping the least well-off. . . ." I can think of many people to whom that agenda could be attributed, . . . but Hayek is not among them. Mr. Glasner's distortion of Hayek cannot be a mere innocent misreading. It sounds more like ideological axe-grinding.

Contrary to Mr. Glasner, the Hayekian agenda was primarily concerned with severely limiting government power so that the spontaneous social and market forces that emanate from the purposeful activities of free men and women may operate. For Hayek, limiting government power mostly meant restricting it to the maintenance of the rule of law, that framework of general rules within which individuals are free to do as they please.

It is at least curious that Mr. Glasner could write his article without mentioning Hayek's essay, "Why I Am Not a Conservative" (the postscript of *The Constitution of Liberty*), in which he criticized conservatives for seeking to use government power to impose their moral views on others. Readers may wish to look it up.

Mr. Glasner's fixation on Hayek's approval of guaranteed subsistence and his support of the U.S. war in Vietnam (people who knew *him cannot recall any pronouncement* on war or foreign policy) demonstrate a failure to distinguish the essential from the incidental. To be sure, Hayek accepted some social-welfare programs, which libertarians for good reason abhor. (Libertarians were always more enthusiastic about Hayek's teacher, Ludwig von Mises, who rejected all such measures.) But social security or, for that matter, the bloated national-security state does not follow from the fundamentals of Hayek's thought. Those fundamentals—including a conception of society as self-regulating, the indispensability of property rights, and a view of the competitive market as a discovery process—are what attract libertarians to Hayek.

As for Mr. Glasner's uninformed assertions about the Old Right, suffice it to say that the leaders of this disparate group were neither anti-Semites nor Nazi sympathizers. The America First Committee barred known anti-Semites like Gerald L.K. Smith from membership (see Wayne Cole's careful scholarship in *America First*). What motivated the Old Rightists was not fanaticism, but rather their individualistic and constitutional objection to Franklin D. Roosevelt's creation of ham-handed national bureaucracies that undermined private enterprise and his covert efforts to involve the United States in war while telling the American people the nation would remain at peace. The Old Right understood that Roosevelt had fundamentally changed America, the constitutional republic.

The fallacy of Mr. Glasner's article becomes clear when one considers that the world view held by the leaders and inspirations of the Old Right—H.L. Mencken, Albert Jay Nock, Robert A. Taft, Felix Morley, John T. Flynn, Frank Chodorov—and the world view expressed in Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* look remarkably alike.

SHELDON L. RICHMAN
Woodbridge, Virginia

DAVID GLASNER writes:

I accept the first two points in Gregory Johnson's letter, though with some puzzlement at his belief that they conflict with anything I wrote. Concerning his third point, I will grant that instead of writing that Hayek's philosophical skepticism was "decidedly incompatible with the religious beliefs to which

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a large segment of the conservative movement subscribes," I ought to have written that his skepticism was "decidedly uncongenial to the religious sensibilities of a large segment of the conservative movement."

Christopher C. Faille is most kind to praise my article generously despite his disagreement with a fundamental point. On that point, I can say only that his quarrel about it is not just with me but with Hayek, whose support for many government programs financed out of general tax revenues was explicit and unambiguous. Hayek's point about the role of prices is that price adjustments implicitly communicate information to people about the availability of, and the demands for, resources, thereby inducing them mutually to adjust their activities so that their separate plans can be simultaneously realized. As long as price adjustment is not blocked by coercive restraints, prices, reflecting the impact of both taxes and government services financed by those taxes, can still perform this vital function. The wonder of the price system is that its capacity to perform this function is not undermined by the provision of various government services, so long as the government does not prevent people from voluntarily agreeing on the prices at which they will exchange goods and services.

Alan J. Levine accuses me of distorting the historical record of prewar conservatism, isolationism, and the America First movement. I did not intend to issue a blanket indictment of all prewar conservatives, isolationists, or America Firsters as anti-Semites and bigots. My mention of Senator Taft was thus not at all mysterious, but an acknowledgment that the Old Right did include individuals of the highest character who were untainted by either bigotry or the toleration of bigotry. And far from viewing American politics of that period as ideologically strait-jacketed, I characterized what passed for conservatism in the era as lacking sufficient coherence to be summarized by any clear set of principles. Nor can I detect even the hint of a suggestion in my article that there were no liberal isolationists, or that all liberals opposed Hitler.

I did not try to write a complete intellectual history of the period, but rather tried to explain Hayek's crucial contribution in helping to transmute the isolationism, protectionism, and reaction of American conservatism into support for internationalism, responsible anti-Communism, and free trade. My aim was not to condemn the Old Right for its sins, but to show how Hayek allowed conservatives to escape from the ideological and programmatic dead end into which the isolationist, protectionist, and nativist tendencies of the Old Right had led them. On the other hand, I do condemn those, like Patrick J. Buchanan, who continue, even with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, to hold up the Old Right as a model for the future of conservatism.

Whatever Sheldon L. Richman may think of my motives, I had no desire, and certainly made no attempt, to convert Hayek into a neoconservative. I should have thought that this would have been clear from the five direct or indirect references I made to Hayek's *liberalism* (in the still honorable European or 19th-century sense of that sadly abused term). My failure to mention Hayek's wonderful essay, "Why I Am Not a Conservative," is therefore not curious in the least, nor does it derive from ulterior, and even sinister, motives ("Glasner's distortion of Hayek cannot be a mere innocent misreading").

Actually, the misreading is all by Mr. Richman, beginning with his misreading of my article. My characterization of the agenda of postwar American conservatism as Hayekian does not mean that I attributed this agenda to Hayek any more than calling a set of economic policies Keynesian means that one is attributing those policies to Keynes. The adjective "Hayekian" was calculated to underscore an affinity between the agenda I described and Hayek's general outlook, in ironic contrast to the outright opposition of the Old Right to that agenda.

And Mr. Richman's description of "the Hayekian agenda" shows that he has misread that, too. For Hayek, "limiting government power" categorically did not mean "restricting it to the maintenance of the rule of law"—a confusion which he repeatedly and explicitly warned against. As he wrote in *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*:

> Far from advocating such a "minimal state," we find it unquestionable that in an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons cannot be provided, or cannot be provided adequately by the market.

Readers may wish to look up the entire chapter ("The Public Sector and the Private Sector") from which this passage is quoted and decide for themselves whether support for some sort of government-sponsored social-security measures follows "from the fundamentals of Hayek's thought." What "limiting government power" meant to Hayek was not, as it means to libertarians like Mr. Richman, "restricting it to the maintenance of the rule of law," but rather subjecting it to the rule of law and requiring that, in performing its service functions, government abide by the same rules that uniformly constrain everyone else.

It is hardly a fixation of mine to note differences between Hayek and libertarians that Mr. Richman himself, however grudgingly, cannot help acknowledging. The difference between us is that it pleases Mr. Richman to think that Hayek's views on social-welfare spending were somehow aberrational, whereas I respect Hayek enough to take him seriously when he writes (in *The Constitution of Liberty*) that

> though a few theorists have demanded that the activities of government should be limited to the maintenance of law and order, such a stand cannot be justified by the principle of liberty. Only the *coercive* measures of government need be strictly limited. [Emphasis added.]

Libertarians do, indeed, abhor such views, but they continue to embrace Hayek (albeit somewhat gingerly) as one of their own, preferring to ignore his heresies or to dismiss them as "incidental."

Mr. Richman intimates a denial, without actually making one, of Hayek's support for postwar anti-Communist foreign policy, which he pejoratively characterizes as a "bloated national-security state." I know for a fact that Hayek supported the U.S. war in Vietnam, because he told me so in the first talk I ever had with him, on the Friday afternoon before the 1968 election when I was an undergraduate at UCLA and he was a

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WHAT BEING JEWISH MEANS TO ME

Joseph I. Lieberman
U.S. Senator
Connecticut

To me, being Jewish means having help in answering life's most fundamental questions, such as, "How did I come to this place?" and, "Now that I am here, how should I live?"

My faith, which has anchored my life, begins with a joyful gratitude that there is a God who created the universe and then, because He continued to care for what He created, gave us laws and values to order and improve our lives. God also gave us a purpose and a destiny--to do justice and to protect, indeed to perfect, the human community and natural environment. In trying to live according to these principles, I am helped by daily prayer and religious rituals such as observance of the Sabbath--a time to stop and appreciate all that God has given us. I also find strength and humility in being linked to something so much larger and longer-lasting than myself.

To me, being Jewish also means the joy of being part of a unique ethnic culture and reveling in its history and humor, its language and literature, its music and moods, its festivals and foods.

Being Jewish in America also means feeling a special love for this country, which has provided such unprecedented freedom and opportunity to the millions who have come and lived here. My parents raised me to believe that I did not have to mute my religious faith or ethnic identity to be a good American, that, on the contrary, America invites all its people to be what they are and believe what they wish. In truth, it is from our individual diversity and shared faith in God that we Americans draw our greatest strength and hope.

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visiting professor in the philosophy department. But though Hayek did not routinely make public pronouncements about foreign policy, it was never a secret among libertarians that he was a dedicated cold warrior. People who knew him should at least remember that much.

But Hayek was less of a cold warrior than that libertarian paragon Ludwig von Mises, who, with characteristic extremism, served on the advisory board of the John Birch Society. The John Birch Society! So far were Hayek and Mises from sharing Mr. Richman's disdain for the "bloated national-security state" that they both justified military conscription as compatible with individual liberty. And Mises, again with characteristic extremism, called anyone "who in our age opposes armaments and conscription . . . an abettor of those aiming at the enslavement of all."

There is at least one public pronouncement that Hayek did make on foreign policy which readers may want to look up. It was a letter to the editor of the *London Times* (January 12, 1980), deploring the failure of the United States government to have sent an ultimatum to the Iranian government saying that unless all the hostages were freed within 48 hours "bombs would be falling at an increasing rate at the seat of the Iranian government." Hayek insisted that in the long run lives would have been saved and peace promoted

> if a government with the power to punish international evildoers had promptly done so. Is it not yet understood that the new international organizations do not yet possess this indispensable power?

The case for the role of the U.S. as the world's policeman has rarely been stated more emphatically.

Mr. Richman asks us to consider the similarity between the world view of leaders and inspirations of the Old Right and the world view Hayek expressed in *The Road to Serfdom*. I am less impressed by the similarity than he. In fact, the world view Hayek, writing in the early 1940's, expressed in *The Road to Serfdom* presupposed unqualified support for the struggle against Hitler and for the effort to wipe out, once and for all, the Nazi menace to Western civilization. That was not a view uniformly or enthusiastically shared by the leaders and inspirations of the Old Right, not because they were anti-Semites or Nazi sympathizers, but because they were unwavering isolationists. And since Hayek regarded Communism as no less a threat to civilization than Nazism, he supported the struggle against Communism as fervently as he did the war against Hitler. What is so troubling about many libertarians is that in their world view (adopted from the Old Right) neither World War II nor the cold war was justified or justifiable.

Israel Watch

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Reading Ruth R. Wisse's article, "The Might and the Right" [September 1992], one may find understanding for the author's mournful mood over Likud's loss in the Israeli elections, but not for her attempts to downplay Labor's victory by characterizing it as a "relatively slight shift"; for her denunciation of the media for its outpouring of optimism; or for her efforts to settle scores with Arthur Hertzberg—as if he single-handedly caused the defeat of Likud.

Why not engage in "Israel-watching" in a fairer and more constructive manner? . . . Why not admit that only very few people (even among the most optimistic) believe in "peace next week"? Why try to put a damper on the hopes for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict? . . .

Mrs. Wisse states that . . . Yitzhak Rabin's policy of "trading land for peace" poses an increased threat to Israel's security. Since, in all fairness, such fears are causing concern to many, including myself, and because I think we should pay attention to what private and knowledgeable Israelis have to say, I am glad to cite the opinions of two such men.

The first is Avraham Shalom, who served as head of Shin Bet, Israel's security agency, under Begin, Peres, and Shamir. In an interview in *Maariv* (September 25, 1992), Shalom was quoted as saying, apropos of the territories, that . . . "One people cannot keep another people under occupation for a long time. . . ."

Elsewhere in the same interview, Shalom said he thought the planning of settlements in 1968 for the establishment of a lasting presence in the occupied territories would not stand the test of reality in the long run. The settlements weren't worth it, because they would create a new Bosnia.

This is not a dovish liberal speaking, . . . but a sober and realistic man whose loyalty and commitment to Israel's security cannot be questioned.

The second is Giora Zorea, retired colonel of the Israel Defense Forces, who said in an interview in *Maariv* (September 11, 1992):

> I . . . think that in negotiations it is possible to give up territories, also on the Golan Heights. I shall support a settlement which will ensure [Israeli] control over the sources of the Jordan, the Banias, and Hatzboni; one which will leave us an intelligence position on Mt. Hermon; one which will remove the Syrian army east of the Damascus hub; and one which will leave an American force as a divider between the two states and also [ensure] the evacuation of the Syrian forces from Lebanon. . . . The settlements on the Golan are not important to me if such an agreement will give us 30 years of quiet with Syria. . . .

I should note that Giora Zorea lost a brother and two sons in combat in the course of the Arab-Israeli wars.

It seems to me that Mrs. Wisse, from her distant watching post in North America, disregards the fact that the Israelis are tired after 45 years of war, including 25 years of occupation, 5 years of *intifada*, and also the bloody, restless years from 1929-39, which I so well remember. Can you blame them for yearning for a respite?

Will this fact perhaps help Mrs. Wisse find the answer to her own question about the causes that have reshaped Israel into a nation "divided between peace-loving progressives and land-hungry fanatics"?

While expressing serious doubts about Rabin's chances to succeed in the peace negotiations, she raises the danger that the Arabs may view Israel's willingness to negotiate as a weakness. But isn't it true that the Arabs' willingness to negotiate is also a sign of their own weakness? Doesn't Mrs. Wisse agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam Hussein contributed to the weakening of the Arabs' position? And that they know it?

History shows that peace between belligerent parties can be

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achieved only when both sides are weakened and when they realize they can gain more by peace than by war. . . .

Finally, I would beg Mrs. Wisse respectfully to give the Israeli citizen more credit. He may be not only a brave fighter but also an intelligent and wise voter. And wouldn't it be better to watch him than to watch *over* him?

JACOB BENJAMINI
Mt. Laurel, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Sometimes one word offers a key to understanding an entire article. In the case of Ruth R. Wisse's "The Might and the Right," that word is "wealthy," as in her description of Arthur Hertzberg as "rabbi for 40 years of a wealthy Conservative congregation. . . ." What does the socioeconomic level of Hertzberg's former congregation in suburban New Jersey have to do with an evaluation of his writings on American Jews and Israel during the Likud years? The answer is: nothing—but the gratuitous use of the word "wealthy" suggests the polemical quality of Mrs. Wisse's critique.

However, by the end of the polemic we see that the real target is not Arthur Hertzberg, . . . but the newly elected Yitzhak Rabin. In Mrs. Wisse's words:

> It . . . remains to be seen whether Labor's policy of "trading land for peace" will actually bring peace or make Israel more vulnerable to another attack. But there can be no question that this policy will be perceived by the Arabs not as a resurrection of Jewish moral power, but as a sign of growing Israeli political weakness.

If there is anything about which "there can be no question," it is that the Arabs have long since learned to respect the strength of the man who led the Israel Defense Forces during the Six-Day War, negotiated with Egypt and Syria forcefully as Prime Minister in the mid-1970's, and served as Minister of Defense in the Likud-led national-unity government during the *intifada*. . . . Surely the Arabs will see not weakness but strength in a policy that accords priority to absorbing Jewish immigrants and enhancing the quality of life of Israel's citizens. In that respect, Rabin and his Labor colleagues are following in the footsteps of an Israeli leader even greater than Menachem Begin. It was the founding Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, who always emphasized the advantage of consolidating Jewish sovereignty in whatever part of the land of Israel was actually available. The renewal of that tradition by the Rabin government is a sign to friends and foes alike of both wisdom and strength.

DANIEL MANN
Bethesda, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . When you read Arthur Hertzberg's remark, cited in Ruth R. Wisse's article, that the Six-Day War was bad for Israel, that is indeed absurd. But when you read Mrs. Wisse's own statement that Begin was "by all accounts the most democratic and law-respecting of all Israeli leaders to date," that too is absurd. Reading both these statements, one aches for some sort of middle ground between the two.

Begin and Shamir were hardliners, of course. But the middle ground between Rabbi Hertzberg and Mrs. Wisse may be discerned when one recalls the impact that Ariel Sharon (who is not mentioned in the article) had on both of them. Their relatively moderate stance was skewed by the impact of Sharonism. . . . Now freed of this burden, the Rabin government can steer a course that will, I hope, meet with approval from both Rabbi Hertzberg and Mrs. Wisse.

[Rabbi] SAMUEL M. SILVER
Temple Sinai
Delray Beach, Florida

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Ruth R. Wisse is absolutely right to criticize those Jews who have joined Israel's enemies in "demonizing" Likud over the last fifteen years. . . .

In the 80's, we saw groups of liberals posing as other things: liberals posed as doctors in Physicians for Social Responsibility; liberals posed as lawyers in the American Bar Association. That liberals should now pose as Jews is perhaps not at all surprising, but to me it is still a disappointment.

STEVEN A. FALK
St. Petersburg, Florida

"They couldn't believe an American actually spoke their language."



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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Amen to Ruth R. Wisse's "The Might and the Right." It is worth noting some further implications of her remarks. Jewish attacks against Israel, against military victory, against Likud, even against Elie Wiesel, spring *at best* from an Enlightenment universalism . . . which addresses a virtuous "humanity at large" and credits even vicious enemies with reasonableness. . . .

This is the *best* possible explanation, and maybe it is the actual motive in some very rare instances. But for the most part this kind of moralism has other sources and other agendas. Jews who espouse universal reason and abstract righteousness do not live in the world as unencumbered intelligences. They know hunger and competition, and are in fact not at all willing to take the worldly risks of aspiring to spiritual purity. Their moralism, their high-mindedness, their reason, their mawkish sentimentalism, are a charade, concealing a frightened search for personal safety behind a mask of disembodied virtue.

In attacking Jewish militancy and particularism, they ingratiate themselves with prevailing local anti-Semitism and are only trying to soften its impact upon themselves. They are fighting not . . . for the high-minded principles they seem to espouse but for their own personal safety and advancement.

The evidence is most conspicuous in academia where the ambience of "learning" generates the deepest hypocrisy. Here, liberal academics can profess the high road, while elsewhere, conservative Jews of cruder bent take risks, demonstrate, fight, build homes on the West Bank, and vent primitive protective group feelings in unsubtle language and action.

But meanwhile those "principled," leftist, PLO-sympathizing, academic Jewish radicals are in fact marking out, under the guise of reason and universalism, their personal niches of safety in milieus which would not take kindly to their militant identity as Jews.

MORRIS GROSSMAN
Fairfield, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . When Jews complained that Jesse Jackson failed to rebuke black anti-Semites, Arthur Hertzberg came to Jackson's rescue.

"I don't expect him to make a speech denouncing Sister Souljah any more than I would denounce those who would push the Arabs off the West Bank," Hertzberg said in the *Village Voice*. "I realize we are both politically constrained."

But as Ruth R. Wisse documents in her article, Hertzberg had no trouble censuring Meir Kahane's Kach party, the religious-Zionist Gush Emunim movement, the right-wing Tsomet party, and Ariel Sharon. . . .

DANIEL L. LEVIN
Whiting, Indiana

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In her article, Ruth R. Wisse refers to a letter that Arthur Hertzberg wrote in 1987 to Elie Wiesel, in which he invoked the memory of the Holocaust as one of the reasons why Jewish leaders like Wiesel should publicly attack the Israeli government.

Hertzberg's misuse of the Holocaust has gone even further than that. At a luncheon sponsored by the (now-defunct) magazine *Present Tense* in 1989, Hertzberg compared the Palestinian Arabs to the Jewish Holocaust survivors who lived in the Displaced Persons camps. "In his own DP camp, the Palestinian, too, is a friendless stranger," Hertzberg declared, ignoring the fact that, far from being "friendless," the Palestinian Arabs have enjoyed almost unlimited military support from the former Soviet Union and the Arab states, and generous financial support from the Gulf sheikdoms, not to mention considerable political support from the U.S. State Department.

That a Jewish historian such as Hertzberg would abuse the Holocaust in this manner is sad evidence that nothing is sacred when a politically partisan academic goes looking for verbal ammunition to use against his assorted targets.

HERBERT ZWEIBON
New York City

RUTH R. WISSE writes:

This magazine initiated its "Israel Watch" department because the Arab war against Israel continues strong, and gathers political strength on this continent. I discussed Arthur Hertzberg's book, *Jewish Polemics*, in that context because I believe that his was one of the most prominent voices from within the American Jewish establishment to join in discrediting the democratically-elected government of Israel as morally unfit to rule. (His congregation's wealth, which is for me a neutral moral category, is of obvious significance—*pace* Daniel Mann—in defining his prominence as an American Jewish leader.) His sustained assault against an Israeli party at a time when Arab anti-Israel propaganda was growing increasingly sophisticated and damaging helped to secure the Arab war against the Jews by suggesting that one of Israel's two main parties was responsible for it. Not I, but Hertzberg, characterized Israel as a nation divided between peace-loving progressives and land-hungry fanatics, and that characterization, repeated by Jacob Benjamini as if it were true, discredits Israeli democracy and restricts Israel's already minimal political options. I have given the Israeli citizen credit all along. That is precisely where Arthur Hertzberg and I differ.

Mr. Benjamini attributes to me the "mournfulness" that permeates his own reflections. Of course Israelis are battle-weary, and one would do anything within one's powers to grant them the unexceptional political status they deserve. But until Mr. Benjamini and I find a way of convincing the Arabs to trade the ideal of conquest for the ideal of mutual toleration, and to develop a democratic politics of accountability within their own states, we are duty bound to watch over Israel, not because we are Jews but because we are moral beings.

Daniel Mann reads hidden intentions into my blunt words. I said exactly what I meant. Prime Minister Rabin is entitled to give away anything he likes as long as the citizens of Israel approve his offerings. But since Arab rulers place the highest value on land, they are bound to see weakness in this policy. If, as Mr. Mann believes, the Arabs admired a policy that accords priority to absorbing immigrants and enhancing the lives of citizens, they would express these values in their own states. Whatever Israel's policies, let us pray that they are based on a realistic appraisal of Arab society, not on Mr. Mann's wishful fantasies.

While grateful for the support of my other correspondents, and for their amplification of my remarks, I do not wish to expand my criticism of Arthur Hertzberg's

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book into a blanket condemnation of him. The worst consequence of his attempt to discredit one side of the Israeli political system is that it draws Jewish polemics inward—substituting a Jewish enemy for the actual threat. In exposing the moral and intellectual failings of Hertzberg's arguments, one does not want to fall into the same trap. Had Arab rulers made their peace with Israel, his polemics would not be so harmful.

The characterization of Begin, a lawyer by training, as the most law-respecting of Israeli leaders I first heard from one of Israel's foremost—and, incidentally, very dovish—professors of law. Rabbi Samuel M. Silver's political prejudice may be obscuring his historical judgment.

Japanese Americans & Internment

To the Editor of Commentary:

James W. Muller's review of *The Chairman*, Kai Bird's biography of John J. McCloy [Books in Review, September 1992], is sadly equivocal concerning the decision to intern Japanese Americans living on the West coast.

After citing Bird's own judgment that internment was "a constitutional travesty," Muller states that ". . . it would be foolish to suppose that the Constitution requires the government to turn a blind eye to the requirements of national security." This is backward: the requirements of national security do *not* require that the government turn a blind eye to the Constitution.

Mr. Muller acknowledges that, in hindsight, ". . . fears of a Japanese-American fifth column in California were groundless," yet he contends that, in 1942, ". . . disloyalty on the part of Japanese Americans could not be safely ruled out." In fact, the State Department's Munson Report, completed one month before Pearl Harbor, concluded that Japanese Americans posed no threat to national security. Even J. Edgar Hoover opposed internment. And 150,000 Japanese Americans in Hawaii were not interned (lest the local economy collapse).

Mr. Muller goes on: "It is fairer to criticize the internment in detail than in principle." This approaches saying that the Holocaust was not such a bad idea, it was just poorly administered. As for the detail: over 100,000 Americans, whose only offense was their Japanese ancestry, were forced from their homes and businesses (at a loss, in 1942 dollars, of $500 million). They were sent to remote camps, where an entire family lived in a single room, most of them for the duration of the war. Notwithstanding, the percentage of Japanese Americans who served in the United States Army in World War II was higher than that of any other racial group; most notably, more than 8,000 served with the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, one of the most decorated American combat units of the war. These men bled and died in Italy, while their families were imprisoned behind barbed wire. The systematic denial of constitutional and human rights warrants more than criticism; it demands condemnation.

Mr. Muller concludes: "But as for the internment itself, if it was a mistake, it was an excusable one. Even the American Civil Liberties Union forbore to criticize it at the time." Executive Order 9066 was signed by Roosevelt, executed with a vengeance by Earl Warren, then governor of California, and not opposed by the ACLU (or by Henry Stimson, Hugo Black, Tom Clark, Milton Eisenhower, and Abe Fortas); none of this mitigates what Sam Ervin called "the most disgraceful episode in American history." It was indeed a mistake and inexcusable, however understandable in an atmosphere of wartime hysteria and racism. McCloy's many accomplishments speak for themselves. But his career was indelibly stained. Mr. Muller's comments, to the extent that they are intended as a defense, serve as a further indictment.

Stuart G. Barr
Denver, Colorado

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . In James W. Muller's review, John J. McCloy is reported as saying that the Constitution hardly requires the government to turn a blind eye to the requirements of national security. McCloy was quite correct. The government has published nine volumes revealing the danger to our national security that came to light when the MAGIC codes between Japan and

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its embassies here were broken. The codes revealed widespread subversion among the Japanese on the West coast. In the hearings on Public Law (PL) 100-383, this extensive information was ignored. On one occasion a dead body was sent back to Japan and in the coffin the FBI found detailed information regarding our points of military and industrial interest on the West Coast.

Mr. Muller writes that it now appears in retrospect that the fears of a Japanese-American fifth column were groundless. This is hardly the case. Our West Coast had been bombed by Japanese submarines, Pearl Harbor had been, in effect, destroyed, the Japanese had successfully invaded the Aleutian Islands. . . . Furthermore, Japanese Americans who had been born in this country at that time were automatically registered as citizens in Japan. Apparently Japan had long-range aims for a fifth column in the U.S.

Public Law 100-383 grants redress and $20,000 each to those Japanese who were relocated and interned, and they also received an apology from our Attorney General "on bended knees." Germans and Italians were also interned, but no reparations have been offered to them. . . . It should be borne in mind that the Japanese were relocated from only four states on the West Coast and could move freely among the 44 others. Some 6,300 Japanese Americans went to colleges outside the four-state area. . . .

Currently there is a case in court challenging the constitutionality of PL 100-383, but it may be too late to retrieve the money: some $1.2 billion already distributed, with an additional $250 million being sought currently in Congress.

These figures do not include the cost incurred by the California State legislature when it ordered that all textbooks dealing with the period portray the relocation of Japanese Americans as motivated by racism and lack of political courage on the part of our government. This is a very serious charge, and especially ironic in light of the fact that Japan today is one of the world's most racist societies, one which does not permit naturalization for anyone who is not Japanese, including even Koreans who have lived there for generations. . . .

Our action toward Japanese Americans living on the West Coast was no less necessary than recruiting an army to fight against Germany, Italy, and Japan. If nothing else, the Japanese who were relocated at least had their families with them, were under no military supervision, and had the highest birth rate in the U.S. at that time. In England, by contrast, *all* Germans, including German Jewish refugees, were interned, and separated from their families. . . .

The present generation of young radical Japanese saw an opportunity to get on the bandwagon, . . . playing on congressional guilt where minorities are concerned. . . .

JEROME GREENBLATT
Laguna Hills, California

JAMES W. MULLER writes:

The letters of Stuart G. Barr and Jerome Greenblatt, with their diametrically opposed judgments on the wartime internment of Japanese Americans (and both written, moreover, half a century after the event), offer a striking illustration of the uncertainties that faced officials like John J. McCloy in 1942. Mr. Barr faults American officials for not having harkened to Curtis B. Munson's paper, which offered reassurance about the loyalty of most Japanese Americans. Yet, as Kai Bird makes clear, that paper was only one of their sources of information; and in fact even Munson made worrisome reference to some who might provide "information on troop, supply, and ship movements" to imperial agents and a few who would "tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves." That the internment was decided upon, as Mr. Barr says, "in an atmosphere of wartime hysteria and racism" (to which he might have added justifiable apprehension), does not make it a hysterical or racist decision. It was an interesting case of Southern amnesia, if not mere puffery, on Senator Sam Ervin's part to call the internment "the most disgraceful episode in American history." Likewise, Mr. Barr betrays a tinge of hysteria, and a startling lack of political judgment and sense of proportion, in suggesting that it might be likened to the Holocaust. He has a blind eye for the necessity that decent statesmen sometimes face in emergencies of favoring the safety of the whole nation over the rights of individuals, which makes him overly angry about a decision that was an honest mistake.

Mr. Greenblatt's eyes are wide open to the danger of Japanese subversion—too wide open. Though he is right to remind us that the Japanese occupied the Aleutian Islands and bombed Pearl Harbor, he does not demonstrate that Japanese Americans contributed to those attacks; and the evidence he offers attests more to the imperial government's hopes for a fifth column than to actual subversion by Japanese Americans. In his stubborn defense of the internment, he follows McCloy, who never acknowledged, even in hindsight, that it had been a mistake or that the United States ought to pay compensation to its victims. He goes beyond McCloy, however, in impugning the motives of the Japanese Americans who sought vindication by Congress, and in denouncing racism in Japan. While Mr. Barr seems to forget that there was a war on in 1942, Mr. Greenblatt seems to forget that it ended in 1945.

Anti-Catholicism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In the October 1992 issue, a number of letter writers responding to George Weigel's "The New Anti-Catholicism" [June 1992], appear eager to downplay the phenomenon itself as part of American history. Indeed, they seem to argue that to the extent to which anti-Catholicism has existed in America, Catholics have deserved it, because of what was done to Jews by Catholics over the course of European history.

With regard to the former point, I would invite them to revisit the question. In actual fact, American Catholic and American Jewish immigrant experiences have been quite similar in this country, beginning with disenfranchisement in the colonial period and continuing through social, educational, and economic discrimination right up to the present. If anything, Catholics have borne the brunt more often of physical attacks (in at least one case a virtual pogrom), perhaps only because of their larger numbers.

Secondly, I would invite readers to contemplate the ethical implications of the collective-guilt thesis embedded in these letters. The American Catholic community, es-

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pecially a quarter-century after the Second Vatican Council, deserves to be looked at on its own merits, as do contemporary Catholic-Jewish relations in this country. One can disagree with George Weigel, I believe, without denigrating his faith.

EUGENE J. FISHER
Director for Catholic-Jewish Relations
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

COMMENTARY's letters section provides an extraordinary forum for discussion and debate. I was, therefore, disappointed that George Weigel was so offended by the tone of some of his interlocutors' comments that he missed the opportunity to address their substance: that American anti-Catholicism represents a political response to the Church's political activism, and so cannot be dismissed as mere religious or social prejudice.

Mr. Weigel's rather startling reference to "the centrality of the notions of election and chosenness to Jewish self-understanding" suggests that he simply overlooks this distinction between the public and private dimensions of religious belief. A more appropriate comparison, for Mr. Weigel's case, is surely the role of Zionism in American political debate: less central than the Church's influence on the abortion question, but similarly broadly resented.

The Jewish conception of "chosenness" in fact works in the opposite direction, restraining private religious belief—however fervently held—from engendering political activity. To adopt a structural anthropological perspective, the idea that the Jewish people has been "chosen" by God is the *only* structural alternative to the obligation of evangelical action, for a religion which claims to be more than a ritual of tribal identity. Judaism defines itself as a universalist religion, whose commandments are morally (and not just socially) binding. Jews are nevertheless *not* required to impose God's commandments on other people; it is for God to choose how and where to give His law.

This core, anti-activist premise of Judaism lends itself to tendentious misconstruction (apparently by Mr. Weigel also) arising, perhaps, from the importation of an anachronistic social-hierarchical context. To be "chosen" seems to suggest the sort of divine election claimed by kings and aristocrats in the European tradition. A more accurate analogy would be the Puritan social context: to be chosen by God is to be given no special privilege but that of obeying His law. It is this understanding of the essentially mysterious relation of God and man which has preserved Judaism from the Church's generalized political activism, as well as from the evangelistic imperative to which some of Mr. Weigel's respondents object.

CLARE WOLFOWITZ
Chevy Chase, Maryland

GEORGE WEIGEL writes:

In her thoughtful and provocative letter, Clare Wolfowitz seems to suggest that the Jewish concept of "chosenness" carries with it no public consequences. At the risk of presumption, may I say that this strikes me as not altogether satisfactory.

It is true that the concepts of "election" and "chosenness" have not been generally understood by Jews to require public proselytizing, in the sense of active recruitment leading to conversion. On the other hand, I do not think it is quite right to imply that Jewish religious belief is a merely private matter. Jewish Americans make all sorts of public moral arguments based on what they understand to be the demands of ethical monotheism—and more power to them for doing so. Furthermore, democratic political activity that draws on explicitly Christian warrants for its moral foundations should not be understood as "proselytizing" or "evangelism," but rather as—well, as political activity. That was certainly Martin Luther King's understanding of what he was doing, as it was Abraham Joshua Heschel's sense of what King was doing: which, among other things, helps us understand the character of Heschel's friendship with and support for King in the cause of securing basic civil rights for black Americans.

Moreover, there is another point of tangency between Jewish and Christian understandings of the relationship between personal religious conviction and the public realm: both Jewish and Christian ethicists have long claimed that revelation gives a distinctive insight into the natural law—the universal moral law, if you will—and its public applications. We do not abandon our Jewishness or our Christianity when we enter the public square; rather, we can (or should) celebrate the moral insight that can be brought into complex issues of the common good by people of religious conviction—even as we defend the principle that the state has no business declaring one or another religious conviction its favored child.

Thus the matter of the "public and private dimensions of religious belief" remains a tangled business, for Jews as well as Christians. Moreover, if I understand Mrs. Wolfowitz correctly, she seems to argue that the current rash of anti-Catholic agitation is somehow related to untoward forms of ecclesiastical politicking. I am not persuaded. Leaving aside the question of precisely how bishops making public moral arguments constitutes "political activity" in any invidious (or undemocratic) sense, I find it hard to believe that the two most recent anti-Catholic outrages—Sinead O'Connor's shredding of a portrait of Pope John Paul II on *Saturday Night Live*, and HMV's use of a mock "confessional" as part of its advertising blitz on behalf of Madonna's "book," *Sex*—have all that much to do with the Catholic Church's position on the moral issues engaged by certain contentious questions of public policy. They are, rather, assaults on the very notion of a moral order. Such exercises in debonair nihilism ought to be profoundly troubling to anyone who cares about democracy, much less democratic civility.

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

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Why the Democrats Finally Won

Joshua Muravchik

THE Democrats have finally recaptured the White House, led by a fresh ticket that distanced itself from conventional liberalism, and abetted by George Bush and, in a sense, Mikhail Gorbachev.

"The economy, stupid," read a famous sign in the Clinton/Gore headquarters in Little Rock, and exit polls ultimately confirmed that the economy was by far the leading issue on the minds of voters. Forty-three percent of those asked to name one or two issues that "mattered most" in deciding their vote cited the economy or jobs; of these voters, only one-quarter wanted to reelect the President, the same number as preferred the independent candidate H. Ross Perot, while fully half of them voted for Bill Clinton.*

In part George Bush was just unlucky. Most economists know very well what few voters want to hear—that a President's control over the vagaries of the business cycle is very limited. In effect this is what Bush said in his first response to the recession that began in mid-1990, when he assured Americans that prosperity would return before long in the natural course of things. By the usual definition, the recession did end at some point in 1991, but no clear recovery ensued and Bush's early reassurances came back to haunt him, reinforcing his image as a patrician out of touch with the woes of the common man.

As the economy's sputterings wore out the patience of the electorate, Bush cast about for palliatives to match those being offered by the Democrats. All he could come up with, however, were either Democratic-type programs like public works (for that, who needs Republicans?) or gimmicks. The first gimmick, announced in the State of the Union address last January, was to instruct the Internal Revenue Service to withhold less in income tax from each earner's pay check, recouping the difference through a higher tax bill at the end of the year. Since taxpayers have a lot of freedom to adjust their own withholding rates through the W-4 form that every wage earner must fill out, and since most people dislike owing the IRS at the end of the year, this device probably engendered more annoyance than economic stimulus.

The second gimmick, announced in Bush's acceptance speech at the Republican national convention, was aimed not at the recession but at its cognate—the deficit. Bush said that he wanted taxpayers to be given the right to earmark 10 percent of their tax payment for reduction of the national debt. But the 10 percent would have to be drawn from other expenditures, and unless specific cuts were enacted in defense or Social Security or Medicare or the like—something neither the Democratic Congress nor Bush himself had yet proposed—these programs would have to be made whole by new borrowing. We would, in short, be going in a circle.†

FOR Bush, the more logical response to the recession—from a political if not an economic point of view—would have been a tax cut, for that is what Republicans can offer convincingly, just as the Democrats' forte is to provide government services. And indeed, Jack Kemp, Newt Gingrich, and several Republican "supply-siders" urged Bush to follow just such a course. But Bush resisted this advice right up until the Republican convention where he promised

> to further reduce taxes across the board, provided we pay for these cuts with specific spending reductions that I consider appropriate, so that we do not increase the deficit.

This pledge was so qualified and vague that it had no impact.

Probably Bush deemed the supply-side advice to be unsound economically, but in any event it could not have worked politically for *him* so soon after he had broken his famous "no-new-taxes" pledge. Had Bush executed a second about-face

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* All my citations of exit polls refer to those sponsored jointly by ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN. Their results may be subject to some revision in the final retabulation.

† If the idea were not so silly, it would have been pernicious. If citizens are allowed to earmark tax payments for debt reduction, why not for other good causes? And why not allow them to withhold their dollars from what they find offensive—armaments, say, or abortions? Down this path lies the end of representative government.

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on taxes, he would have looked not like a leader with a plan for recovery but like a politician who could not decide in which direction to go.

The tax-pledge reversal did not hurt Bush only by limiting his economic options. After all, the original declaration, "Read my lips: no new taxes," was more than a policy pronouncement. The most memorable line of his 1988 campaign, it was designed to dispel his image both as a "wimp" and as one who held no deep convictions. The "wimp" charge was forever laid to rest by Bush's strong leadership against Iraqi aggression, but the idea of him as a man without convictions was confirmed with a vengeance when he reneged on his tax commitment. There was some unfairness here, since Bush did exhibit strong conviction in a few areas. He was steadfast in his pro-life position on abortion, and in his solicitude for China's reform Communists whom he had come to know during his brief stint as ambassador there. But rather than adding up to a coherent philosophy or sense of direction, these constituted a pastiche.

On other matters his positions seemed more muddled. For example, he vetoed one civil-rights bill, calling it a "quota bill," and then signed another, claiming it was not a "quota bill." But the real issue was not so much quotas—fixed numerical requirements—as it was racial (and other such) preferences, and both bills had that in common. According to one "administration official" quoted anonymously in the *Washington Post*, Bush signed the second bill not because it differed significantly from the first, but "because of the after-effects of the [Clarence] Thomas hearings."

Bush rose to his greatest moment in defeating Saddam Hussein, for which the world will long remain in his debt, but we know now that he himself had fed this monster. His justification was that he had been trying to win Saddam over. Other things being equal, it is always desirable to make new friends, but Saddam was a tyrant, a butcher, a terrorist. Why would we want a friend like that—especially if the price was supplying parts for his war machine?

During Operation Desert Storm, Bush spoke of a New World Order, which some might have taken as a reference to the dramatic spread of democracy. Two years later, in one of the presidential debates, Bush himself said that this was what he had meant. Yet at the time he coined the phrase, he opted to leave Saddam in power rather than attempt to democratize Iraq, and he exerted little pressure for democratic reforms in Kuwait after it was rescued by U.S. forces. If, on the other hand, the New World Order involved upholding the UN Charter's proscription of aggression, why did Bush sit immovably on his hands when Serbia committed aggression against Bosnia?

In all probability, the New World Order, like "read my lips" and the "education President" and the "environmental President," was just a speechwriter's invention. Bush himself seemed not to care which President he was, just so long as he was President.

This is not attractive to voters, and combined with his lack of oratorical gifts, it made Bush a mediocre candidate. Not that he had ever been a particularly good one. He had been defeated in the Republican primaries by Ronald Reagan in 1980, he had lost two races in Texas for the Senate (to Lloyd Bentsen in 1970 and to Ralph Yarborough in 1964), and in 1988 he had begun the presidential race trailing Michael Dukakis by 17 percentage points. But he had overcome that deficit by presenting himself effectively as Reagan's true heir and a generic conservative, and by demonstrating to the voters, through symbols like Willie Horton, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), that Dukakis was a liberal.

Dukakis's riposte that the race was "not about ideology" only served to underline the point. When they went to the polls, 80 percent of liberals voted for Dukakis and 80 percent of conservatives for Bush, while moderates split evenly. But only 18 percent of the voters called themselves liberals, while 33 percent called themselves conservatives, giving Bush an easy victory.

II

After the 1988 election, liberal pundits came up with a plethora of theories to explain away the outcome: the voters were too selfish, or not self-interested enough; the accident of peace and prosperity had conspired against the Democrats; the election had turned on technique, or lies, or racism; Bush's margin, a mere 8 percentage points, hardly constituted a victory at all. But fortunately for the party, these liberal rationalizations made little dent either on the Democratic standard-bearer in 1992 or on Democratic primary voters. Bill Clinton knew that the party needed to move back toward the Center, and rank-and-file Democrats seemed to know it, too.

It was in the presidential primaries in 1968 that the Democratic party first began moving to the Left. But the real shift occurred in 1972, when George McGovern, the candidate who ran farthest to the Left, won the nomination. Twenty years later, it was in the presidential primaries that the party finally reversed direction. This time Bill Clinton, running as a "different kind of Democrat"—code for "not a liberal"—swept the field.

Clinton entered the lists as the champion of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a group of mostly Southern Democrats organized after the 1984 election to speak for the party moderates. Unlike the older Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), which sought to

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combat the dominant liberal wing head-on, the DLC worked gently to nudge and cajole the Democrats away from the Left (an approach which seems to have had better results).

To be sure, despite his DLC connection, Clinton's stance was a liberal one in certain areas. He was strongly pro-choice on abortion; he favored equal rights for homosexuals, including in the armed services; and he laid stress on the inclusion of women and minority-group members in all authoritative bodies. He also campaigned for an additional cut in the military budget of $60 billion over four years beyond the reductions already proposed by Bush, and his economic program was based on the idea of government "investment," which, his opponents aptly noted, was a euphemism for spending. To top it all off, during the primaries, he was criticized by one of his Democratic rivals, Paul Tsongas, for "pandering" to various interest groups.

These liberal positions, however, were balanced by others of a notably different cast. Crime is among the most sensitive of social issues, and it was pivotal to the 1988 election. Bush hammered Dukakis as a member of the ACLU—an organization widely seen as responsible for the efflorescence of procedural protections of criminal defendants that have weakened law enforcement—and as a governor who opposed the death penalty and who supported lenient treatment of murderers (which, rather than race, was what the much-misrepresented Willie Horton ads were about).

Clinton, in contrast to Dukakis, vocally supported the death penalty, underscoring the point by flying home to Arkansas in January 1992 to facilitate the controversial execution of cop-killer Rickey Ray Rector. The 1992 Democratic platform, moreover, called crime "a relentless danger in our communities," and it declared that "the simplest and most direct way to restore order in our cities is to put more police on the streets." This was a far cry from liberal pieties about solving the "root causes" of crime. So too was the platform's proposal to create a Police Corps as a form of community service through which young adults could work off college loans.

CLINTON again managed to distinguish himself from liberal orthodoxy on the critical subject of race. He did this not in his formal positions, but in his handling of Jesse Jackson.

It started with a celebrated incident at a convention of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition in June, when Clinton criticized Sister Souljah, a black performer, for urging blacks during the Los Angeles riots to spend a week killing whites. By any reasonable standard Clinton's remarks were exceedingly mild. All he said was, "If you took the words 'white' and 'black' and reversed them, you might think David Duke was giving that speech." But this was received as an affront by Jackson, who had grown accustomed to fawning treatment from Democratic leaders. (In 1984, for example, after Jackson and his supporter, Louis Farrakhan, made anti-Semitic utterances, Democratic leaders turned aside a convention resolution against anti-Semitism lest it be interpreted as a rebuke to Jackson.) Rather than bowing to Jackson, Clinton let him stew (which he did, visibly), while other less controversial blacks—Ron Brown, Vernon Jordan, and Barbara Jordan—assumed prominent roles in the Democratic campaign.

On the issue of welfare, too, Clinton established his nonliberal credentials. "Welfare should be a second chance, not a way of life," he said, and he put forward proposals limiting welfare eligibility to two years.

Also, notwithstanding his advocacy of defense cuts, Clinton spoke more often and more forcefully than any Democratic candidate in recent memory about the importance of maintaining military strength and of being willing to use it. On other foreign-policy issues, he even ran somewhat to Bush's Right: he criticized the President for "coddling" dictatorial regimes and he advocated tougher polices toward China, Serbia, and Cuba. These positions not only won over some neoconservatives (including me), but they correspondingly antagonized the far Left. For instance, the radical scholar Richard Falk complained:

> The Clinton ticket['s] position on foreign-policy matters is either banal or identical to that of Bush. And where it departs, as in the setting of the Middle East, the Democratic party position is actually worse.

Aside from his stands on various issues, Clinton established his nonliberal persona in two other ways. One was his insistence on speaking of and for the middle class. This was neither bold nor original, but in the 1970's and 1980's, the Democratic party had so often looked like an alliance of the poor and the highly educated that the renewed emphasis on the middle class suggested middle-of-the-road as well.

The other important symbol was his selection of Senator Al Gore as his running mate. Gore's book, *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*, might have placed him pretty far to one side of the debates about environmental policy, and some conservative groups might have tagged him as a big spender. But by most measures Gore was a moderate rather than a liberal (and his wife, Tipper, famous crusader against obscenity in popular music, was viewed by many liberals as a benighted reactionary). Gore was, in fact, very close on the ideological spectrum to Clinton himself, and since choosing him as a running mate did not balance the ticket either in this way or regionally, sexually, racially, or generationally, it gave the impression that Clinton was serious about his own nonliberal philosophy.

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It also helped to counter the impression created at the Democratic convention—by a color guard made up of homeless veterans, and by the presentation of not one but two AIDS speakers—that the party was bent on repeating its past mistake of identifying itself predominantly with victims and fringe groups. When Clinton named Gore in defiance of traditional ticket-balancing, he gave the Democrats a very different image: two boyish Southerners who seemed to offer something new but not far-out to a country yearning for change but not radical change.

Exit polls showed that in 1992 conservative voters still outnumbered liberals by about 3 to 2 (the margin had been almost 2 to 1 four years earlier). The polls showed, too, that liberals voted overwhelmingly Democratic and conservatives overwhelmingly Republican, and that this ideological commitment remained a stronger predictor of a person's vote than his own economic progress or regress. Half the voters, however, identified themselves neither as liberal nor as conservative but as moderate, and the moderates, who had usually divided almost evenly, gave Clinton a 17-point margin.

III

With the extremely low approval ratings to which he had sunk since the end of the Gulf war, it was inevitable that Bush would try to turn the election into a referendum on Clinton rather than on himself. This strategy had been effective against Dukakis in 1988. For all the bitter recriminations to the effect that Bush had run a "dirty" campaign, all he had done in essence was to depict Dukakis quite accurately as a liberal. In 1992, the Bush campaign's attacks were much more personal, focused as they were on the "character issue"—that is, on Clinton's marital problems and his avoidance of the draft during Vietnam. These attacks weakened Clinton, but not as much as the ideological assault had weakened Dukakis.

Another part of Bush's strategy in 1992 was to shift attention away from the economy, which worked against him, and onto the social issues, which in the past had generally worked to the advantage of Republicans. But with the issues of crime, race, and welfare having largely been neutralized by Clinton, the Republicans had to find something else—and the something else they found was "family values."

This was not easy political ground to occupy. Defined loosely, the term had no political edge, no inherently partisan implication. Governor Mario Cuomo's much-celebrated speech to the 1984 Democratic convention, a liberal classic, took "family" as its theme. And when Barbara Bush, at the 1992 Republican convention, said that family values included "integrity, strength, responsibility, courage, sharing, love of God, and pride in being an American," it was not obvious why they would necessarily lead anyone to vote for her husband.

Defined more sharply, however, there is a real political issue here. It is about the progressive dilution of moral standards, expressed in rising rates of divorce, illegitimacy, and venereal disease, and about clamorous "liberation" groups that seem to deny the inherent differences between men and women, and between heterosexual unions and homosexual ones. Yet even this is not easy political ground, for while most Americans are on the conservative side of such questions, most also believe in tolerance and compassion. This ambivalence expresses itself, for example, in opinion polls showing that many people who favor "equal rights" for homosexuals also oppose employment of homosexuals in the military or as elementary-school teachers. And it also showed up in the 1992 exit polls.

The same ambivalence suggests why the Republicans failed to gain as much as they might have done with the "family-values" issue. When, at the Republican convention, Pat Robertson and Patrick J. Buchanan both sounded this theme, they did so in a way that lacked any trace of tolerance or compassion. To make matters worse, Buchanan declared that "there is a religious war going on in our country . . . as critical . . . as was the cold war itself," and he summoned true believers to battle. But few Americans want their country to go the way of Lebanon, Bosnia, the Sudan—places where there really are religious wars. If a religious war were brewing in our country, most Americans would want to know how to end it.

With Buchanan setting the pace, the Republicans even fumbled the chance to score some points at the expense of Hillary Clinton. Bill Clinton had left himself open to attacks on his wife's politics by his comment early in the campaign, "Buy one, get one free." Soon thereafter various press accounts revealed that Hillary Clinton had served in 1988 and 1989 as chair of the board of the New World Foundation, which had given money to a variety of left-wing causes. These included the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador (CISPES), a self-proclaimed support group for that country's Communist guerrillas, and the Christic Institute, a wacky pro-Sandinista group specializing in bizarre conspiracy theories, which was later fined by the courts for bringing baseless law suits. The Republicans might have asked some pointed questions about whether Hillary Clinton knew the true nature of these groups. Instead, they chose to attack her on the ground that she would "give children the right to sue their parents."

The filial-litigation question was intended to represent a larger concern—namely, the erosion by government of parental authority. What with Washington, D.C. schools distributing condoms

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to students against their parents' stated wishes, and with New York City suspending a local school board because it objected to the tenor of an elementary-school curriculum on homosexuality, there is something to this concern, but even here the Republicans were off target. For the critical issue is not so much the erosion of parental authority as the erosion of parental responsibility. Increasingly, parents give birth out of wedlock, abandon their children, expose them to drugs and disease *in utero* or soon thereafter, and in myriad ways put their own convenience or "self-realization" ahead of the safety or comfort of their offspring.

Had they had the wit to use it, the Republicans at their national convention were handed a perfect symbol of this issue in the person of Woody Allen, who was revealed to have been committing what by any common-sense definition constituted incest. Allen's defense of his actions will stand as the classic expression of the sensibility behind parental abdication. The relationship with his de-facto stepdaughter, he explained, "continues to turn around my life in a wonderfully positive way." Yet instead of running against Woody Allen, the Republicans ended up running against Gregory K., a twelve-year-old who sued his neglectful, drug-abusing mother so that he could remain in the custody of foster parents who were giving him the nurturing that she had failed to provide. The result, so *Newsweek* reported, citing Clinton campaign polls, was that by the end of the GOP convention Hillary's "favorable ratings had gone up."

Given the tin ear with which the Republicans played this tune; given, too, that the party which usually wants to get government "off the backs" of people did not explain clearly what it now wanted the government to do about family values; and given George Bush's image as a politician whose ambition was stronger than his convictions—given all that, the theme of family values fell flat and with it the Republicans' chance of derailing the Clinton/Gore express.

IV

QUITE apart from its outcome, the 1992 election demonstrated that, despite a year of handwringing about the state of the nation, the American political system is in good health. Voter turnout, which had been in a much-lamented steady decline, leaped from 50 to 55 percent. Although early on there was much carping about the electorate's choices (if God had intended us to have democracy, why didn't he give us better candidates?, went one joke), in the end 70 percent said they had voted "in favor" of their man rather than "against" the other two—and the ratio was constant for the supporters of all three candidates.

With the economy stalled, a spirit of discontent permeated the campaign, but it seemed excessive and even whiny when our troubles were compared with those of other peoples or other times. A dozen states held referendums on limiting the number of terms members of Congress can serve, and the proposals passed in every state. Yet 93 percent of the congressional incumbents who ran were reelected. If the voters were so tired of representatives who serve many terms, why did they not just vote them out? Still, if the referendum voters were merely blowing off steam, this was a harmless way of doing it. A more harmful way would have been to rally behind "populists," and this they did not do in large numbers.

On the Democratic side, that would have meant supporting Jerry Brown, whose main substantive proposal was to abolish the progressive income tax, but whose campaign otherwise was redolent of the old New Left. "In America democratic choice is rendered illusory," he declared. "In reality, there is only one party . . . the Incumbent party." His slogans brought back the 1960's: "Speaking truth to power," "We the People," and "The revolution continues."

On the Republican side, the populist alternative was evocative of the 1930's Right rather than of the 1960's Left. It took the form of Buchanan's nativist America First campaign in which he advocated cutting off immigration and all foreign aid, withdrawing American forces from around the world, reviewing all existing treaty commitments, and throwing up new trade barriers. This last policy comported ill with his advocacy of less government and more markets, and so too did his promise of more federal assistance for the unemployed.

The populist who scored best in 1992 was neither on the Right nor on the Left; he was Ross Perot, candidate of the "radical middle," as *Newsweek* put it. Perot's message, said *Newsweek*, was "anger about the dysfunction in Washington and despair that no one was willing to talk about it honestly." The buzzword Perot popularized for this problem was "gridlock." But gridlock is not a dysfunction; it is the way the system was intended to work. We were all taught its genius in school, except then it was called the separation of powers. America's founders feared the "tyranny of the majority" and deliberately devised a system in which one part of the government would restrain the others, and in which government action would require the collaboration of different bodies, all resting ultimately on the people but drawing their mandates differently. (It was all the more absurd when George Bush began to echo the complaint about gridlock, since his party in particular is devoted to the principle of restraining government.)

The specific result of gridlock, said Perot, was the budget deficit, and he earned applause for being braver about discussing it than either of his opponents. Yet he still resorted to a dodge. He blamed the deficit on the government and the

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parties, but never on the real culprits—ourselves. For the root cause of the deficit is the electorate's failure to reconcile its yen for services and benefits with its aversion to taxes. Indeed, up until this year, when voters were asked whether they favored divided government (a President from one party and a Congress dominated by the other), they answered affirmatively. In effect, they liked having Democrats to give them services and Republicans to lower their taxes.

Perot scored surprisingly well, winning 19 percent of the vote, and his presence on the ballot may have caused the increase in turnout. But he made no difference to the outcome: the polls showed that those of his supporters who would have voted at all had Perot not been on the ballot would have divided evenly between Bush and Clinton.

Finally, then, the choice came down to George Bush and Bill Clinton, two rather accomplished politicians, neither one a demagogue. The voters opted for change. It was a choice they might not have made were it not for another man, the unsung hero of Clinton's victory, Mikhail Gorbachev. Had Gorbachev not called off the cold war, the Democrats probably could not have won.*

Thus, voters were asked in the exit polls what their feelings would be if Clinton won: would they be excited, optimistic, concerned, or scared? Despite the outcome, 54 percent said they would be concerned or scared about a Clinton victory. In fact, even one-third of those who went for Clinton responded this way! The voters, we can conclude, were consciously making a gamble. Further, when asked what qualities in a candidate were critical to determining their choice, only 16 percent of the electorate cited "good judgment in a crisis," and that 16 percent went overwhelmingly for Bush.

In other words, had the cold war still been raging, and had the danger of international crises seemed more imminent, the voters would probably not have gambled on Clinton, but would have resigned themselves to Bush's failings and returned him to office. They would have returned him because he had proved his mettle in the Persian Gulf crisis, because the young governor from Arkansas had yet to prove his, and because Clinton's party had lost America's trust so far as managing the cold war was concerned.

V

The end of the cold war has given the Democrats a new lease on life. Clinton is not only the first post-cold-war President but the first President of his generation. The country took a chance on him with a mixture of hope and anxiety, and it is eager to see what he will do. He has shown himself to be an extremely gifted politician, and if he governs successfully he could reshape our politics. In so doing he would inevitably reshape his party, bringing it out of the blind alley into which it turned in 1972, back toward the political Center. Conversely, the party could pull him to the Left, just as it did its one other President in the last quarter-century, Jimmy Carter, another Southern governor who ran as a moderate.

The *Nation* magazine, which granted Clinton a backhanded and grudging endorsement (it stopped short of urging its readers to vote for him), took heart from the fact that "the new Congress is likely to have a slew of new leftish Democrats." And it called for a "post-election mobilization" to push the new administration leftward. If Bill Clinton follows Jimmy Carter in succumbing to such pressures, America will lose and so, eventually, will he.

The reason is that the electorate remains mostly moderate in its views, but more conservative than liberal. Even on basic economic orientation, usually the strong suit of the Democrats (as opposed to social issues or foreign policy), the exit polls revealed a conservative tilt. Voters were asked whether they would prefer that "government provide more services but cost more in taxes" or that "government cost less in taxes but provide fewer services." Fifty-three percent chose less taxes while 38 percent chose more services.

Clinton prevailed on this and on other, social-issue questions because he carried a clear majority of those choosing the liberal option while managing to split almost evenly the larger group who chose the conservative position. Or, to illustrate the point with other data, most of those who called themselves liberal voted for Clinton, but they accounted for only one-third of Clinton's votes.

Many of the issues facing the country today, in both foreign and domestic policy, are new, and Clinton has a proclivity for new answers. To govern effectively, and to win a second term, he will have to find those answers where he found his victory—in the Center.

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* By invoking Gorbachev, I do not mean to contest the claim that Ronald Reagan is to be credited for America's victory in the cold war. On the contrary, I endorse that claim. But since Soviet expansionism drove the conflict, it was always the Soviets' to call off. And Gorbachev was the one who called it off, although we might say that Ronald Reagan created the conditions for that decision.

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Is Police Brutality the Problem?

William Tucker

ITEM: On July 20, 1992, Sergeant Peter Viola, and four other New York City police officers, were summoned to the home of Annie Dodds, a politically prominent black woman in Brooklyn, to settle a domestic dispute. It was one of those routinely dangerous, noncriminal confrontations that the police have learned to abhor.

Mrs. Dodds's two sons, Harold Dodds, 34, and Tyrese Daniels, 28, were engaged in a violent argument. Although the police could not then know it, both brothers had extensive criminal records. Daniels in particular had been charged several times with assaulting police officers.

As the five cops worked patiently to soothe tempers, Daniels suddenly turned on his brother and hit him over the head with a metal pipe he had been brandishing. In the ensuing melee, all five cops were injured, one suffering a fractured shoulder. Mrs. Dodds also suffered a few scratches. Nevertheless, she went to the Brooklyn district attorney, Charles Hynes, and complained of Sergeant Viola's behavior. Viola was subsequently charged with felonious assault and is now awaiting trial.

Item: In January 1992, Scott Baldwin, a 210-pound running back at the University of Nebraska, underwent a "psychotic episode," jumping out of a friend's car and running naked through the streets of Omaha. Coming across a woman walking her dog, Baldwin smashed her head into a parked car, nearly killing her. He was charged with assault, but acquitted by reason of insanity.

The coach of the Nebraska football team, Tom Osborne, then took Baldwin into his home for several months. But on September 5, the evening of Nebraska's first game of the season, Baldwin again turned up in Omaha, this time trying to break through the glass door of a stranger's apartment. Two female police officers were dispatched to the scene. When they tried to handcuff Baldwin, he wrestled one to the ground and attempted to grab her gun. The other officer drew her gun, held it to Baldwin's head, and threatened him. When Baldwin kept fighting, she lowered the gun and shot him in the ribs, paralyzing him for life.

State Senator Ernie Chambers of Omaha, Nebraska's only black legislator, blamed the police for sending two women to the scene and called the shooting "avoidable and therefore unjustified."

Item: On October 7, 1992, Jerry Haaf, a 30-year veteran of the Minneapolis police department assigned to traffic duty, stopped at a pizza shop at 2 A.M. for a cup of coffee. While he was sitting at a table filling out reports, two young black males, in full view of several witnesses, walked up behind him and shot him through the heart. Despite an episode like this, and despite a general rise in crime and gang violence, Minneapolis's liberal city administration continues to insist that police behavior is the city's major problem. Says Mayor Donald Fraser: "I've never met a black family in Minneapolis that hadn't been abused by the police."

Item: On September 16, 1992, three off-duty New York City police officers became embroiled in an argument with 18-year-old Ywanus Mohamed as they were entering a subway station. During the argument, Mohamed pulled a box-cutting razor knife and slashed officer John Coughlin in the face, cutting him so badly he nearly died. The wounds required 500 stitches. Officers Thomas Cea and Patrick O'Neill subdued Mohamed, but after they had him handcuffed they allegedly continued punching him and broke his jaw. Mohamed, and Officers Cea and O'Neill, have all equally been charged with felony assault.

Item: Again in New York City, a riot erupted and the entire city spent the summer of 1992 on edge after an undercover police officer named Michael O'Keefe killed 23-year-old Kiko Garcia, a suspected drug dealer, in a street confrontation in Washington Heights. A grand jury eventually exonerated the officer, but Mayor David Dinkins

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used the occasion to push for the removal of the remaining six police officials from the city's twelve-member police-review board, and to turn it into a completely civilian body.

Item: And again in Brooklyn, on August 19, 1991, in the Crown Heights section, a young Orthodox Jew named Yankel Rosenbaum was set upon by a mob of black teenagers yelling "Get the Jew." One of them stabbed him, and before he died he identified his killer as Lemrick Nelson, Jr. The police also found a knife in Nelson's possession with blood stains on it that matched Rosenbaum's, and two detectives testified that Nelson had confessed. But on October 30, 1991, in a verdict that seemed to many a mirror image of the Rodney King case, the jury (made up of six blacks, four Hispanics, and two whites) acquitted Nelson of all charges. Evidently the reason was that the jurors did not believe the testimony of the police officers on the scene and concluded that they had framed Nelson.* The *New York Times*, which had scarcely been able to contain its outrage over the white and Hispanic jury that had acquitted the police officers in the Rodney King case, now blamed not the jury but the police department—for the crime of having "lost all credibility with the neighborhoods it serves." For good measure, the *Times* also attacked the policemen's union for having "forfeited public faith" through its "callous arrogance." And the moral it drew from the occasion was that the city needed "a more independent board to review complaints of police misconduct."

IN ADVANCING the bizarre suggestion that the police rather than the criminals are the real problem confronting us, and that the solution therefore lies in civilian oversight, Mayor Dinkins, District Attorney Hynes, Senator Chambers, Mayor Fraser, the *New York Times*, and the many other politicians and media pundits who agree with them, have a good deal of support from the academic world. For example, according to David Bayley, professor of criminology at SUNY Albany, and the leading American authority on foreign police forces,

> We're way behind the rest of the English-speaking world on this issue. England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all have strong systems. The best civilian-review board in North America is in Ontario. Their police department has completely lost sovereignty with respect to internal punishments.

Yet that did not prevent Toronto from erupting in riots last June when a 22-year-old black youth was shot to death by an undercover police officer. Nor is there any evidence that civilian-review boards do any better in this country in defusing the tensions between minority communities and the police.

Sam Walker, professor of criminology at the University of Nebraska, who specializes in civilian-review boards, has just completed a survey in which he found that 35 of the nation's largest cities now have such boards. Walker argues that they act as an outlet to deflect police-civilian confrontations and prevent violence and frustration from building up within poor and minority communities:

> The experience is that when the procedure for filing complaints is made more open to the public, the number of complaints rises. San Francisco has a very open system and has lots of complaints, while Los Angeles has no complaint procedure and is not even talking about one. San Francisco also didn't have any riots. The Mayor of Omaha recently changed the system so that complaints could be filed at city hall rather than at the police stations. The number of complaints immediately doubled. In my judgment, the number of complaints a city has about police brutality is a reflection of public confidence in the police.

Yet public opinion, led by local anti-police activists, is likely to conclude the opposite. First, the number of complaints filed is seen as evidence that police brutality is "widespread." Second, since only a very small number of complaints ever lead to disciplinary action (just as a very small number of criminal complaints ever lead to jail sentences), the vast number that fall apart or are not resolved will usually be taken as proof that "the system isn't working."

The truth, however, is that most complaints are either frivolous or unjustified. This is borne out by the experience of the old New York City Board, which the Vera Institute for Justice, a nonpartisan organization, found to be prejudiced neither for nor against civilians or police officers.

In 1990, the Board's annual report showed a total of 2,376 complaints for "excessive force," 1,140 for "abuse of authority," 1,618 for "discourtesy," and 420 for "ethnic slurs." Among the 2,376 complaints for excessive force (presumably the most serious charge), injuries were documented in 267 cases. These involved 71 bruises, 92 lacerations requiring stitches, 30 fractures, 22 swellings, and 41 "other." In the 2,286 cases that were pursued, 566 were dropped because the complainant became uncooperative, 234 were dropped because the complainant withdrew the charge, and 1,405 were closed with less than full investigation, usually because the complainants became unavailable. Only 81 cases resulted in a finding against the policeman.

To understand why there is such an overload of frivolous cases, it is first necessary to realize that the vast majority of complaints do not involve serious charges. In 80 percent of the New York cases, the complainant did not even seek

* For a fuller discussion of what happened in Crown Heights, see the article by Philip Gourevitch, beginning on p. 29.—ED.

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punishment or further investigation, but only wanted to confront the officer.

Furthermore, the serious complaints are often the work of criminals who are seeking some leverage in the charges against them. "They file a complaint as soon as they are arrested and hope to use it as a trade-off in bargaining their case," says Robert M. Morgenthau, the district attorney of Manhattan. Drug dealers in particular have become adept at using the complaint system as a bargaining tool. In the 34th precinct (Washington Heights), which led all New York City precincts for homicides in 1991, arresting officers now routinely hand drug suspects the civilian-complaint form as an ironic gesture in "community relations."

When Professor Walker was asked to point to a system that works, he replied:

> That's a question I've been asked a hundred times and I don't know the answer. I was talking to a reporter from the *Detroit News* and he told me that Detroit has a strong civilian-review board and few complaints about police brutality. Maybe the system works there. I'm going to have to go up and see.

Detroit, of course, is a city where, as one columnist wrote recently, "the wheels have fallen off Western civilization."

THERE are people who contend that to downgrade the problem of police brutality is to adopt a white perspective and to manifest insensitivity, or worse, to the black condition. No doubt there is some truth to this charge. After all, as Mayor Fraser points out, law-abiding blacks are more likely to be harassed by cops than are their white counterparts, so that for the former, police misconduct is indeed something to worry about. But a cursory glance at the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports makes it clear why focusing on police misbehavior is so perversely misplaced an emphasis.

Since 1986, the incidence of all crimes per 100,000 population is only up 6 percent, and some property crimes (pocket-pickings, purse-snatchings, and motor-vehicle accessory theft) have actually shown a slight decline. But these small decreases in property crimes have been more than offset by a huge increase in personal and violent crimes.

Thus, the rate of violent crime is up 29 percent overall and 24 percent in per-capita terms. Murder rates are up 23 percent and 18 percent per capita. Robbery rates have risen 33 percent in real terms and 28 percent in per-capita terms. This includes an absolute increase of 50 percent for bank robberies, 38 percent for street robberies, 27 percent for convenience-store robberies, 16 percent for residential robberies, and 11 percent for gas-station robberies. Aggravated assault is also up 28 percent in absolute terms and 23 percent per capita.

Does all this mean that America is becoming a far more violent society? Not entirely. What is unique about this crime wave is that it has been confined almost completely to black juveniles. The lines for "white" and "other" (Hispanic, Oriental, American Indian, etc.) are almost perfectly flat over the same period. But the arrest rates for blacks has gone nearly vertical.

What is more, violent blacks are getting younger and younger. In an analysis of the Uniform Crime Reports, James Alan Fox, dean of the Northeastern University College of Criminal Justice, found that crime rates were up the steepest for the youngest groups. Arrest rates for murder climbed 121 percent for 17-year-olds, 158 percent for 16-year-olds, and 217 percent for 15-year-olds. Even 12-year-olds were up 100 percent.

This unprecedented crime wave among young blacks has hit the cities hardest. Minneapolis, for example, has 40 percent of Minnesota's crime, even though it has only 8 percent of the state's population. In New York, 85 percent of the state's record 2,200 crimes in 1990 were in New York City (less than half the state's population). And within New York City, 70 percent of the murders were concentrated in a few neighborhoods—Washington Heights, Harlem, East Harlem, the South Bronx, East New York, and Bedford Stuyvesant. Brooklyn's 75th precinct (East New York), a drug-infested wasteland with a population of 160,000, had more murders than Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany combined (total population 880,000).

The reasons for the upsurge in inner-city violence are by now familiar. The most obvious is the introduction of crack cocaine, which has transformed drug addiction from a messy, disease-ridden, needle-passing subculture to a cleaner, inhaling-based "mainstream" habit among major portions of the underclass population. Once again, the arrest statistics reflect this change. While juvenile arrests for marijuana and other drugs are down or level since 1985, arrests for cocaine have soared during the same period. And once again, this increase has been concentrated entirely among blacks.

Beyond that, there is the disintegration of normal social life in many black ghettos. What is most striking is the loss of the mediating institutions of society—the churches, stores, schools, voluntary organizations, commercial activities, and ordinary street life that once formed a buffer between criminals and law-abiding citizens. On the streets surrounding the Robert Taylor Homes, a dreaded housing project on the South Side of Chicago, there is little sign of life except for a few graffiti-scarred playgrounds and scattered rows of desolate—though still inhabited—homes. Among the ruined buildings are an abandoned factory and a burned-out YMCA. Over nearly twenty square blocks, the only commercial advertising is a ubiquitous billboard on the back of bus-stop

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benches, advertising: "Beepers. Call 633-9610." Beepers, of course, are the standard equipment of the drug trade.

Most forbidding of all, however, is the collapse of history's oldest bulwark against crime and violent behavior—the nuclear family.

The majority of black males in ghetto areas no longer have any real adult role to play, either at home or in society. Their role as breadwinner—however poorly it may have been played in the past—has now been usurped by the welfare system. In projects like the Robert Taylor Homes, where more than 90 percent of the households involve only women and children, adult men have all but disappeared.

Over half of all black children born in this country are now born to unwed mothers, and in many poor areas, the figure exceeds 80 percent. Some of these women may supplement their welfare grant with some kind of furtive arrangement with a new man. But family units built around stable marriages are essentially unknown.

Nationwide, 25 percent of black men between the ages of 15 and 35 are entangled in the criminal-justice system—as prison inmates, defendants, parolees, or probationers. In cities like Washington, the number approaches 40 percent. Homicide is now the most common cause of death for black men between the ages of 20 and 35, and one in every 22 black men can expect to be murdered.

From the time they reach physical maturity until the time they disappear into the netherworld of dereliction and homelessness, these young black men lead lives of stupefying violence. In this unrelenting free-for-all, there are no qualms about killing someone for a pair of sneakers or sunglasses or because the other person is wearing the wrong colors or looks the wrong way. Listen to the voices of Sidewinder and Bopete, two fourteen-year-olds, as recorded in a California youth-detention center by Lèon Bing for her chronicle of Los Angeles gang life, *Do or Die*:

> [Bopete:] "Sometimes I think about not goin' back to bangin' when I get outta here. I play in sports a lot here, and I. . . ."
>
> Sidewinder's laugh interrupts. "Sound like a regular ol' teenager, don't he? I sound like that, too, after the drive-by. I got shot twice in the leg, 'cause they was shootin' at the car, and when that happen I didn't want to bang no more, either. Makin' promises to God, all like that. But when it heal up. . . ." He is silent for a moment; maybe he's thinking about a freedom he won't taste for a while. Then, "I tell you somethin'—I don't feel connected to any other kids in this city or in this country or in this world. I only feel comfortable in my 'hood. That's the only thing I'm connected to, that's my family. One big family—that's about it."
>
> "In my 'hood, in the Jungle, it ain't like a gang. It's more like a nation, everybody all together as one. Other kids, as long as they ain't my enemies, I can be cool with 'em." Bopete lapses into silence. "I'll tell you, though—if I didn't have no worst enemy to fight with, I'd probably find somebody."
>
> "Ye-eeeeeeeh," Sidewinder picks it up. "*I'd* find somebody. 'Cause if they ain't nobody to fight, it ain't no gangs. It ain't no life. I don't know . . . it ain't no. . . ."
>
> "It ain't no fun."
>
> "Yeah! Ain't no fun just sittin' there. Anybody can just sit around, just drink, smoke a little Thai. But that ain't fun like shootin' guns and stabbin' people. *That's* fun."

It might seem that nothing more could be piled atop this disintegrating social scene to make a policeman's life more difficult and dangerous. But something has been: the proliferation of illegal guns, particularly automatic and semi-automatic weapons.

Says Hubert Williams, head of the Police Foundation:

> There's a strong feeling among the departments around the country that we're being outgunned in our own neighborhoods. You can see it in the number of high-power, high-tech weapons confiscated off the streets. I mean, add it up. There are only about 70 patrolmen in every precinct and each one has one gun. How many guns are there in the neighborhoods we're patrolling?

The speed and sophistication of the weapons in the hands of today's drug dealers have made the rap singer Ice Cube's description of South Central Los Angeles—"the concrete Vietnam"—no exaggeration. According to Jack Killorin, of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco:

> The kind of semi-automatic weapons in the hands of criminals today means even one bad guy can do a devastating amount of damage. It's not necessarily the power of the guns—although certainly that makes a difference. But many criminals are now armed with semi-automatic weapons that can literally fill the air with bullets. Not only are guns faster and more powerful, but there's an almost psychopathic willingness to use them.

In 1981, American gunmakers manufactured 1.7 million revolvers and 837,000 semi-automatic pistols. In 1991, the ratio was completely reversed—1.3 million semi-automatics to 456,000 revolvers. Standard revolvers, carried by most police officers, fire six shots and then require reloading, while semi-automatic pistols usually contain a clip of 16-24 bullets. "It's during that reloading time, when the first round of bullets runs out, that a lot of officers are killed," says Killorin.

Nevertheless, in New York City, Mayor Dinkins—against the urging of the FBI—has person-

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ally prevented the police from switching to semi-automatic 9-mm. weapons, even though such weapons are now carried by his own bodyguards.

WHAT can we expect the police to do under these circumstances?

In 1968, James Q. Wilson examined the problem in his classic book, *The Varieties of Police Behavior.* In that long-lost era, when the principal problems of police work involved dealing with drunks and breaking up fights at parties, Wilson discovered three styles of police action, which he termed the "watchman," the "legalistic," and the "service."

The "watchman," or "order-maintenance" style, common in cities with old political machines, tended to concentrate on maintaining order, giving individual patrolmen a lot of latitude to enforce the law as they saw fit. Large concentrations of gambling and prostitution were usually tolerated—often in black neighborhoods—as long as they did not offend the "respectable" people of the town.

The "legalistic" departments had usually been through some kind of reform period. Police stuck by the letter of the law and were impeccable about corruption. They wrote speeding tickets on an equal basis for city councilmen and black ghetto residents alike. The police force had usually been put out of the reach of politics and a strict civil-service or merit system prevailed.

The "service" style was a kind of middle ground, found mostly in the suburbs. The police were not "pro-active," but extremely conscious of the desires of their constituents. The law was upheld in a neutral way, but the police were unobtrusive about it as well. Although this style worked well in homogeneous suburbs, Wilson doubted that it could serve as a model in heterogeneous urban populations.

Regrettably enough, Wilson discovered that both the laissez-faire order-maintenance style *and* the reform-minded legalistic style (which was in many ways its opposite) *both* aroused resentment in black communities:

> Order maintenance means managing conflict, and conflict implies disagreeing over what should be done, how, and to whom. Conflict is found in all social strata and thus in all strata there will be resentment, often justified, against particular police interventions (or their absence), but in lower-class areas conflict and disorder will be especially common and thus such resentment will be especially keen. It is hardly surprising that polls show young lower-income Negro males as being deeply distrustful of and bitter about the police; it would be a mistake, however, to assume that race is the decisive factor.

But when minimal order-maintenance (which had been the rule in the South) gave way to a stricter effort to impose middle-class standards on the entire community, the resentment remained. In Wilson's words:

> One reason for the increasing complaints of "police harassment" may be that, in the large cities, Negroes are being brought under a single standard of justice; one reason for the complaints of discrimination may be that this process is proceeding unevenly and imperfectly. As the populations of our large cities become, through continued migration, more heavily Negro, more heavily lower-income, and more youthful, we can expect these complaints to increase in number and frequency, especially if, as seems likely, organizations competing for leadership in the central cities continue to seek out such issues in order to attract followers.

Having so accurately foreseen what was coming, Wilson (in collaboration with George Kelling) later developed the well-known "broken-windows" hypothesis, which has served as the basis of the "neighborhood-policing" movement. Wilson and Kelling decided that the watchman style had been correct in one respect—order maintenance does matter. "A broken window that remains broken is a signal that no one cares and an invitation for more broken windows," they wrote. Or, as a resident of Washington Heights put it during the tensions last summer:

> I know the police are never going to clean up the drug problem in this neighborhood because they can't even deal with the problem of double-parked cars.

Wilson and Kelling's neighborhood policing is now the basis of a reform movement that is being instituted all over the country—even in places where it does not seem entirely appropriate. Foot patrolmen are now walking the beats of South-Central Los Angeles, trying to win the trust of the community—even though in such neighborhoods they may be the only people around not traveling by car.

BUT whether or not neighborhood policing will do any good, one thing remains clear: to concentrate on police "harassment" and "brutality" is to divert attention from the real problem that faces our society, which is the terrible upsurge of violent crime over the past five years. Worse yet, this focus creates a climate and leads to policies which can only have the effect of making it harder for the police to do their job, and perhaps also of making them less willing to do it.

In Los Angeles last May, the police department hesitated to mount a show of force when the Rodney King verdict was handed down because officials feared they would be blamed for igniting violence. "It would have been seen as provocative," said Willie Williams, who succeeded Daryl Gates as L.A. police chief in June. As it was, there were many reports of police passivity in the face

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of looting and arson, and order was not restored until three days later when 9,000 National Guardsmen and federal troops hit the streets.

In Minneapolis (which not only has a civilian-review board but also an organization in which members of the major drug gangs work together with the police in trying to establish domestic tranquility), the cops are feeling anxious and inhibited. Says Jerry Larson, a veteran detective and vice president of the city's Police Federation (the policemen's union):

> The mayor told us for years that gangs here wouldn't be a problem. We warned him they would and now we've got a problem. You can't handle these gangs without getting pro-active and having all this constant criticism from the political establishment makes us real leery about doing our jobs. It'll be like New York, where the police just drive by things. I know some New York coppers and they say, "The hell with it. If those people aren't killing each other, we're not getting out of our cars."

In New York City itself, as though to confirm Larson's observation, Officer Todd Jamison declared in responding to charges of police brutality after an arrest that left one of his colleagues injured: "There are certain things where we have the power of discretion, we can turn our heads and say, why get involved?" An even more striking comment was made by Officer O'Keefe. When asked why he had not drawn his gun sooner in his mortal struggle with Garcia in Washington Heights, O'Keefe replied: "The truth is, in the current climate, a cop is more worried about getting in trouble than getting killed."

A poignant incident that occurred in Chicago drives the point home. When the Chicago Bulls won the National Basketball Association championship in June 1992, thousands of the city's residents—nearly all of them black—celebrated by rampaging through the downtown stores, breaking windows, looting, and turning over parked cars. (The *New York Times* reported that, of the 100 people injured during the riots, 94 were police officers.) Picking up a pattern which had been established in the Los Angeles riot a month before, the mobs singled out Korean-owned businesses for attack. Park Jung, the 32-year-old owner of a men's clothing store on the West Side, found more than 100 people trying to break through his storefront. When he appealed for help to several police officers who were standing idly by, they refused, advising him to "take care of your life and go home." He left and his store was destroyed.

"What else could I do?" Mr. Park said. "I hate America. I'm going back to Korea."

But those of us who are staying here in America will have greater and greater cause to rue the fact that the police are being morally disarmed and demoralized by a climate of opinion that seems to regard them as a bigger threat to society than the criminals they have to confront—and by whom they are being increasingly outgunned. For many years, criminologists have tried to dismiss swings in the crime rate with the bland assertion that they represent shifts in the crime-prone population of young males. But the current outburst has occurred during a trough in the population cycle. As Dean Fox points out:

> What we've seen in the past few years is nothing compared with what we'll see in the next decade and on into the next century. Right now, we have the fewest 18-to-24-year-olds we've had since 1965, but next year they will start to go back up.

In other words, the worst is yet to come, and if the police continue to be incapacitated by a fixation on their occasional misbehavior, we—and most especially the young blacks among us—will have even less protection against violent crime in the future than we do today.

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The Crown Heights Riot & Its Aftermath

Philip Gourevitch

EARLY one evening during the riot in the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn in August 1991, I stopped in at the 71st precinct station and chatted briefly with Captain Mescolotto, an executive officer who had been called back from vacation to help deal with the mayhem in the area. We spoke as the riot's third day was turning into its fourth night. The precinct halls were jammed with uniformed men and women; outside, in the parking lots and along the streets, police vans and cruisers were densely parked, their windows taped against anticipated attack. Similar vehicles could be found a few blocks away, smashed and burned, turned over on their roofs. In those areas near the center of the hasidic community of Crown Heights, there were also hundreds of cops decked out with riot helmets and plexiglass body-shields.

By the look of it, the forces in blue had secured the neighborhood. But with each passing day, Jewish residents and their leaders had been increasing the volume of their complaints. The city, they said, was failing to protect them, the rioters were being allowed to rampage unchecked, too little force was being brought to bear, too few arrests were being made, the police were clearly under orders to hold back, law and order were cowering in the face of a mob that only grew wilder as it sensed its full power to intimidate.

I myself had watched the previous day as black rioters hurled rocks and bottles at a throng of Hasidim while policemen stood between the two groups, holding the line but doing nothing to stem the attack. The police were taking the lion's share of the casualties in these confrontations, but whenever the issue of inaction came up, Mayor David Dinkins and the then-police commissioner, Lee Brown, offered tight-lipped denials of any restraining orders and insisted they were doing everything within their power to restore peace to the neighborhood.

Perhaps Captain Mescolotto, who had arrived on the scene only that morning and was still dressed in civilian clothes, had not been fully briefed on the official line by the time I talked to him. Perhaps that was why, when I asked how his officers felt about being restrained, he answered, "They're flipping out." What held them back?, I pursued, mentioning that in addition to the TV and press cameras I had noticed a couple of kids among the rioters carrying video-cameras. Captain Mescolotto then said of his colleagues, "A lot of them feel that they're paying the price for Rodney King."

Rodney King had already become a household name in America by that time, although less apocalyptic in its resonance than now. The famous videotape of the arrest and brutal beating of King by a group of white Los Angeles policemen had been broadcast repeatedly on national television, and while the officers who beat him had yet to stand trial for using excessive force, they had already been convicted in the public mind. The footage of the prone black man being clubbed and kicked by white men in uniform while others stood by confirmed the traditional historical narrative of race in America, the story of black victimization by white power. And that view of things was only fortified when the men who beat King were eventually acquitted by a white and Hispanic jury in suburban Simi Valley, California, even as the riots that followed the verdict seem to have appalled and frightened Americans as much as the verdict itself.

Analogies between the Rodney King case and the situation in Crown Heights would surface again this past fall as New Yorkers attempted to make sense of a Brooklyn jury's decision that Lemrick Nelson, Jr., a seventeen-year-old black, was not guilty in the murder of Yankel Rosenbaum, a young Orthodox Jew who had been set upon, beaten, and stabbed by a mob of up to twenty young black men on the first night of the Crown Heights riot a year earlier. After all, the two cases seemed similarly airtight; and just as a predominantly white jury in Los Angeles had exonerated whites against all the apparent evidence, so in Brooklyn a predominantly nonwhite jury exonerated a black against all the apparent evidence. But the comparisons quickly became strained and were ultimately misleading. For if what happened in Los Angeles fit the conventional public understanding of American race

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relations, the story of Crown Heights turned convention on its head.

That is why Captain Mescolotto's frank remark was so telling. In evoking Rodney King, Mescolotto was saying, essentially, that whenever blacks began to riot, the reaction of official America—and also of the mainstream press—would be: here goes another explosion of racial tension, and an explosion of racial tension means that blacks have been pushed to the wall; that some terrible racist incident has caused a battered minority to explode in rage; that we must deal with the event evenhandedly, expressing our sympathy with the cause of the rioters and being careful above all not to anger them further.

But there *was* no cause being championed in Crown Heights, unless one counts lawlessness and anti-Semitism as causes. Nor was the riot, strictly speaking, a minority riot, but rather a rampage by some of the neighborhood's 180,000-strong black majority against a Jewish minority of 20,000. Most importantly, it was a riot not by victims of racism but by racists, an attack on Jews because they were Jews. Blacks shouting anti-Semitic slogans, and explicitly proclaiming themselves the proud reincarnations of Hitler, sought to destroy and/or drive out their Jewish neighbors by force. In this respect, the event was unprecedented in American history.

So deep is the American predisposition to perceive blacks as the victims of racism that when they explode in the role of racists, we lack even the vocabulary to describe it. In order to give their purpose a name, the rioters themselves summoned up the Nazis; their victims, analogously, reached back in time and across the Atlantic for a word to describe what was happening to them: pogrom.

II

THE terms are not altogether inappropriate. In recent years, political anti-Semitism has flourished in the black community. According to a new study by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), blacks are twice as likely as whites to hold strong anti-Semitic views. Other studies have shown (although the ADL report disputes it) that black hatred follows an inverse pattern to that in the general population, increasing in direct proportion to education and wealth rather than the other way around. Be that as it may, while Jews speak to one another about black anti-Semitism, it is shockingly rare for white leaders of any creed, let alone for blacks, to speak directly *to* blacks about anti-Semitism in their extended community.

One exception is the literary critic, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. of Harvard, who published an op-ed piece in the *New York Times* this past summer, arguing forcefully that the ultimate damage done by black anti-Semitism is to the political culture of blacks themselves. For his pains, Gates was lambasted by other blacks and received at least ten death threats, and no significant public support. Derrick Bell, a black professor who left Harvard Law School over its alleged racism, angrily told the *Times* that "blacks should be very careful about criticizing each other because whites love it so much when they do."

The consequences of this attitude and of the situation it has bred were on display in Crown Heights in August 1991. If anti-Semitism is entrenched among the black elite, it has also clearly trickled down through all sorts of media—the black radio and press, rap lyrics, the teachings of black Muslims and academic Afrocentrists like Leonard Jeffries of City College, and the speaking appearances on campuses of Kwame Toure and Louis Farrakhan—as well as through the defensive support these black racists receive from high-profile black activists and clergymen.

The most conspicuous anti-Semite plying his trade in the summer of 1991 was Jeffries, whose relentless slurs against Jews enjoyed enormous attention in the press during the first weeks of August. When he was criticized, many mainstream blacks rushed to Jeffries's defense—or kept silent. Black newspapers like the *Amsterdam News* and the *City Sun*; the black radio station WLIB, long an open-air forum for anti-Semitic ranters; and some of the black activists who would later figure significantly in Crown Heights—Al Sharpton, Colin Moore, C. Vernon Mason, Sonny Carson, Lenora Fulani—all went to bat, expressing their approval of Jeffries's "scholarship" and denouncing his critics as race-baiters.

This, then, was the immediate background to the riot. Not only was anti-Semitism in the ether, it was gathering steam as a loud and increasingly mainstream black movement when a station wagon from the entourage of Menahem Schneerson, the Lubavitcher *rebbe*, careered out of control and crashed onto a Crown Heights sidewalk on the night of August 19, crushing to death a black child, seven-year-old Gavin Cato, and leaving his seven-year-old cousin, Angela Cato, badly injured.

The violence erupted immediately. When the driver of the station wagon, Yosef Lifsh, stepped out of his car with the intention of helping the children he had hit, he was set upon by angry black bystanders who beat and robbed him before the police could reach the scene. Moments later, an ambulance from the Jewish-run Hatzolah service arrived. Police, seeking to remove the object of the crowd's anger, directed the crew to take away Lifsh and his passengers. Before the Hatzolah vehicle was out of sight a city ambulance had arrived to begin the gory and laborious task of removing the Cato children from beneath the car, but Lifsh's attackers were enraged at the decision to place him in the first ambulance. Crying racism, the growing crowd was worked into a

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lather by a provocateur, described by witnesses as "tall and bald-headed," who chanted "Jews, Jews, Jews."

When the gathering dispersed, smaller groups ran off in different directions, smashing cars and hurling rocks and bottles at passers-by and homes. Shortly, a mob came upon Yankel Rosenbaum, a twenty-nine-year-old Australian ultra-Orthodox Jew—not a Hasid, as the papers still insist on calling him—who was in New York to conduct historical research at the YIVO Institute. Rosenbaum was beaten and stabbed by attackers who shouted "Get the Jew" and "Kill the Jew" before fleeing as police arrived on the scene.

Chasing after the scattering assailants, officers nabbed several suspects, including Lemrick Nelson, Jr. They brought him to Rosenbaum, who lay wounded on the hood of a car, and the dying man identified Nelson as his attacker. The police also reported finding a bloody knife and three bloody dollar bills in one of Nelson's pockets, and DNA testing later established that this blood corresponded to Rosenbaum's. Nelson was arrested and taken to the 71st precinct, where, according to the sworn testimony of detectives, he confessed to stabbing Rosenbaum. In the meantime, Rosenbaum was taken to Kings County Hospital, where two of his wounds were treated while a third went unnoticed and continued to bleed. He died shortly after midnight.

III

EXCEPT for one article in an obscure Trotskyite publication which hailed Rosenbaum's murder as a "revolutionary act," the killing of a Jew in Crown Heights was not championed by anyone at the riot as a boon for black activism. But Sharpton and Carson and the other demagogues who flocked to the neighborhood over the next days to capture the spotlight as leaders of the "protest" wasted no breath mourning Rosenbaum. Nor did they lament any of the other injuries, fire-bombings, looting, and property damage that followed his murder. Instead, they quickly conjured up their own version of events, according to which Gavin Cato's "murder" at the hands of the Jewish driver was the latest in a series of racial assassinations that included the killings of young black men in Howard Beach and Bensonhurst. By the time of Sharpton's speech at Gavin Cato's funeral, the list had expanded to include "the four girls who got killed in Birmingham one morning" during the 1960's civil-rights movement and "brother Malcolm [X]."

Separating themselves cunningly from the rioters, but never condemning their violence, Sharpton and his on-again-off-again partner, the lawyer Colin Moore, moved into high gear with a call for the arrest of Lifsh. Even though more than twenty similarly accidental vehicular deaths had occurred in Brooklyn since 1989 without a single arrest—several involving local Hasidim run down by blacks—Sharpton's pressure led Charles Hynes, the Brooklyn district attorney, into convening a grand jury. The jury found no cause for an indictment, but that did not stop Sharpton, even on the evening of Lemrick Nelson's acquittal, from continuing to demand a full investigation of the Lifsh case.

Throughout the three days and four nights of rioting in Crown Heights, and over the days of nonviolent marches that followed, no black leader stood up to denounce the anti-Semitism expressed by the rabble or the rabble-rousers. Signs with messages like "Hitler didn't do his job" bobbed over commemorative banners for Gavin Cato. On the sidewalks, young blacks taunted Hasidim with the teachings of Leonard Jeffries and Elijah Muhammed, the late leader of the Nation of Islam: "You came from Russia and Poland where you slept in caves. You sold slaves." Seeing my reporter's notebook, one rioter stopped to shout: "Write this down. Jews are murderers. The black Hitler is coming this time." Al Sharpton's rhetoric peaked at the Cato funeral:

> [T]he world will tell us he was killed by accident. Yes, it was a social accident. . . . It's an accident to allow an apartheid ambulance service in the middle of Crown Heights. It is an accident to think that we will keep crying and never stand up and call for justice. . . . What type of city do we have that would lie on our children and allow politics to rise above the blood of innocent babies? Have we lost all our moral fiber? . . . Talk about how Oppenheimer in South Africa sends diamonds straight to Tel Aviv and deals with the diamond merchants right here in Crown Heights. The issue is not anti-Semitism; the issue is apartheid. . . . All we want to say is what Jesus said: if you offend one of these little ones, you got to pay for it. No compromise, no meetings, no *kaffe klatsch*, no skinnin' and grinnin'. Pay for your deeds. . . . It's no accident that we know we should not be run over. We are the royal family on the planet. We're the original man. We gazed into the stars and wrote astrology. We had a conversation and that became philosophy. We are the ones who created mathematics. We're not anybody to be left to die waiting on an ambulance. We are the alpha and omega of creation itself. . . . We will win because we're right. We will win because we're strong. God is on our side.

Sharpton, who wears a medallion of Martin Luther King, Jr. around his neck, did well by this speech. Newspapers reported the diamond-merchants slur, but not a peep was heard from within the black community. No doubt the speech failed to provoke an outcry because it was not surprising, and it was not in the least bit new. It was simply another statement of the going poison of anti-Semitism and Afrocentrism, pitched to the righteous cadences of classic civil-rights oratory, a standard-issue compression of lies, bigotry, and nationalist swagger.

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When I interviewed Sharpton the next month, he was proud to point out that no violence had ever occurred while he was leading a march in Crown Heights, that no pro-Hitler signs had ever appeared in the ranks that followed him. This was true. But his claim that he had been turning black rage into nonviolent channels was absurd. He abandoned the neighborhood as soon as the fire had gone out in the furnace and there was no apparent advantage to be had in stirring the ashes. Had he and his colleagues stayed away in the first place, the rioters, by all accounts a disorganized, uncoordinated crew of unemployed young men, many of whom did not even live in the neighborhood, might well have scattered the morning after the accident.

IV

On the third day of the riot, at the time that I was speaking to Captain Mescolotto, Mayor David Dinkins was a few blocks away meeting with members of the black community, urging them to "Increase the peace," and getting nowhere. Stepping out of a meeting with the Cato family, he was greeted by a barrage of bottles and stones from a crowd that had gathered in the street; he had to retreat into the building before his guards could secure safe passage to his limousine. That night, the mayor increased the police. By the next evening, force and arrests had checked the uprising. Three days and four nights had gone by.

It took another three weeks before Dinkins—under pressure not only for his apparent inaction during the riot but also for having seemed to equate the racial murder of Yankel Rosenbaum with Gavin Cato's accidental death—called Rosenbaum's killing a "lynching." The *New York Times* article which reported that fact went to great pains to explain why the mayor had not spoken sooner:

> Although the mayor has condemned the murder of Mr. Rosenbaum again and again, his words have always been clearly aimed at keeping the peace. The mayor was forced to walk a fine line, with black protest leaders like the Rev. Al Sharpton crying for the arrest of the driver who killed the boy, and Jewish leaders calling for the arrests of more members of the crowd who attacked Mr. Rosenbaum.

The article then went on to quote from Dinkins's speech at the Cato funeral (he did not attend Rosenbaum's): "Two tragedies. One a tragedy because it was an accident. The other a tragedy because it was not."

The perception shared by the mayor and the press that the situation in Crown Heights was two-sided, and that both sides required equal respect and equal consideration, bears examination. A staple of mayoral rhetoric, this notion serves a general public desire for a nostalgic view of black-Jewish relations. Even today, in the wake of the Nelson verdict, there are those—in addition to Mayor Dinkins, they include Jesse Jackson, the editorialists of the *New York Times*, and even leading spokesmen of the non-Orthodox Jewish community—who define the problem as one of an interrupted "dialogue," a tragic rupture in the black-Jewish alliance to which both sides are understood to have contributed substantially. In the ongoing search for the "root causes" of the rioting, one still hears little mention of anti-Semitism.

Mayor Dinkins, it should be stipulated, seemed determined to do the right thing in Crown Heights. His failure to confront the anti-Semites forcefully was not a function of indifference, malice, or—as some have charged—racial prejudice. He failed to denounce black anti-Semitism not because he is black, but because he failed to see it. He virtually acknowledged as much in a speech following the Nelson verdict this past November at the Jewish Theological Seminary:

> Now I've already spoken repeatedly in the strongest terms about this shameful, inexcusable crime, and of my utter sadness that it was committed by individuals who belong to the one segment of our mosaic that should know in the most personal way just how monstrous a crime lynching is—the African-American community. But some people are just too tied to the politics of the past—they see everything through an ethnic prism—and *this*, brothers and sisters, is the real enemy: not you and I, but this idea of "us" and "them." . . .

So far, so good; but then it turned out that by "us and them" the mayor had in mind not the black anti-Semites but those who had charged *him* with responding inadequately to the riot:

> Some people look at this large and very complicated picture and they see only two things: the mayor is African-American and the rioters are African-American—and they conclude that, therefore, the mayor must have held the police back.

In gross contrast to his kid-glove handling of the black demagogues who stoked the rioters for days on end, Dinkins was here attempting to play turnaround with his Jewish critics. For raising questions about his role in Crown Heights, *they* were being racially divisive:

> There is not a single shred of evidence that I held the NYPD back—and there never will be. And every time this utterly false charge is repeated, the social fabric of our city tears just a little bit more. It must stop.

To make matters worse, Dinkins warned of a backlash by black lawmakers against Jewish politicians—a warning which some found it hard to distinguish from a threat.

But one can accept that Dinkins did not act as he did because he is black, and still argue that as mayor he did not move with appropriate swift-

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ness and force to quell the rioting, or to discredit the claims of the race-baiters behind it. By failing to do so, Dinkins essentially granted immense credibility to those who preached to blacks against Jews. He caved in to them physically by not ordering a police crackdown, and then he caved in to them rhetorically by accepting their terms of discussion.

Those let down by Dinkins in Crown Heights were not only Jews, and not only the city's white middle class—he had already let Asians down by standing aside during a black boycott of Korean grocery stores the year before—but most blacks as well. After all, the rioters in Crown Heights represented only a tiny percentage of the community, and their support within it was far from universal. At least as often as a black person came up to me to denounce Jews and justify the riots that August, another would come up to me to express neighborly feelings for the Jews and to denounce the riots. These working- and middle-class blacks were every bit as terrified as their Jewish neighbors by what was going on in the streets. They had homes and families and jobs; they had their heritage and their religion. Yet every time they picked up a newspaper or turned on the TV, or just looked out their window, they saw the word "black" identified with the forces of lawlessness and hate. Nobody was offering an equally powerful alternative voice to those forces, not even the mayor of the City of New York.

V

As the Nelson jury reached its verdict this past November, the city asked for a delay of several hours before it would be announced. Crown Heights and the area around the Brooklyn court house were then flooded with police, in anticipation of black unrest in the case of a conviction. And perhaps there would have been disturbances, although Nelson's trial had in fact never been taken up as a cause by anyone. He had spent fourteen months in jail, unable to raise the $150,000 bail, and aside from his family there was never any significant presence of supporters in the court. Even so, Mayor Dinkins's response to the not-guilty verdict was once again muted, especially when compared with his outright condemnation of the Rodney King verdict last summer. "It is always difficult when a terrible crime has been committed and no party is found guilty," the mayor said. "It somehow leaves one's sense of justice unfulfilled."

Once more the mayor's words were too little, too late (as they would be again when he first opposed and then welcomed a federal investigation into the case). Angry Hasidim poured out of the courthouse and marched across the Brooklyn Bridge to City Hall, chanting "No justice, no peace." There was some scattered violence in Crown Heights that night, perpetrated by both Hasidim and blacks, but as the Hasidim like to point out, nobody expected them to riot, and they did not.

The Hasidim of Crown Heights are no Gandhis. They tend to be openly critical of blacks, and their criticisms often smack of bigotry. Moreover, their uncompromising rejection of modern liberal society in favor of anachronistic, separatist ways makes them alien not only to their black neighbors but to just about everyone else, including the majority of their fellow Jews. It does not, however, prevent them from being fundamentally law-abiding.

At once anti-individualistic and radically exclusive, the Hasidim are seen by many as, in the words of one local police officer, "pretty basically un-American." But since when is it un-American to live by the words of that most American of poets, Robert Frost, "good fences make good neighbors"? To the Hasidim, it is in the American spirit to live as they please, free from persecution. As far as they are concerned, they were minding their own business in August 1991 when they were attacked and the city failed to protect them. Everything else that might be said, either about the riot or about them, is false or beside the point.

Their spirituality and their isolationism have not, however, prevented the Hasidim from becoming a formidable thorn in Mayor Dinkins's side. They have filed a class-action suit against the city, enumerating their claims of inadequate protection during the riot and pointing to the erasure of a month's worth of 911 emergency phone tapes which they had sought in evidence.

In response to mounting criticism, the mayor spent much of November making conciliatory gestures toward Jewish leaders, but these were often tainted by a growing testiness. He was particularly embittered when a few fliers were distributed among the Hasidim protesting the Nelson verdict, displaying his picture beneath the legend, "Wanted For Murder." In smaller type, the fliers explained:

> During the rioting, looting, and assaults in Crown Heights on the night of August 19, 1991, Mayor David Dinkins instructed the N.Y. Police Dept. not to take any action, but to allow the rioters to "*vent their rage.*" We therefore indict Mayor David Dinkins as an accomplice in the murder of Yankel Rosenbaum.

The accusation was plainly over the top: the quotation cannot be attributed to the mayor or substantiated by any known evidence, and Rosenbaum's murder took place before any city policy on the riot could have been formulated. Still, as violent reactions go in such charged situations, the flier seemed a relatively mild example of rhetorical excess. If such "Wanted" posters had been the grossest manifestation of rage by South-Central Los Angeles blacks after the Rodney King verdict, their designers would

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probably have been hailed for their creative channeling of anger.

Ironically, it was Dinkins himself who kept the image of the fliers alive. The work of unidentified agitators, the fliers had been roundly repudiated by Jewish leaders when the mayor brought them up again in a special televised address on the eve of Thanksgiving. With pain in his voice, he declared: "The poster identified me by name and by picture. . . . In burying a seven-year-old boy and a quiet Bible scholar, did we bury decency too?" By harping relentlessly on the most marginal and absurd charge against him, the mayor plainly sought to paint all his critics as hysterical provocateurs and racists and to place them on the defensive. When he told his Thanksgiving audience that "A few members of the clergy have forsaken the prayer book for the press release," he was not speaking of the black reverends who encouraged the Crown Heights riot, but of the Jews who would not let him forget it.

Still, Dinkins admitted for the first time in the Thanksgiving speech that "errors in judgment" had been made in the police response to the riot, and he said, "When a mistake is made. . . . I am accountable because the buck does stop here at this desk." He also acknowledged for the first time that black anti-Semitism played a role in Crown Heights, although the effect of his remark—"Hatred, of any kind, whether it is black anti-Semitism or Jewish racism, cannot be tolerated"—was blunted by equivocation.*

VI

DAVID DINKINS was elected in 1989 as a "racial healer," after campaigning against his predecessor, Edward I. Koch, in language not so different from that of the "Wanted" poster he now decries. He is currently at the beginning of his bid for a second term, and the issues that will come back to haunt him in this campaign are the same issues that he stood on in his first campaign: law and order, and racial equality. He has been accused of acting according to a racial double standard; if he means to regain the confidence of the city's voters he will have to show the courage to fight the divisiveness that comes *from* the black community as fiercely as he does that which is turned against it.

Simple political arithmetic dictates that in order to win, Dinkins must retain the Jewish support he had in 1989. A "study" published two years ago by the New York African American Institute at SUNY Albany (the same outfit that sponsored a notoriously anti-Semitic speech by Leonard Jeffries in July 1991) contends that Jews are racists because they voted for Dinkins in smaller numbers than for previous Democratic candidates. But the statistics published in that same report show that Jews voted for Dinkins in larger percentages than any other group of white voters, and that without the Jewish vote he would have lost the election. Dinkins has been mindful of this, and he has gone out of his way to appear solicitous of Jewish concerns. But the test of the mayor is not what he will say to Jews. It is what he will say to blacks—about the black racism, the anti-Semitism, and the lawlessness that were so frighteningly manifested in Crown Heights and that were then tolerated and for too long justified by the mindless application of a false paradigm of black victimization.

* A week later, Dinkins came under fire again when he leaped to judge as a bias crime the beating by Crown Heights Hasidim of a black burglary suspect. The quickness and emotion of his response stood in contrast to his delayed reaction to recent Jewish anger and injury.

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Islam vs. Democracy

Martin Kramer

In the summer of 1881, the English poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt wrote a series of essays subsequently published under the title, *The Future of Islam*. Blunt was a high-born patron of the downtrodden, a policy intellectual of sorts who enlivened the drawing rooms of Victorian ministers and viceroys. He had also fallen under the spell of the forerunners of modern Islamic fundamentalism. In his book, Blunt argued that these thinkers had carried Islam to the brink of a great religious reformation. Under their inspiration, he wrote,

> I committed myself without reserve to the Cause of Islam as essentially the "Cause of Good" over an immense portion of the world, and to be encouraged, not repressed, by all who cared for the welfare of mankind.

It fell upon England, as the world's greatest power, to "take Islam by the hand and encourage her boldly in the path of virtue."

More than a century later, a frantic quest for the "Cause of Good" in the Middle East and North Africa has again seized the West. In an era of democratization, these lands of Islam remain an anomaly—a zone of resistance to the ideals that have toppled authoritarian regimes of the Left and the Right. For several years now, political scientists and policy-makers, borne along by a tidal wave of research grants and federally-funded initiatives, have scanned the horizons of Islam for signs of democracy. In a plethora of academic papers and conferences, they have speculated on the reasons for the absence of democratic movements, and suggested what should be done to encourage their emergence. Suddenly, this past year, many of them reached a stunning conclusion: these movements have already appeared, in the guise of Islamic fundamentalism.

It has been a year of fervent Western testimonials. Islam, avers a noted journalist in *Foreign Affairs*, is now "at a juncture increasingly equated with the Protestant Reformation," due to the growing number of fundamentalists who "are now trying to reconcile moral and religious tenets with modern life, political competition, and free markets." What these "supposed fanatics" really want, writes a leading political scientist in *Ethics and International Affairs*, is "the end of corrupt, arbitrary, and unpredictable rule and the imposition of the rule of law and responsible government." The new Islamic fundamentalism should be seen "for what it is," concludes a former intelligence analyst in the *Washington Post*,

> a movement that is historically inevitable and politically "tamable." Over the long run it even represents ultimate political progress toward greater democracy and popular government.

These views now reverberate in the hearing rooms of Washington. The director of the CIA, Robert Gates, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February:

> I'm not ready yet to concede that Islamic fundamentalism is, by its nature, anti-Western and anti-democratic. There are some fundamentalist elements in the region—they're not in power—that are not necessarily that way. And I think that it's also an evolution.

"I had made myself a romance about these reformers," Wilfrid Blunt confessed fifteen years after publication of *The Future of Islam*, "but it has no substantial basis." Blunt was not the first Westerner to be swept off his feet, then left bewildered, by the promise of Islamic revival. Since the Enlightenment broke the lock of medieval prejudice against Islam, the reform of Islam had been declared inevitable, even imminent, by a parade of visionaries and experts. The current representation of Islamic fundamentalism as a portent of democracy has opened another chapter in this cyclical saga of hope and disillusionment. When that chapter comes to be written, it might begin by asking how Islamic fundamentalism, still loathing the West and loathed by it, yet became the hope of democratizers.

For most of the 1980's, those who saw Islamic fundamentalism for what it is saw groups as violent and dogmatic as any in the

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world. These were people who mixed nostalgia with grievance to produce a millenarian vision of an Islamic state—a vision so powerful that its pursuit justified any means. Angry believers invoked this Islam when they executed enemies of the revolution in Iran, assassinated a president in Egypt, and detonated themselves or abducted others in Lebanon. Their furious words complemented their deeds. They marched to chants of "Death to America" and intimidated all opponents with charges of espionage and treason. They did not expect to be understood, but they did want to be feared, and feared they were, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Yet their violence failed to overturn the region. While fundamentalists did seize the state in Iran, in most Arab countries they lurked about the edges of politics. They were often dangerous, and always fascinating, but they posed no mortal threat to the established order.

By the decade's end, however, many of these same groups had managed to transform themselves into populist movements, and even win mass followings. They did so by riding a huge tide of discontent, fed by exploding populations, falling oil prices, and economic mismanagement by the state. While regimes fumbled for solutions, the fundamentalists persuaded the growing numbers of the poor, the young, and the credulous that if they only returned to belief and implemented God's law, the fog of misery surrounding them would lift.

Islam is the solution, ran the fundamentalist slogan. What that meant, no one would say. The treatises of those billed as first-rate theoreticians seemed vague, by design. Here and there, fundamentalists organized model communities. Although billed as successful experiments in self-reliance, they were actually Potemkin mosques, built and supported with money from oil-rich donors. Fundamentalists also organized Islamic investment banks, which were supposed to prove that market economics could flourish even under the Islamic prohibition of interest. The most extensive experiment in Islamic banking, in Egypt, produced Islamic financial scandal in fairly short order.

But most of the new followers read no theory and lost no money. They stood mesmerized by the rhetorical brilliance of men like the Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi, Tunisia's Rashid al-Ghannushi, and Lebanon's Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. These preachers did not intone musty Islamic polemics against unbelievers. Often they sounded more like the tenured Left, venting professorial condemnations of the West's sins.

Indeed, many of them issued from the academy. Turabi, schooled at the University of London and the Sorbonne, had been a professor of law and a dean; Ghannushi, a professor of philosophy. They had overheard the West's self-incrimination, uttered in Left Bank cafés and British and American faculty lounges. This they reworked into a double-edged argument for the superiority and inevitability of Islam, buttressed not only by familiar Islamic scripture but by the West's own doomsday prophets, from Toynbee onward. These wise men of the West had confessed to capital crimes: imperialism, racism, Zionism. If *they* felt the tremors of the coming quake, could Muslims not feel them? Those who listened long enough to words pumped from pulpit amplifiers did indeed begin to feel a slight tremor, and the mosques filled to overflowing.

A great deal of solid scholarship on these movements appeared during the 1980's, making it difficult to view them benignly. Their theories of *jihad* and conspiracy, embedded in wordy tracts, received critical scrutiny. True, Edward Said, Columbia's part-time professor of Palestine, presented a contrary view in *Covering Islam*, a book which bemoaned the Western media's treatment of Islam. The book was much admired by the Islamic Jihad in Beirut, prolific deconstructionists (of U.S. embassies) who circulated it among Western hostages for their edification. But the violence of the fundamentalists made them a difficult sell, and when in 1989 they filled the streets to demand the death of the novelist Salman Rushdie, they bit the hands even of those few Western intellectuals who had tried to feed them. As the decade closed, Islamic fundamentalism could count on few foreign friends.

MEANWHILE, even as Islam's fundamentalists were demanding the death of Rushdie, a longing for democracy (and capitalism) swept across Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, rulers took fright at the scenes of revolution from Romania and East Germany, and proceeded to initiate tightly controlled experiments in political pluralism. At the time, the architects of these experiments had no sense of the fundamentalists' appeal; they thought that the openings would work to the benefit of parties advocating liberal reform.

But it was the fundamentalists who led the dash through the newly opened door. The first of a succession of surprises occurred in Egypt's parliamentary elections in 1987, when a coalition dominated by the fundamentalist Muslim Brethren emerged as the biggest opposition party in a contest gerrymandered to assure victory for the ruling party. The fundamentalists also outdistanced all other opposition parties in the 1989 elections for Tunisia's parliament, although a winner-take-all system gave every seat to the ruling party. That same year, the fundamentalists nearly captured the lower house of Jordan's parliament, in that country's first general election since 1967. Then,

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in 1990, the fundamentalists swept the country-wide local elections in Algeria.

Given these successes, almost overnight fundamentalist movements became the most avid and insistent supporters of free elections—an unpatrolled route to the power that had hitherto eluded them. Liberal Arab intellectuals, who had lobbied for democratic reforms and human rights for much of the 1980's, now retreated in disarray, fearful that freer press and elections might play straight into the hands of fundamentalists.

For Western theorists of democracy, it was as if the Arabs had defied the laws of gravity. Few admitted the bind as frankly as Jeane Kirkpatrick, who said:

> The Arab world is the only part of the world where I've been shaken in my conviction that if you let the people decide, they will make fundamentally rational decisions.

Most theorists, however, refused to be shaken. In order to synchronize the Arab predicament with the march of democracy, they developed a convenient theory—the theory of initial advantage.

The fundamentalists, according to this theory, enjoyed an advantage in the first stages of democratization: they knew how to organize, to stir emotions, to get out the vote. But "as civil society is enlivened," announced one political scientist, "it is only natural that the influence of the Islamist groups will be challenged." Then their appeal would fade, once the people enjoyed a full range of options. In the privacy of the voting booth, the voters would become rational actors, and elect liberals and technocrats who proposed serious answers to the crisis of Arab society.

Algeria's parliamentary election, first scheduled for June 1991 and then postponed until December, was to have proved the point. According to the theorists, Algeria had the best chance of giving birth to a liberal democracy. More than any other Arab country, Algeria enjoyed an intimate connection with Europe, and its elites were at home with the ways of the West. True, the new Algerian voter had already given one sweeping victory to the Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French acronym, FIS) in local elections. But expert opinion declared the FIS victory a "protest" against the corruption of the ruling party, not a vote for a stern regime of Islamic mores. Anyway, ran the argument, the FIS had lost its initial advantage, first by mismanaging the municipalities where it had assumed authority, and then by backing Saddam Hussein in his Kuwait blunder.

"Saddam's defeat has turned the Algerian political situation upside down," announced *L'Express*, "leaving the FIS in the worst position of all." It was safely predicted that Algerians would turn away from the sheiks in the upcoming parliamentary elections—a fair and free ballot, structured in technical consultation with the best Parisian authorities in the *sciences politiques*. "The FIS can now count on only a die-hard bloc of unemployed urban youths," opined an American political scientist in the *Journal of Democracy*, who found it "unlikely that the FIS will gain enough votes to dictate the makeup of the new government." Such confident assurances helped to anesthetize Algeria's elite, who secretly worshiped foreign expertise and looked surreptitiously to the foreign press to explain their own predicament to them.

Thus, Paris and Algiers were both astonished when the FIS won a landslide victory in the first round of the parliamentary election, nearly burying Algeria's regime and its Westernized elite. The Sudan's Turabi was right for once when he claimed that any observer with insight should have been able to predict the outcome: "The Western media wished this not to be so, so they hid the facts from everyone, so the results came as a surprise." But the self-deception went beyond the media, to the battery of democracy doctors who had ministered to the ailing Algerian polity. Their theory of initial advantage proved to be an immense blind spot, large enough to conceal a near-revolution.

ALGERIA confirmed something that has been demonstrated in study after study of fundamentalist movements: fundamentalism is no fad, but the preference of a generation. It will not stop on a dime—on the failure of Saddam's *jihad*, or the scandal surrounding Islamic banks in Egypt, or haphazard garbage collection in fundamentalist-run towns in Algeria. Nor do the fundamentalists now need a detailed plan to alleviate suffering, because they possess potent words, and those words vest suffering with meaning. In a Western polity, the Pied Pipers of the disaffected young could not hope to win power in a landslide vote. But the explosion of the young population in the Arab world has given this generation an immense electoral advantage. After Algeria's parliamentary election, the bleak reality could not be denied: free elections in the Middle East and North Africa were more likely to produce fundamentalist rule than not.

The failure to anticipate the FIS victory should have cut deeply into the credibility of Western democracy doctors, with their blithe promise that the fundamentalist appeal would fade in a truly free ballot. But over the past year they have rebounded with a new discovery. Fundamentalism, they now claim, is destined not to disappear but to triumph, because *it* is the yearning for democracy in Islamic camouflage.

Those who claim credit for this discovery muster three arguments in support of their contention that Islam has become the "Cause of Good," and that Islamic movements therefore deserve

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the sympathy the West has bestowed on democracy movements elsewhere. Paradoxically, each of these arguments has already been systematically refuted—by the fundamentalists themselves.

THE first argument holds that Islamic fundamentalism, whatever its past, has entered upon an evolution, and has already started to reconcile Islam with democratic values. As one academic apologist claims:

> Many Islamic activists have "Islamized" parliamentary democracy, asserting an Islamic rationale for it, and appeal to democracy in their opposition to incumbent regimes.

The distortion here does not lie in the claim of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Although the dominant interpretation of Islam has historically sanctioned authoritarian rule, the reinterpretation of Islamic sources, done with enough imagination, could conceivably produce an opposing argument for Islamic democracy. Here and there, intrepid Muslims have searched the divine word of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, and the early history of Islam in order to establish the democratic essence of Islam, buried deep beneath the chronicles of despotism.

But these are not the Muslims leading the fundamentalist movements now bidding for power. Fundamentalists insist they have not demanded free elections in order to promote democracy or the individual freedoms that underpin it, but to promote Islam. Inded, when leading fundamentalist thinkers do address the broader question of democracy, it is not to argue its compatibility with Islam but to demonstrate democracy's inferiority to Islamic government. Such a virtuous government, they affirm, can rest only on obedience to the divinely-given law of Islam, the *shari'a*.

A deception lurks in any description of the fundamentalists as being committed to the rule of law, for the *shari'a* is not legislated but revealed law; as such, in the eyes of the fundamentalists it has already achieved perfection, and while it is not above some reinterpretation, neither is it infinitely elastic. If anything, fundamentalist exegesis has rejected reformist attempts to stretch the law much beyond its letter, and has even magnified the differences between Islamic and universal law.

At the heart of these differences reside Islamic law's principled affirmations of inequality, primarily between Muslims and non-Muslims, secondarily between men and women. This has made fundamentalists into the most unyielding critics of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom to choose one's religion and one's spouse. Both freedoms indisputably contradict Islamic law, which defines conversion out of Islam as a capital offense, and forbids marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. (In 1981, the leading fundamentalists met in Paris and put out an Islamic Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which omitted all freedoms that contradicted the *shari'a*.)

The *shari'a*, as a perfect law, cannot be abrogated or altered, and certainly not by the shifting moods of an electorate. Accordingly, every major fundamentalist thinker has repudiated popular sovereignty as a rebellion against God, the sole legislator. In the changed circumstances of the 1990's, some activists do allow that an election can serve a useful one-time purpose, as a collective referendum of allegiance to Islam, and as an act of submission to a regime of divine justice. But once such a regime gains power, its true measure is not how effectively it implements the will of the people but how efficiently it applies Islamic law.

The ideal of Islamic government most often evoked by the fundamentalists harks back to the notion of a just commander, ruling in consultation with experts in the law. There is a revulsion against the combat of parties and personalities in democratic politics, well expressed by the Sudan's Turabi, fundamentalism's best-known spokesman in the West. In a tract on the Islamic state, Turabi explains that such a state, once established, really has no need of party politics or political campaigns. While Islamic law does not expressly oppose a multiparty system,

> this is a form of factionalism that can be very oppressive of individual freedom and divisive of the community, and it is, therefore, antithetical to a Muslim's ultimate responsibility to God.

As for elections:

> In Islam, no one is entitled to conduct a campaign for themselves directly or indirectly in the manner of Western electoral campaigns. The presentation of candidates would be entrusted to a neutral institution that would explain to the people the options offered in policies and personalities.

Through this elaborate hedging, Turabi arrives at a tacit legitimation of one-party rule, which is the actual form of government he now justifies and supports in the Sudan.

Of the vast complex of democratic values and institutions offered by the West, the fundamentalists have thus seized upon only one, the free plebiscite, and even that is to be discarded after successful one-time use. They remain ambivalent, if not hostile, to party politics, and they spend much of their intellectual energy arguing that the reckless expansion of freedom can only harm the collective security of Islam. When asked which existing regime most closely approximates an ideal Islamic order, fundamentalists most often

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cite the governments of the Sudan or Iran—the first a military regime, the second a hierocracy ruled by an increasingly autocratic cleric, and both first-order violators of human rights.

THE second argument holds that Islamic fundamentalism drives many movements and represents a wide spectrum of views, not all of them extreme. Because of its diversity, the past or present performance of fundamentalism in one setting says nothing about its future performance in another. And this diversity also rules out domino-like progress: the world does not face an Islamintern, but a variety of local movements.

The concept of a diverse fundamentalism has wound its way to Washington, where it achieved full flower in a June 1992 speech by Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs:

> In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we thus see groups or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideals. There is considerable diversity in how these ideals are expressed. We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movements. What we do see are believers living in different countries placing renewed emphasis on Islamic principles, and governments accommodating Islamist political activity to varying degrees and in different ways.

But this claim for the diversity of fundamentalist movements—again labeled expectantly as movements of reform—is most convincingly countered by the fundamentalists themselves, with their uncanny knack for refuting every Western argument made on their behalf. Turabi put it best, in an interview granted just after the FIS success in the first round of the Algerian parliamentary election. The awakening of Islam, he said, has produced a movement notable for its *uniformity*. If there appear to be differences, that is because "God in His wisdom is varying and distributing the phenomenon to let people know that it is coming everywhere at all times."

The leading fundamentalists insist that their movement is pan-Islamic as a matter of principle. The borders that separate their countries, drawn up by European imperial fiat, do not bind them morally or limit them politically. And in practice, fundamentalist movements have an irresistible tendency to think and act across borders. Over the past decade, the international traffic among Islamic fundamentalists has grown intense. Fundamentalist leaders jet from conference to conference to open channels that will assure the rapid transmission of ideas and mutual aid. They learn from one another, imitate one another, and assist one another.

The greatest success of their joint efforts has been the aid they collectively mobilized for the Afghan *mujahideen* during the 1980's—aid that included money, materiel, and thousands of volunteers who fought in the Islamic *jihad* against the Soviet occupation. No less striking has been the success of the Islamic Republic of Iran in implanting the indomitable Hezbollah, a fundamentalist movement faithful to Iran's revolution, on Lebanese soil, where it has waged a largely successful *jihad* against American, French, and Israeli forces.

Thanks to the jet, the cassette, and the fax, pan-Islam is no longer a bogey but a growing reality. Turabi, for example, categorizes Islamic fundamentalism as a "pan-national movement," and the Sudan's policy reflects it. The Sudan has run Algerian voting data through its computers for the FIS, it has provided diplomatic passports for foreign fundmentalists, and it has brought the foremost fundamentalists to Khartoum to create an Islamic Arab Popular Conference, of which Turabi is secretary. Iran is still more active, not only continuing to finance Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also including a line item in its budget for support of the Palestinian *intifada*—monies which have gone largely to fundamentalists who battle the peace process. Visitors to Khartoum and Teheran, and even to Amman, are astonished at the odd mix of foreign fundamentalists who can be spotted in hotel lobbies and government ministries.

There is, in short, much ado about something, part of which is visible aboveboard in publicized visits and conferences, part of which is arranged in the conspiratorial fashion mastered by the fundamentalists during their long years underground. And so the apologists, preoccupied with imaginary changes in the substance of the fundamentalist message, overlook perhaps the most important transformation of all: the emergence of a global village of Islamic fundamentalism.

ACCORDING to the final argument, fundamentalism, whatever the dangers it might pose to freedoms or borders, still poses no real threat to Western interests or to the stability of a new world order. The fundamentalists' goals cannot be achieved in defiance of the West. States which have sold oil to the West will still sell it; states which have needed Western aid will still need it. Once in power, promises another Western apologist, fundamentalists will

> generally operate on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally interdependent world.

But where their apologists see an interdependent world, the fundamentalists themselves see a starkly divided world. During the Gulf crisis, they championed the view that any partnership be-

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tween believers and nonbelievers constituted a violation of divine order. Therefore, while Saddam may have done wrong when he invaded Kuwait, King Fahd, who depended on "American 'Crusaders'" to defend Saudi Arabia, most certainly sinned. Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, official spokesman of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, announced that "Islamic law does not permit any enlisting of assistance from polytheists [*mushrikun*]." According to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the exiled leader of the Tunisian fundamentalist movement, Saudi Arabia had committed a colossal crime. Of Saddam, no friend of Islam before the crisis, he said:

> We are not worshiping personalities, but anyone who confronts the enemies of Islam is my friend and anyone who puts himself in the service of the enemies of Islam is my enemy.

For fundamentalists, the identity of the enemy has remained constant since Islam first confronted unbelief. In *their* vision of interdependence, Islam will indeed sell its oil, provided that it is allowed to invest the proceeds in instruments of war which will enable Muslims to deter any form of Western intervention. This proliferation will eventually create a world order based not on American hegemony but on a restored balance of power—and terror. As Hezbollah's mentor, Fadlallah, says in a transparent reference to military might and the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons:

> We may not have the actual power the U.S. has, but we had the power previously and we have now the foundations to develop that power in the future.

THIS restored balance between Islam and the West excludes the intrusive existence of Israel in the lands of Islam. Unlike several Arab regimes and some elements of the PLO, which have grudgingly accepted the reality of the Jewish state, the fundamentalists remain uncompromisingly theological in their understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestine is a land sacred to Islam, a land stolen by the Jews. Not an inch may be alienated. Israel is a cancer in the Islamic world, implanted by imperialism and nurtured by the U.S. The Jewish state has to be fought, passively through nonrecognition, actively through *jihad*. This view is shared by fundamentalists of all stripes, from the many Sunni movements in the Muslim Brethren tradition to the Shiite movements that receive guidance and support from Iran.

The opening of direct talks among Israel, the Palestinians, and other Arab states has revealed how tenaciously the fundamentalists adhere to their rejection of any negotiated accommodation. Said the Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi on the eve of the 1991 Madrid conference:

> We are the major nation in this region, whereas the Jews are an alien and temporary entity. It is our judgment that the Jews should leave the region.

This might have been taken for an extreme position had not so many Western commentators labeled Musawi a moderate upon his assassination by Israel a few months later.

A few fundamentalists have allowed that the simple elimination of the state of Israel, without the expulsion of the Jews living there, would satisfy the precepts of Islam. As Turabi told a Washington audience last May:

> Islamists think that principles have to be observed. That is not to say that the Jews have to be thrown out, but they [the Islamists] think that the Palestinians are entitled to their land.

That land, according to Turabi, includes all of Palestine, and he avers that he cannot accept recognition of Israel under any terms. Indeed, on his return to Khartoum, a troubled Turabi warned the visiting PLO chairman Yasir Arafat that some Arab states were plotting against the Palestinian cause, and were "befriending Israel in much the same way they did in the days of the Crusaders." The Crusader analogy, having been pressed into service to explain the American deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia, has now returned to regular duty as the fundamentalist frame of reference for Israel's "usurpation" of Palestine.

As the peace talks have proceeded, Islam's fundamentalists have begun to mold Muslim opinion in favor of a resumption of the *jihad* for Palestine. Ibrahim Ghawsha, speaking for Hamas, the largest Palestinian fundamentalist movement, has drawn analogies that go beyond the usual parallel of Israel and the Crusaders:

> We think the conflict between the Arabs and Jews, between the Muslims and the Jews, is a cultural conflict that will continue to rage throughout all time. . . . Algeria fought for 130 years. Even the Baltic states, which were occupied by the Soviets, have had their independence recognized by world states 45 years after they were occupied. The Palestine question is only [about] 40 years old, considering that it came into being in 1948. We are at the beginning of the road. Our adversary needs to be dealt with through a protracted and continuous confrontation.

An escalation of fundamentalist violence has indeed met every sign of progress in the talks. Jordanian fundamentalists have tried to penetrate Israel's border with Jordan. Palestinian fundamentalists from Hamas and the several branches of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have launched knifing and gun attacks against Israelis. And Hezbollah has stepped up attacks against Israel's security zone in south Lebanon, and even sent rockets into northern Israel. Their ascending vio-

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lence may not have stalled the peace talks, but the fundamentalists hope that if they can draw enough blood, it will strengthen their argument that the Zionist entity does not constitute an irreversible fact, and that steadfastness in battle will deliver all of Palestine to Islam.

For movements that have supposedly forsaken the violence of *jihad*, it is remarkable how persistently and passionately they invoke it against "Crusaders" and Jews alike.

DEMOCRACY, diversity, accommodation—the fundamentalists have repudiated them all. In appealing to the masses who fill their mosques, they promise, instead, to institute a regime of Islamic law, make common cause with like-minded "brethren" everywhere, and struggle against the hegemony of the West and the existence of Israel. Fundamentalists have held to these principles through long periods of oppression, and will not abandon them now, at the moment of their greatest popular resonance.

These principles bear no resemblance to the ideals of Europe's democracy movements; if anything, they evoke more readily the atavism of Europe's burgeoning nationalist Right. The refusal to see Islamic fundamentalism in this context, or to take seriously the discourse of the Islamists, is evidence of the persistent power of the West to create a wholly imaginary Islam. In this instance, the myth of fundamentalism as a movement of democratic reform assures the West that no society on earth has the moral resources to challenge the supremacy of Western values: even Islam's fundamentalists, cursing the ways of foreigners, will end up embracing them. This is a reassuring gospel, but it necessarily ignores Islam as it is actually believed and practiced by the fundamentalists, and this denial has sowed the seeds of future disillusionment.

As for the fundamentalists themselves, they and their apologists warn against the futility of resisting the fundamentalist surge. "Islam is a new force that is going to come anyway, because it's a wave of history," Turabi assures his Western listeners, and "superficial obstacles will certainly not stand in the way." In fact, fundamentalism will triumph no matter what the West does, because it "thrives" on repression.

But does it, after all? The regime and elite of Algeria (like those of Iraq) still rule despite predictions of their inevitable collapse, and seem to draw on unexpectedly deep reservoirs of resolve. In Tunisia and Egypt, too, governments have taken a page from the Algerian book and instituted stiff measures against their own fundamentalist oppositions. Movements which grew more vocal and violent as the Algerian fundamentalists marched toward power have lost their confidence now that the FIS leaders have been marched off to prison.

Contrary to Turabi's claim, then, the fundamentalists have not thrived on repression. While the support for these movements is broad, it is not uniformly deep. A fundamentalist movement, when faced with the massive force of the state, can also be broken, following the precedent of the Syrian movement whose leaders were killed, jailed, and exiled by a determined regime in early 1982. Syria's Islamic opposition has not been heard from since, and its fate stands as a grim reminder to the fundamentalists of the price a movement may pay if it relies on divine protection alone.

THE present stage in the strategy of the fundamentalists is therefore charged with irony. As governments crack down on fundamentalist movements, their apologists and even their leaders have taken to pleading more vociferously for the *deus ex machina* of American intervention. The same fundamentalists who condemned Saudi Arabia's enlisting of assistance from "polytheists" would enlist some of it themselves, if they could. Their approach has been to tug at the conscience of the Western democracies. In particular, they ask that the United States intervene to protect the rights of free speech and assembly so precious to the West, and press for free elections throughout the region. "I am trying to tell my audiences that the values which are dear to them are also common to Islam," said a disingenuous Turabi in Washington, especially citing "free government based on consultation and participation."

Until now, the fundamentalists have offered nothing in exchange for this protection. In his policy speech on Islam last June, Assistant Secretary Edward Djerejian expressed suspicion

> of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance.

Yet the speech left open the possibility of an accommodation if fundamentalists ceased to be "extreme," and so demonstrated that fundamentalism's apologists had won acceptance of their most essential point: fundamentalism is a movement of "reform," itself susceptible of reform. With Djerejian's speech, the United States moved, in Blunt's formulation, "to take Islam by the hand and encourage her boldly in the path of virtue."

If those hands are joined, the overture to fundamentalism promises to be the riskiest policy venture of the next decade in the Middle East and North Africa. According to one academic analyst,

> The 21st century will test the ability of political analysts and policy-makers to distinguish be-

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tween Islamic movements that are a threat and those that represent legitimate indigenous attempts to reform and redirect their societies.

Would that these movements could be divided into two such broadly opposed categories. But every movement combines threat and "reform" in a seamless message, and much of the supposed reform is threatening as well—to women, minorities, and the occasional novelist who would write a book on Islam. Which of these movements could be trusted with power, and which would betray that trust at the first opportunity? No one can possibly know, because the threat that resides in fundamentalism is anchored to its foundations, and is liable to resurface at critical moments when the peace and stability of the region hang in the balance.

Political pluralism and peace do have true friends in the Middle East and North Africa. They are beleaguered and dazed by the generational surge of Islamic fundamentalism, and they are divided over the fate of Algeria and its implications. Some have been ridiculed by the democracy theorists as self-styled liberals, guilty of peddling the view that existing governments are preferable to the anointed fundamentalists. But their forebodings are as justified as those of Westerners who shudder at the rise of their own extreme Right, and they remain democracy's only hope in the Arab world. In partnership with gradually liberalizing regimes they might just muddle through—provided they are not sacrificed on the altar of a bankrupt paradigm.

When Wilfrid Blunt published *The Future of Islam* in 1882, that future seemed to belong to the Mahdists, the zealots of the day, who within a few years took Khartoum, seized Western hostages, and threatened all of Islam with revolution. But by the century's close, Mahdism in the Sudan had been contained and finally destroyed, and a French observer could write that "Islam today is vanquished, its political decadence . . . inevitable." The demise of present-day Islamic fundamentalism is no more inevitable than its triumph. But this movement too could well be spent by the end of this century, especially if it is not abetted by a misguided reprise of the Carter administration's policy toward Iran—a policy which, in the name of human rights, first inaugurated the era of the ayatollahs.

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De Gaulle

Elie Kedourie

CHARLES DE GAULLE died in 1970 at the age of eighty. He was thus fifty years old when, as an unknown officer recently promoted to the (temporary) rank of brigadier general, he made his famous broadcast from London rejecting the capitulation of France to the Nazis after the debacle of May-June 1940. From that time, and until he resigned as President of the French Republic in April 1969, he was a more or less constant presence on the world scene, spoken of in the same breath as Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. During the 30 years which spanned the call to his countrymen over the BBC and his death at his house in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, he was able again and again, by dint of his determination and his powerful personality, to impose his vision and his will on events which were momentous for his country and for the world.

To give a proper account of such a long and crowded life, to exhibit the hero's character in all its complexity and contradictions, keeping in view both the wood and the trees, is a daunting task from which many writers would flinch. One's admiration for the French political journalist Jean Lacouture, who has undertaken this task and triumphantly brought it to a conclusion,* is thus very great—all the greater in that the kind of biography he has written, with its spacious narrative and meticulous concern for detail, though very familiar in the English-speaking world, is a genre hardly practiced by French authors. Lacouture's style, moreover, elegant, ironical, lively, witty, and allusive, carries the narrative forward at a smart pace, engaging the reader's interest all the way.

A VALUABLE feature of this biography is that it serves to situate Charles de Gaulle in his particular familial and social milieu. His father, a product of Jesuit education, himself became a teacher in Jesuit *collèges*. When the religious *congrégations* were expelled from France at the beginning of the century, he founded and headed a private school run on the same principles. Both he and his wife were fervent Catholics and monarchists. Henri de Gaulle believed that the Revolution of 1789, like the Protestant Reformation, was in essence Satanic, and that to love the Revolution was to become remote from God. It was natural that he should have been an early subscriber to the paper of the ultra-nationalist, anti-Dreyfusard movement, *Action française*. His son Charles continued to read it into the 1930's.

By tradition and upbringing, then, Charles de Gaulle belonged on one side of the great divide which ever since 1789 had split—and in many ways still splits—French society and politics. But in the case of both de Gaulle and his father, some qualifications have to be made.

Some time after the Dreyfus trial, Henri de Gaulle began to doubt the captain's guilt and to set his face against the anti-Dreyfusard hysteria. His son Charles was neither a follower of Charles Maurras, the leading ideologist of *Action française*, nor a monarchist. He identified himself, in a mystical sort of way, with France itself. Although France had been made by the French kings, it had in time become a republic, and from the very beginning of his career as an officer de Gaulle was faithful to republican institutions. As for his religion, he was certainly raised as a Catholic, but his loyalty to Catholicism was bound up with his consuming loyalty to France, to the idea of France. As he told a nephew, "I am a Christian by reason of history and geography."

The adolescent de Gaulle seems to have been already fully formed in his outlook and attitudes. They exemplified those of a certain French society, traditionalist in its political loyalties, *bien pensant* in its religion, attached to the idea of French greatness, and taking for granted public service and the sacrifice necessary to defend and preserve that greatness. De Gaulle was, naturally, bent on a military career, one which would enable him to render a signal service to his country.

ELIE KEDOURIE was one of the leading contemporary scholars of world politics and a longstanding contributor to COMMENTARY. The present article, in a somewhat expanded version, was among the last projects he completed before his death last June at the age of sixty-six.

* Volume I, *Le Rebelle 1890-1944*; Volume II, *Le Politique 1944-1959*; Volume III, *Le Souverain 1959-1970*, Editions du Seuil (Paris), 1984-86. An abridged English translation in two volumes has been published by Norton: *The Rebel 1890-1944*, 615 pp., $29.95, and *The Ruler 1945-1970*, 640 pp., $29.95.

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At the age of fifteen he already had a vision of himself at the head of an army confronting and repelling a German invasion of France.

In 1909 he applied, and was admitted, to the officers' school of Saint-Cyr, and after six months' service he was promoted to the rank of corporal. To someone who suggested that his abilities justified promotion to sergeant, de Gaulle's commanding officer retorted that the suggestion was absurd, given that the young soldier would have considered beneath him anything other than the rank of *connétable*—i.e., the supreme commander of the army in France under the monarchy. In a felicitous phrase, Lacouture describes de Gaulle as striving, from his very beginnings, to make himself his own Pygmalion. *Connétable* he considered himself, and *connétable* he would become.

On graduating from Saint-Cyr in 1912, de Gaulle was appointed lieutenant in an infantry regiment commanded by Colonel Philippe Pétain. This was the beginning of a long and complex relationship which started on de Gaulle's side as almost filial but suffered progressive estrangement, and then after 1940, when Pétain became the head of the Vichy government under the Nazis, turned into one of irreducible opposition and enmity.

During World War I, Lieutenant de Gaulle was twice wounded on the Western Front, received the *croix de guerre*, and was promoted to captain. In 1916 he took part in the deadly battles at Verdun. His company was decimated, and he himself was thought to have fallen in battle. In fact, the wounded de Gaulle had been taken prisoner. Between 1916 and 1918, he tried twice to escape from captivity, but was recaptured on both occasions.

In 1922, Captain de Gaulle was admitted to the *Ecole supérieure de guerre*, the military equivalent of the *Ecole normale supérieure* where generations of French statesmen and government officials received their training. He spent two years there. His teachers, though impressed with his abilities and his intellect, nonetheless had their doubts. One of them noted that de Gaulle spoiled his undoubted qualities by excessive self-confidence and by his disdain for the views of others. His attitude, the teacher noted, was that of "an exiled king."

In 1925 de Gaulle was appointed to the staff of Pétain, who was by then a marshal and the vice president of the Supreme War Council. There, de Gaulle was to serve as Pétain's draftsman or ghost writer. In particular, Pétain had in mind a survey of the French soldier through the ages, which de Gaulle would draft under Pétain's guidance and which would eventually appear under the marshal's name. De Gaulle was busy with this task for two years, but when he left Pétain's service in 1927, he was given to understand that his work would be changed or amended by the officer who had taken his place. De Gaulle objected, and some years later, over Pétain's protests, he brought out a modified version of the work under his own name.

By the time *La France et son armée* (*France and Its Army*) was published (in 1938), de Gaulle already had a number of other works to his credit. These, fresh, original, eloquent, went counter to established doctrine among French military leaders about the conduct of war under modern conditions. Thus, de Gaulle was one of the first to see the potentialities of armor on the battlefield in making possible, indeed mandatory, a war of movement, a *Blitzkrieg*, to use the term which characterized the similar strategy adopted by the German army and which enabled it swiftly to overrun France in 1940.

His writings also put forward a distinctive view of the military vocation, and of military leadership. The army, for de Gaulle, was akin to a religious order. He envisaged a professional force, dedicated to the defense of the state and the advancement of its interests, and commanded by a leader devoid of prejudice and unencumbered by clients, "strong enough to impose himself, adroit enough to persuade and attract, great enough to undertake a great task." In *Vers l'armée de métier* (*Toward a Professional Army*), published a year after Hitler's coming to power, he called for a reconstruction of French institutions which would of necessity begin with the army, "the most complete expression of the spirit of a society."

Between 1927, when he left Pétain's staff, and 1931, de Gaulle commanded an army unit stationed in Germany, and then served in Beirut as head of intelligence and operations. When he came back to Paris in 1931, he was attached to the general secretariat of the Ministry of War, an important post which he occupied until 1937 when he was appointed to command a tank regiment headquartered in Metz. During this period he was not only becoming better known as an author, but his presence in Paris allowed him to seek support for his ideas in political circles—ideas of which his military superiors were contemptuously dismissive. Through the circle of Colonel Mayer, which he assiduously frequented, de Gaulle was able to approach prominent politicians to convey his sense of the imminent danger posed by Hitler—which he saw very early—and to advocate a change in strategic views and a much greater emphasis on armor and on the war of movement. He even saw Léon Blum shortly after Blum became Prime Minister in 1936, but the interview produced no results.

Some two years earlier, de Gaulle had established relations with Paul Reynaud, a former minister and by then a very influential figure in the National Assembly. Reynaud read *Vers l'armée de métier*, was persuaded by it, and henceforth became a champion of the colonel's ideas. Reynaud

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became Prime Minister on March 19, 1940. Less than two months later, the Germans invaded and quickly routed the French. Facing a disaster, Reynaud replaced the commander-in-chief and himself took over the Ministry of War.

On May 23, de Gaulle was promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general. On June 3, he sent a remarkable letter to the Prime Minister, pointing out that the French defeat had resulted from the application by the Nazis of military concepts which he himself had propounded for France but which the French command had refused to employ. Now, he continued, Reynaud had given power and position to yesterday's men—Pétain as vice president of the Council of Ministers, and Maxime Weygand as the new commander-in-chief—who would lose the war if they were not stopped. The country would welcome the advent of a new man, fit for the new kind of war. He wished to serve by Reynaud's side, but not as a mere official. If Reynaud could not appoint him under-secretary of state for war, then let him be the commander of the armored corps. "Let me say without bashfulness," the letter concluded, ". . . that I alone am able to command this corps which shall be our supreme resource. Having invented it, I make bold to direct its use." Two days later, de Gaulle's appointment as undersecretary of state for war was announced.

It was, however, entirely too late. Between his appointment and the French capitulation on June 17, de Gaulle did his best to encourage Reynaud to continue fighting, but in the end Reynaud gave in to the views of the majority of his cabinet and resigned. Pétain succeeded him and immediately asked for an armistice. De Gaulle had just returned to Bordeaux—where the government had taken refuge—from a visit to London where he had persuaded Churchill to offer an Anglo-French union. He immediately decided to go back to London and from there, on June 18, he made the historic broadcast in which he rehearsed the reasons for the French defeat and predicted that the same tanks which had destroyed the French army would one day serve to destroy the victors. "Whatever happens," he concluded, "the flame of French resistance must not go out and will not go out."

THE brigadier general (temporary) was now on his own. His country defeated, he chose to throw in his lot with a power whose own survival was, to say the least, very questionable. Britain, moreover, though an ally of the Third Republic, was now looked upon as a quasi-enemy by the French soldiers and politicians who had decided to bet on a Nazi victory—and in the summer of 1940 that looked like an almost sure bet. Such a victory, these Frenchmen believed, would ensure the survival of France, albeit with a diminished status, and would eradicate the anticlerical and godless Third Republic which had been exploited, corrupted, and destroyed at the hands of Jews and Freemasons.

By his connections and upbringing, by his profession and professional associations, de Gaulle might have been expected to sympathize with such views and attitudes. But ever since his period of service on Pétain's staff he had increasingly become the adversary of the ruling military orthodoxy and its proponents. And there was something else of even greater importance, something which went to the very heart of the contention between him and most of his fellow officers and military superiors. In 1926 or 1927, when he was drafting for Pétain the book which he later published under his own name, de Gaulle had referred to the political frenzy which at the time of the French Revolution had made a plaything of the French generals, depriving them "of prestige, often of their life, and sometimes of their honor." Pétain, in going over the draft, had changed the order of the words, putting "life" at the end of the sentence to emphasize its primacy over prestige and honor. De Gaulle wrote a rejoinder on the margin: "This is a gradation: prestige, life, honor," half-underlining the last word. This punctilious and steadfast preference of honor over life proved after 1940 to be the foundation on which de Gaulle built his political career.

In the four years between the London broadcast and his triumphant entry into Paris on August 25, 1944, de Gaulle, from being an unknown officer sentenced to death by the lawful government of his country, made himself into the embodiment of the French state. His outraged sense of honor was the goad which drove him. This was not, however, a blind or irrational passion, for he rightly believed that there had been no need to capitulate in June 1940, since the Republic, with its navy intact and a great number of troops at its disposal overseas, could have fought on from a North African base.

He was thus correct to despise Pétain and his followers as defeatists. But he could do nothing to dislodge Pétain, who had the support of the bulk of the French people, or to drive out the occupying power. To achieve any of this, the military might of Britain, and above all of the United States, was indispensable.

Moreover, his Vichy opponents could and did argue that what de Gaulle advocated was mad and dangerous, and that it was safer for the French people to accept the harsh conditions of the armistice, with a large part of France free of occupying armies, than to go on fighting a war which would inflict new and greater suffering. Besides, the outcome of such a war was doubtful in the extreme: it looked as if the Axis powers would win, but even if they lost, France could avoid the consequences of defeat at no cost to itself. Either way, de Gaulle's speeches and posturings could not by themselves affect the results.

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The President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, thought very little of de Gaulle and his Free French, considering it much better to maintain good relations with Pétain, who controlled a territory and an administration and whose authority was recognized in North Africa and other parts of the French empire. Roosevelt's antagonism continued unabated until the Normandy landings in the summer of 1944, when the Americans actually proposed that France be administered by an Allied military government, as Italy had been after the invasion of the previous year.

By that point, however, it had become clear that this was an impracticable and foolish policy. Unlike Italy, France was not a former enemy—and anyway, the Allies had already recognized de Gaulle's Committee of National Liberation as representing French interests. Roosevelt's policy, whatever its original justification in 1940, now seemed merely the expression of a gratuitous hostility, and had to be abandoned.

Roosevelt's attitude to the Free French was later responsible, in part, for de Gaulle's own hostility, during his years of power after 1958, to those whom he called the Anglo-Saxons. Another powerful and lasting cause of his festering resentment had to do with the destruction of the French position in the Levant at the hands of the British—approved and supported by the U.S.—in 1942-45. The British invaded the two French-mandated territories of Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1941, accompanied by a small Free French contingent. They formally recognized Free French authority there, but in a foolish and shortsighted policy from which neither they nor the populations concerned were to reap benefit, did their best to incite the local governments to defy the French mandatory power. Not only was de Gaulle unable to resist, he also had to endure the taunts of Vichy that he was the dupe or lackey of the British. This humiliation, and the powerlessness which caused it, de Gaulle was not to forget.

De Gaulle entered Paris on August 25, 1944, and installed himself in the Ministry of War. The situation which confronted him was daunting. As the head of the provisional government of the French Republic, he had to attend to the military operations in eastern France where the German threat was far from eliminated. He had to remedy the penury to which Germans had reduced Frenchmen. He had to reestablish legality and the authority of the government in a country riven by hatreds and ferocious desires for vengeance, and where Resistance forces, mostly leftist and Communist, sought to impose themselves in those areas where they had operated.

The head of the provisional government had next to confront a range of issues which were both complicated and unfamiliar. It was no longer a simple question of standing fast against the Germans, against Vichy, against Roosevelt. It was now a matter of governing a country emerging from a ruinous foreign occupation, divided upon itself, and where the political parties which had been active in the Third Republic, and others which emerged at the liberation, were by no means willing to obey the general without question. De Gaulle, to do him justice, in no way envisaged running the country single-handedly; he was advised and assisted by a Consultative Assembly which had been set up in Algiers. Over a year after the liberation of Paris, elections were held for a Constituent Assembly.

Very soon, however, it became clear that he and the political parties in the Assembly (where the Communists were the largest group, followed by the Socialists and the Christian Republicans) were at loggerheads. De Gaulle was determined that the Fourth Republic should on no account suffer from the instability, the disorder, the anarchy promoted by party quarrels in the Third Republic, while the parties in the Assembly, the Communists in particular, resented de Gaulle and accused him of Bonapartism and dictatorial tendencies. Such a state of affairs could not last for very long. On January 20, 1946, the savior of his country, unprepared to subordinate his policies to the whims and ambitions of shifting parliamentary majorities, resigned his office.

He may have expected that the Assembly, finding itself rudderless, would recall him to power. But this did not happen. De Gaulle retired from the political scene, only to reemerge with a new political organization, *Rassemblement du peuple français* (Assembly of the French People), which was intended to be above and beyond the sordid factions battening on the body politic. This venture was clearly an attempt to recreate in peacetime the kind of natural solidarity called forth by the need to resist a foreign invader; as such, it was out of place in governing a polity where a multitude of interests and views were in perpetual competition.

De Gaulle's philosophy of government was encapsulated in a speech of October 1944 which, Lacouture rightly remarks, sets out the views he was never to abandon and scarcely to modify during the quarter-century which followed. He showed himself in this speech to be a thoroughgoing *dirigiste*. In order to exploit the resources which belonged in common to the French people, he declared, there was no other way than "what is called the *planned economy*." "We want the state," he went on, "to direct the economic effort of the whole nation to the benefit of all." The state must take direction of the principal sources of the wealth which was the common possession of the people, and should also supervise some of the other economic activities. (He did add that this should not exclude initiative and the quest for just profit.)

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THE *Rassemblement*, which initially attracted a great deal of public support, proved a failure. In 1947, it won 40 percent of the vote in municipal elections, but by the 1951 general elections its vote was down to 22 percent, and in 1956 plummeted to 4 percent. In the same year an opinion poll revealed that only 1 percent of the electorate wished to see de Gaulle at the head of affairs.

Yet de Gaulle had not given up his political ambitions. In April 1954 he confided to a follower that he wanted to return to office and would undoubtedly do so. He felt confident because the French were losing the war in Indochina, and this would once again, as in 1940, open to him the gates of power.

To climb again to the supreme power, de Gaulle was counting on a catastrophe. What took place in May-June 1958 was not exactly a catastrophe—and certainly nothing in any way to compare with the debacle of 1940—but a complication of plot and intrigue, and the threat of a military *coup d'état*.

It had to do with Algeria. The guerrilla-led Algerian insurrection, which began in November 1954, posed a formidable threat to French rule and even to the stability of the Fourth Republic. A large army had to be sent from the metropolis, while the status of the native majority and the position of the European settlers in Algeria became a pressing political issue. Between the end of 1954 and May 1958, when the Fourth Republic came to an end, successive governments grappled with the problem. At the time and afterward, Gaullists sneered at the efforts made by these governments to end the insurrection and institute equity between natives and Europeans. Yet by the summer of 1958, when de Gaulle took over, these unstable and short-lived governments had won the "battle of Algiers," had methodically worked to reduce terrorism elsewhere in the country, and had set up a fortified barrier on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier which the guerrillas in the so-called Army of National Liberation were powerless to penetrate.

To defeat the insurrection, however, was much less difficult than to establish an equitable and evenhanded political order. This would have to be done in the face of entrenched and determined opposition by the European settlers who had been accustomed for decades to impose their will on the administration in Algiers as well as Paris. These Europeans were by no means willing to abandon their privileged position, or to allow Paris to make changes in the governance of Algeria which might threaten their interests. Many army officers, smarting from the recent French defeat in Indochina, came to sympathize with the cause of the Europeans in Algeria, to mistrust the resolution of the government, and to fear that victory on the ground would be rendered useless by pusillanimity or worse on the part of the politicians. It is hardly surprising that the governments of the Fourth Republic had neither the means nor the time to grasp this nettle.

MATTERS came to a boil in the spring of 1958. The Europeans and the French army officers in Algeria feared that a weak government in Paris would give in to U.S. and British pressure to internationalize the Algerian question. On May 13, General Salan, commander-in-chief in Algeria, supported by other senior officers, took over the headquarters of the government in Algiers and called for de Gaulle to come to power. They believed, or had been led to believe, that he sympathized with the cause of French Algeria and would become its savior.

The call for de Gaulle to take over was by no means a spontaneous development. De Gaulle, as Lacouture shows with much detail, had an organized apparatus working for him in Algiers, where his devoted followers were able to establish connections with civilian and military leaders and to spread the gospel of the savior. These agents were joined by an old and fervent Gaullist, Jacques Soustelle, who had recently been governor-general of Algeria and whose behind-the-scenes influence was crucial in ensuring that the military junta would raise the Gaullist banner. All these—Soustelle in particular—were to see themselves duped by de Gaulle's policies after he took power.

The junta threatened that its forces would descend on Paris and oust the government there unless de Gaulle were allowed to take over. De Gaulle knew of these demands, and encouraged them both privately and publicly. Privately he evoked the prospect of parachutists occupying the National Assembly unless he were put in power, while his public declarations, in which he adamantly refused to condemn the Algiers *coup d'état*, served to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the lawful government.

De Gaulle's actions during this period his sympathetic biographer calls a masterpiece of strategy and stratagem. De Gaulle, writes Lacouture (in a passage which does not figure in the English translation), had conducted much more praiseworthy operations, or ones at any rate with greater purity, but none which more eloquently showed that "there was no action taken by him, however cynical, which was not (in his own eyes) taken for the good of the state."

This is, one supposes, the best construction that can be put on de Gaulle's actions between May 13 and 29, when the supine parliament and the intimidated politicians nervelessly allowed power to fall from their hands. But it is very difficult to describe his behavior and his triumph as honorable.

Nor was the sequel exactly honorable. He tricked and bamboozled his most devoted followers and his military supporters, who believed that he had at heart the cause of French Algeria, when

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in fact, as Lacouture reveals, he had already persuaded himself that French sovereignty over Algeria had to be abandoned. There was the famous occasion in Algiers when, a few days after he came to power, he shouted to the crowd: "*Je vous ai compris*" ("I have understood you"). Read in the context of the whole speech, this exclamation by no means signified that he supported the notion of a French Algeria, but it nevertheless gave the impression that he was fully at one with the feelings and desires of his audience. More than once, whether carried away by the enthusiasm of the crowd, or intoxicated by his own voice, de Gaulle expressed sentiments the sense of which admitted of no misapprehension, but which he emphatically did not share. There was thus the exclamation "*Vive l'Algérie française!*" thrown to the crowd in another speech during the same trip, and a long passage in still another speech to the effect that for France to abandon Algeria would be a great crime. On the way back to France, however, de Gaulle told a confidant that the Europeans as well as the army officers were dreaming.

De Gaulle also tricked his own Prime Minister, Michel Debré, one of his most devoted partisans. In November 1960 the President gave an important speech on Algeria, the text of which he showed beforehand to Debré. Shortly before it was broadcast, Debré was informed of a slight change. Where the original speech had referred to an Algerian republic which had "never existed," now it affirmed an Algerian republic that "one day will come into being." In his memoirs, Debré describes this event as "brutal."

De Gaulle had his way. His policy rendered nugatory the achievements of the army, which had succeeded in checkmating and neutralizing the rebellion, and handed over Algeria to the National Liberation Front (FLN). The officers who had made possible his ascension and who could not stomach what they considered a betrayal were led to attempt a *coup d'état* which he suppressed ferociously—as, of course, he had to.

As for the main issue in Algeria—namely, the coexistence of Europeans and native inhabitants on tolerable and equitable terms—de Gaulle settled it by abolishing it. His impatient and brutal policies handed over Algeria totally to a band for whom politics was nothing but violence (even though its violent courses on the battlefield had not been successful). The Europeans left in a panic, since there was now no one and nothing to protect them from a lawless regime: the French troops still awaiting transport back to France were forbidden to intervene and protect the Europeans, or those Algerians who had served the Republic, from molestation, rapine, and murder. Of these Algerians it is said that 100,000 were murdered at the hands of the triumphant FLN and its now proliferating camp followers. The native population, too, was left to the mercies of a despotic regime, the misgovernment, incompetence, and corruption of which during three decades have driven Algerian society and economy into the ground.

Lacouture cites a declaration made before the High Military Tribunal by one of the hundreds of officers who rose against de Gaulle's Algerian policy in April 1961. This officer, Major Denoix de Saint Marc, took full responsibility for his own actions and those of the officers under his command. A lot, he said, can be asked of a soldier, and in particular he can be asked to die, since this is his profession. But he should not be asked to cheat, to lie, to perjure himself. When the officers decided to rise they had in mind the slogans written on walls all over the countryside, pledging that the army would remain and protect villages and encampments. And he added: "We thought of our forsaken honor." One does not know if Major Denoix had in mind de Gaulle and his defiant gesture of June 18, 1940. That gesture too had been made for the sake of honor.

HONOR and pride naturally go hand in hand, but pride may slide into arrogance. The eleven years in power which the triumphant beneficiary of the *coup d'état* of May 1958 would enjoy were indeed marked by the imperiousness and arrogance of power.

De Gaulle had never liked parliamentary and party politics. The circumstances of his departure from power in 1946, the failure of the *Rassemblement*, and the twelve years in the wilderness which followed served to make that dislike invincible. As soon as he was installed he set in train preparations for a new constitution, in which the wings of the National Assembly were radically clipped and the President was endowed with extensive powers and in effect given control over the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. He was also given sweeping emergency powers, overriding and suspending ordinary laws. The Assembly, as one critic said, thus became akin to the *parlements* which under the monarchy had served merely to register the royal decrees sent down to them. As de Gaulle said to a confidant in April 1961: "I have reinstated the monarchy to my benefit."

This was not enough, however. The 1958 constitution provided for the election of the President by an electoral college made up of deputies, senators, representatives from overseas territories, and regional and local councilors in metropolitan France and in overseas possessions. In September 1961, de Gaulle sprang on his government the proposal that the President should be elected by a referendum of all the voters. This required a change in the constitution which, de Gaulle also proposed, should itself be the subject of a referendum. De Gaulle's proposal elicited disagreement within the Council of Ministers, and was defeated in the Assembly. De Gaulle dis-

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solved the Assembly. He resolutely went ahead with the referendum and won the vote, as well as the elections which the dissolution of the Assembly had made necessary.

De Gaulle's constitution is, so far, the last of a long procession beginning in 1790. Its chief virtue is said to be that it reduces considerably the governmental instability which was a feature of the Third, and even more the Fourth, Republic. It is undoubtedly true that the new constitution has drastically reduced the turnover of ministers in France. But whether France as a result is better governed is moot, since the government of a modern, complex polity depends, to a very large extent, on an efficient and honest bureaucracy, and much less than is commonly thought on the politicians who succeed one another, in an evanescent procession, at the head of the various administrations.

For de Gaulle, governmental instability was a consequence of the quarrels and maneuverings of the political parties which he hated and wanted to destroy. It is, however, chimerical to seek to destroy political parties in a free society—and in any case, the referendum did not succeed in preserving de Gaulle himself from political failure. Though he had tamed the parliament, in May 1968 a combination of student riots and industrial strikes so shook his position that in panic he took refuge for a day, together with his family, with the French forces stationed in Baden. The day was saved by his Prime Minister and devoted follower, Georges Pompidou, who had remained at his post in Paris. For this de Gaulle never forgave him, and Pompidou resigned shortly thereafter.

The tumults of May 1968 shook de Gaulle's prestige profoundly. They may be said to have brought him down, as riots and tumults have brought down so many governments in French history. The following spring he insisted on a referendum on some changes in the organization of local government. He lost. The issues involved were hardly a resigning matter, but de Gaulle, who only a few months previously had affirmed that he would remain in office for the seven years to which he had been elected in 1965, abruptly resigned.

One important consideration—perhaps the most important—which led de Gaulle to liquidate Algeria was his desire to make France into a first-class military power. His object was to enable France to pursue a *Weltpolitik*, a global policy. In his estimation, the Algerian entanglement greatly hampered such a project.

The project required first and foremost that France should become a nuclear power. Without nuclear armaments France, de Gaulle considered, would be unable to defend itself, and thus to pursue a foreign policy strictly geared to its own interests. France did become a nuclear power in 1960. This was two years before the liquidation of French rule in Algeria—a liquidation which, according to de Gaulle's own logic, should therefore not have been any longer required.

At the forefront of de Gaulle's mind in pursuing a French *Weltpolitik* was the humiliation of his country and of himself between 1940 and 1945; he was determined to avoid a repetition. Also, he believed it imprudent to rely on the United States for the defense of Europe. If it came to a crunch, was it conceivable that the U.S. would risk a nuclear strike to protect Paris or London? The question was reasonable, but the practical consequences which de Gaulle drew from it—that the defense of France had to be the affair of France itself—were not feasible.

Defiance of the Americans and generally of the "Anglo-Saxons" seemed now to be the guiding principle of this imperious and willful man (although in one particular case—his veto of British membership in the European Economic Community in 1963—his position made a great deal of sense in terms of French interests). In 1959, he withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO, and in 1966 he withdrew France from NATO's military structures. On an official journey to Mexico and Latin America, he took pleasure in taunting the U.S. by a public denunciation of "hegemonies," and by promising the crowds in Mexico City that they would henceforth walk with him hand in hand. He was, he rejoiced to one of his ministers, planting a French flag at the doorstep of the U.S. With the same imperiousness, he denounced Israel for, in effect, daring to win the Six-Day War of 1967, and that same year during an official visit to Canada he shouted to the crowd in Montreal, "Long live free Quebec!" After his retirement, while on a visit to Dublin, he drank a toast to a united Ireland.

During that visit to Dublin in 1969, the French ambassador asked de Gaulle to inscribe for him a copy of his war memoirs. Doing so, de Gaulle wrote down a quotation from Nietzsche: "Nothing is worth anything. Nothing happens, and yet everything takes place. But this is of no consequence." The weary skepticism of this sentiment disengages, at the last, the man of power from the passions and obstinacies of a long life crammed full of prodigious peripeties, and in so transcending them, in a measure purifies and consecrates his genius.

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The Voice of NPR

Andrea Levin

National Public Radio (NPR), America's premier tax-supported radio network, with a budget of $59 million in 1993 and an audience of more than fourteen million listeners per week through 458 affiliated stations, operates under a federal statutory mandate of "strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature." Yet it has consistently violated this mandate by an anti-Israel tilt in its Middle East coverage.

A recent segment, broadcast September 16, 1992, is emblematic. Here NPR, marking the tenth anniversary of the slaughter of Palestinian Arabs by Lebanese Christian Arabs at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, dug up and replayed an interview taped just after the 1982 events. In that interview the NPR host, Noah Adams, is heard to ask Loren Jenkins, the reporter on the scene in Lebanon, "Do you have any doubt now of the complicity of the Israel defense forces there?" To which Jenkins responds, "There is no doubt in my mind that Israel aided and abetted the whole operation."

Yet the Kahan Commission of Inquiry, convened by the Israeli government and lauded internationally for the independence and integrity of its investigation, did not find that Israel had "aided and abetted the whole operation." Rather, it condemned the Israeli army for negligence in not anticipating possible attacks by angry Christians bent on avenging the assassination of the (Christian) Lebanese President, Bashir Gemayel. Later inquiries also revealed that, contrary to the impression conveyed by Jenkins, the overwhelming majority of the victims were not women and children, but men. Nevertheless, his ten-year-old account—now definitely known to have been incomplete, misleading, and inflammatory—was put forward by NPR as a responsible rendition of the truth about Sabra and Shatila.

There was more. The interview with Jenkins did not segue into a report on the many awful massacres that have afflicted Lebanon since 1982, including mass murders of Christians by Muslims and the Shiite-Palestinian "war of the camps" that took the lives of thousands. Nor did NPR go on to remind listeners of the plight of that country today under the boot of a 40,000-man Syrian occupation force. Nor was the opportunity taken to bring listeners up to date on the dire fortunes of the Christian minority that carried out the Sabra and Shatila murders. Instead, the story that followed the Jenkins interview was a recounting of Israel's failed policy in Lebanon and the supposed disenchantment of an entire generation of Israelis with the Israel Defense Forces.

NPR's selection of anniversaries to commemorate is itself revealing. Thus, while all this time was devoted to the tenth anniversary of Sabra and Shatila, not a word was heard on NPR about the tenth anniversary of the massacre of some 20,000 of his own people in the city of Hama by the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Of particular note, too, was NPR's piece on the 20th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics. The occasion was used not to recall the murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists, but to reminisce at length about the United States basketball team's loss of a gold medal to the Soviets.

On NPR, even programs about the arts often show a penchant for biased treatment of Israel. An interview aired on July 21, 1991, for instance, probed the work of a playwright who saw a parallel between the suffering of Jews under the Nazis and that of Arabs at the hands of Jews. (The same day, yet another NPR segment drew a spurious comparison between Israeli detention facilities and Nazi concentration camps.)

As with the arts, so with journalism. Seymour Hersh was given three separate opportunities to promote his latest (and widely discredited) book about Israel's villainy, *The Samson Option*. Gloria Emerson had her vituperative book about Gaza peddled on two successive weekly installments of Terry Gross's program, "Fresh Air." And the most recent assault against Israel by Leslie and Andrew Cockburn was featured within days of its appearance in the bookstores. By contrast, serious scholars publishing on Israel, or the authors of books about the Arab-Israeli conflict that fail to label Israel as the villain, rarely if ever get an airing.

In August 1991, CAMERA wrote to Bill Buzenberg, vice president of news and information at NPR, expressing concern about such biased coverage and asking for a list of guests heard on the network's major programs in order to evaluate more precisely the dimensions of the problem. When Buzenberg did not respond, CAMERA wrote to the president of NPR, Douglas Bennet, repeating the request and proposing a meeting with network officials. Again, no reply.

More than three months later (apparently at the urging of an affiliate that had been subjected to increasing public complaint about the network's Middle East cover-

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age), NPR finally responded, through its managing editor, John Dinges. He did not supply the requested list, but he did offer the use of NPR's library to CAMERA's researchers. Dinges also stated in his letter that the network had begun "to compile a coverage review of NPR stories and interviews concerning Israel for the period August 8 to November 8, 1991." In turn, CAMERA proposed to do an overlapping, but more extensive, study of the six months from July 1, 1991 through December 31, 1991. Comparing the results of the two inquiries would, it was assumed, prove illuminating.

The study CAMERA did was based on NPR's own Program Library Geographic Report, which lists, by country or region, all stories more extensive than brief, headline-like glosses. Titles of five to eight words describe the subject of each broadcast and allow some evaluation of the issues discussed. The Geographic Report also allows for a comparison of the coverage of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict with the coverage of other issues in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

What emerged from a careful analysis of this material was a devastating indictment of NPR's record. The index cites 278 stories on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of those, not a single one reported on the balance of military power between the Arab states and Israel. Not a single one reported on the threat to Israel posed by Arab acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology. And despite frequent references to the issue of territorial concessions by Israel, not a single one addressed the strategic significance of the West Bank and Gaza to the nation's security.

Furthermore, NPR turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to anything and everything casting doubt on the Arab world's willingness to make genuine peace with Israel. Thus (to cite only a few of the cases detailed in the CAMERA report):

• Notwithstanding the much-discussed offstage consultations between the PLO and the Palestinian Arab delegation to the peace talks then going on with Israel, no coverage was given to the PLO's "two-step" plan, which advocates the acquisition of whatever territory can be gotten through negotiation as a first step toward the annihilation of an enfeebled Israel. Nor were any reports aired on the continuing endorsement by PLO leaders of this "two-step" plan.

• No stories were devoted to the goals and actions of Hamas (the fundamentalist Islamic Resistance Movement). Yet this organization's adherents comprise an estimated 40 percent of the population of Gaza and the West Bank and vehemently oppose any peaceful accommodation with Israel.

• NPR provided no coverage of the Teheran conference in October 1991, whose theme, emblazoned in banners at the gathering, was "Israel must be destroyed." Nor did NPR report that the president of the Palestine National Council (the governing body of the PLO), the speaker of the Jordanian parliament, and an official Syrian delegation all attended this conference.

• Arab anti-Semitism—rife in the media, the arts, and the schools and universities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq—received no coverage on NPR.

• Another obvious barometer of the region's willingness to accommodate a Jewish state in its midst—the plight of non-Arab, non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East—was ignored, with one exception. Only recently discovered by NPR in the context of the Gulf war, the Kurds were covered in 15 stories out of 154 on Iraq. But the ongoing war of the Islamic fundamentalist Arab government of Sudan against Christian and animist blacks of that nation, whose plight has been characterized by the director of Human Rights Watch as more deserving of the label "genocide" than any oppression in recent years, went entirely unreported. Muslim-Christian tensions in Egypt, Lebanon, and the West Bank were likewise ignored.

• In general, the intensifying pressure of Islamic fundamentalism, whose central tenets include the destruction of Israel, received only negligible coverage (two pieces on Algeria and one on Pakistan). There were no reports on the impact of Islamic militants in Egypt or Lebanon or among Palestinian Arabs.*

• No stories dealt with the spiraling number of Palestinians murdered by other Palestinians, a phenomenon that in 1991 took three times as many Palestinian lives as were lost in clashes with Israeli soldiers.

• In a subgroup of 39 segments randomly selected on the basis of the NPR crossfile heading "peace," 43 Arabs (36 of them Palestinians) were interviewed. No representatives of Hamas or of the so-called hardline factions of the PLO were included. The Palestinians selected were primarily Western-oriented and moderate-sounding. By contrast, only half as many Israelis (22) were interviewed, and their political makeup was virtually the converse of the Arabs'. While 12 were representatives of the Likud government then in power, the remaining 10 consisted of 7 from the far Right and 3 from the far Left. No speaker from the centrist Labor party was chosen, and no speaker was heard to advocate territorial compromise (as opposed to complete withdrawal) or to voice the concern over security that is felt by the vast majority of Israelis in connection with the territories.

As INSIDIOUS and harmful to public understanding as these cavernous omissions by the network has been the tendentious nature of the news actually proffered. Linda Gradstein, NPR's "Middle East" correspondent (though in reality she reports almost exclusively on Israel and only rarely on the other states in the region), has employed her position to project personal political views. Those views have been expressed in public statements advocating the creation of a Palestinian state, urging the Israeli government to engage in direct negotiations with the PLO (whose nondemocratic and violent character she consistently blurs or over-

* For a fuller discussion of Islamic fundamentalism today, see the article by Martin Kramer, beginning on p. 35.—ED.

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looks in her NPR reports), and opposing the right of Jews to live in the West Bank.

Among the most pernicious techniques in Gradstein's reporting is the equating of grossly dissimilar actions by Arabs and Jews. On October 10, 1991 she uttered this unforgettable comparison:

> But the hardliners and religious fanatics on both sides are fighting against peace. In radical Islam, there is no room for Israel as a Jewish state. And in messianic Judaism, there is no place for Muslims on the Temple Mount.

In other words, the many millions of radical Muslims who destabilize whole nations, who kidnap and kill innocent people, and who advocate the destruction of Israel (not to mention the conversion of all non-Muslims and the subjugation of women), are no different from the nonviolent handful of Temple Mount Faithful whose greatest provocations are parades, newspaper ads, and speeches.

Gradstein's own fringe political views are frequently presented as though they reflect the actual geopolitical interests of the parties. On October 16, 1991, she stated:

> . . . the biggest issues remain what they were at the beginning: who will represent the Palestinians? And if a conference is convened, will Israel be willing to trade land for peace?

Absent as always was the full Middle East context which reveals that for Israel "the biggest issues" are not those involving the Palestinians but those related to war and peace with heavily armed neighboring Arab states.

Gradstein's misrepresentation of the geopolitical issues is undergirded by her "human-interest" stories. In the spring of 1992 she reported on the funerals of two young victims, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish victim was Helena Rapp, a fifteen-year-old Israeli girl who was stabbed to death by a Palestinian Arab on her way to school. Her funeral was mentioned by Gradstein on May 25, 1992, in four sentences, three of which consisted of critical references to retaliatory skirmishes in which angry Jews accosted Arabs.

Three days later, on May 28, 1992, Gradstein delivered an 80-sentence report on the funeral of twenty-two-year-old Anton Shamili, who was shot and killed by an Israeli soldier on the West Bank. Interwoven with sympathetic detail about Shamili ("He liked music and soccer and his friends say he was always quick to tell a joke and to laugh") were allegations by an Arab group that Israel employs "death squads" to hunt down Palestinians.

In effect endorsing these allegations, Gradstein asserted: "One fact is clear; Israeli soldiers are killing Palestinian men in increasing numbers." But the one fact that is clear is the opposite. The number of Palestinians dying in clashes with Israelis has declined since 1989, from 282 that year to 99 in 1990 and 86 in 1991. In contrast, the number of Palestinians who have been killed by other Palestinians has risen from 58 in 1988 to 238 in 1991.

In the Israel of Gradstein's reports, not only does the government harass Palestinians and dispatch death squads, but the average Israeli small businessman exploits poor Arab workers. On March 27, 1992, Gradstein did a piece on the difficulties of a young Arab named Khalid at the "slave market," a rendezvous point for day laborers. Describing Khalid as "twenty-six, with warm brown eyes and a stubbly beard," Gradstein stated that "the workers take home only about $30 a day." NPR's Middle East correspondent neglected to mention that the average Israeli service worker earns even less on a per-diem basis, just $496 per month; that the average Egyptian worker earns $40 per month; and the average Jordanian $68 per month.

Having thus established that Palestinians are exploited by the Israelis, as well as harassed and displaced, Gradstein concluded with this signature insight about cause and effect in the cycle of Palestinian-Israeli violence:

> . . . as the economic situation in the territories gets worse, more Palestinians will be drawn to violence and more violence will cause an even harsher Israeli crackdown.

PRESENTED with these and all the other findings of the CAMERA study, NPR's response was to express pride in the work of its staff, and to concede only that it had made a few minor factual errors. (A typical example of this stonewalling was an NPR official's explanation of why no speakers from the violent and openly anti-Semitic Hamas organization had been interviewed during the coverage of the peace talks and related events: "because Hamas doesn't talk about peace.") There was no mention of the study NPR itself had ostensibly undertaken and which had guided the structure of the CAMERA evaluation.

NPR vice president Bill Buzenberg has said that "our role is not as an advocate, but as a sounding board for the most extensive discussion possible." Surely, however, this protestation is belied not just by NPR's systematic suppression of essential information about the Middle East, but by the contemptuous disdain with which the network has treated a carefully documented analysis drawn entirely from its own archives.

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A Postscript on Finlandization

Walter Laqueur

In the 1970's the term "Finlandization" entered the political lexicon and became for a while a major bone of contention. The term referred to the special relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union: it meant, very briefly, appeasement by Finland of its powerful neighbor to the extent that the country could no longer be defined as neutral and independent in the traditional sense. There was no Soviet censorship in Finland, but there was Finnish self-censorship, driven by fear and anxiety, and a great readiness to acquiesce in Soviet wishes was very much in evidence.

Having become interested in the topic, I visited Finland and read everything then available in languages other than Finnish. In December 1977 an article of mine, "The Specter of Finlandization," appeared in Commentary. The article strove to be measured in tone; I acknowledged that, given Finland's geopolitical situation, it was obvious that certain concessions toward the Soviets had to be made. But I also argued that Urho Kekkonen, president of Finland for 25 years (1956-81), had carried this trend much too far (though he himself was not a Communist or even a socialist). It was not the policy of wisdom, maturity, and responsibility that Kekkonen and his supporters claimed, and furthermore it set a bad example for the rest of Europe.

"The Specter of Finlandization" was widely commented upon in Finland itself and elsewhere in Scandinavia. The reception there was mixed. Some thought the article was well-informed, others denounced it as ignorant, and a few believed that "Laqueur" was the pseudonym of a highly placed U.S. official. Ironically, however, most Finnish commentators—familiar with the true state of affairs in their country—were far less strident in their defense of Finlandization than some of Kekkonen's well-wishers in the West.

Thus, a *Washington Post* commentator maintained that Finland was where most of Europe wanted to be. The eminent American diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan, in a book entitled *The Cloud of Danger*, praised the Finns—that is to say, the Kekkonen policy—for their "composure and firmness" and objected to the common usage of the term "Finlandization as signifying something humiliating and spineless." Vice President Walter Mondale, speaking in Helsinki, stated that the term interfered with accurate communication because it was "charged with emotion." An Israeli professor of political science called Finland a paradigm for the future, a "solution to the problems facing an isolated minor state pitted against a great military power."

In 1981 Kekkonen, now getting old, retired or was forced to retire. His successor, Mauno Koivisto, a Social Democrat, was not the candidate preferred by Moscow, but he was elected anyway, and nothing untoward happened to Soviet-Finnish relations. The only major setback, the deepening of Finland's economic crisis, was unconnected with the politics of Finlandization. It arose mainly because the country's foreign trade had been largely oriented toward the East.

The debate triggered by my article in Commentary (and by my two rejoinders to critics)* eventually died down, but the issues involved naturally continued to preoccupy people in Finland. Rumors even began to circulate that Kekkonen had been a Soviet agent, but they were dismissed as base calumnies by his official biographer—who denied everyone else access to the relevant archival material.

Then, about a year ago, the former "resident" of the KGB in Helsinki began to talk: Kekkonen and other leading proponents of Finlandization had received money from Moscow. More recently, the files of the foreign department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) were opened; this resulted in a book called *The CPSU and Finland: Secret Documents, 1955-68*, edited by V. Chernous and Hannu Rautkallio.† (A second volume is scheduled to appear in early 1993.) The documents proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the leading proponents of the Kekkonen line had been paid many millions of finnmarks through the office of the KGB: some of this money was used for their election campaigns, but there were also payments for personal use.

In my article I repeatedly called Kekkonen a (misguided) patriot. In fact, I had a certain weakness for the man: the erstwhile winner of an Olympic gold medal in the high jump could not be all bad. Well, perhaps he was a patriot; perhaps he would have acted as he did even if the Soviets had never paid him a single ruble.

But what is one to say about the experts in America, Britain, and elsewhere—those diplomats and academics who showered fulsome praise on Kekkonen and his policies and who derided my article? I never claimed to be an authority on things Finnish, but those experts should have known that something was rotten in Helsinki.

This, however, is part of a wider post-mortem on judgments and misjudgments of the cold-war era.

Walter Laqueur *is chairman of the Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. His most recent book is* Thursday's Child Has Far to Go, *which has just been published by Scribner's.*

* "Letters from Readers," May 1978 and October 1978.

† For other revelations from the CPSU files, see Eric Breindel's "Moscow Gold," Commentary, December 1992.—Ed.

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Books in Review

General's Story

IT DOESN'T TAKE A HERO. By H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF with PETER PETRE. *Bantam. 544 pp. $25.00.*

Reviewed by LAURIE MYLROIE

LESS than half this book deals with the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf. But were it not for that war, Norman Schwarzkopf would probably not have had the chance to tell the rest of his life story, beginning with his boyhood in New Jersey, through his years as a cadet at West Point, his two tours in Vietnam, and his subsequent military service. For though that story has its interest, the book's significance rests on its account of the Gulf war.

Schwarzkopf's encounter with destiny began in July 1988, when he was appointed commander-in-chief of Central Command (Centcom), the American forces responsible for the defense of the Persian Gulf. In late July 1990, Centcom ran a computer exercise in which Iraq attacked Kuwait and the United States defended the Saudi oil fields. Ironically, even as Centcom was rehearsing that scenario, Saddam Hussein was preparing to act on it. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.

Schwarzkopf describes the events that followed as he saw them and in the order they happened. The advantage of this approach is that it preserves the sequence of the historical record; the drawback is that Schwarzkopf's perspective is narrow, sometimes confusing, and on occasion self-serving. The book contains few revelations, and is most interesting for the light it sheds, sometimes inadvertently, on relations between military and civilian authorities in America's first major war since Vietnam.

LAURIE MYLROIE *is a fellow in Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where she is writing a monograph on Iraq since the Gulf war.*

As Iraqi troops advanced into Kuwait, posing a threat to the Saudi oil fields, President George Bush initially opted to send American forces to defend Saudi Arabia. The decision to liberate Kuwait itself proved far more difficult to take, and opinions on its wisdom were severely divided. Already in mid-August, Schwarzkopf was stressing to General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that an offensive operation would require many more U.S. soldiers than the President had committed.

Soon the civilian leadership in the White House began to press for the development of an offensive option. But Powell continued to instruct Schwarzkopf to plan only with the forces allocated for defense, and he also asked him to prepare an option "to defend Saudi Arabia indefinitely." At an October 11 White House briefing, Centcom did present an option for an attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait; this, however, was the so-called "up-the-middle" option which, by using only the number of soldiers already deployed, would inevitably have led to heavy U.S. casualties.

The civilians present at the meeting reacted with consternation. "One of the White House hawks," writes Schwarzkopf,

> began suggesting that we'd intentionally sent in a high-casualty attack plan to scare the President away from launching a ground war.

Be that as it may, it is a fact that Powell did not favor a ground war, and in any case the offensive plan Centcom presented was, as Schwarzkopf recognizes, plainly inadequate.

The October 11 meeting produced no decision, and soon the Saudis grew nervous that America might end up doing nothing. Schwarzkopf's unease grew, too—in late October he drafted a memo pressing for guidance—but then Powell called to say that Bush had decided on an offensive. That decision having been made, military preparations proceeded relatively smoothly: an offensive plan was developed and Schwarzkopf was given even more forces than he had asked for. Although some hitches arose within the international military coalition put together by President Bush, Schwarzkopf managed them successfully.

On January 16, 1991, after the failure of diplomatic efforts to secure an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the air attack began. Schwarzkopf describes that campaign just as it appeared on CNN. On the first day, allied planes destroyed 36 fixed Scud launchers and 10 mobile launchers. There were blessedly few casualties. But this only exacerbated the tensions between the military and civilian leadership. Even then, writes Schwarzkopf,

> neither Powell nor I wanted a ground war. We agreed that if the United States could get a rapid withdrawal, we would urge our leaders to take it.

Schwarzkopf's civilian antagonists responded by trying to advance the date of the ground war to preempt a Soviet effort to negotiate Iraq's withdrawal.

Moscow failed, and the ground war began on February 24. Like the air war, it went much better than expected. On the fourth day, Schwarzkopf, in an internationally televised briefing, proclaimed "the gate's closed"; Iraq's armored forces had been trapped. Actually, Schwarzkopf misspoke: another day would have been needed to surround the Republican Guards, the heart of Saddam's army. After this briefing, however, Powell telephoned from Washington to propose a cease-fire, Schwarzkopf agreed reluctantly, and Bush called for a unilateral cessation of hostilities to take effect nine hours later.

THROUGHOUT this book Schwarzkopf presents himself as a man of action, a soldier's soldier, contemptuous of Washington pencil-pushers. In his account of the Gulf

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The Analytical Marxists on Exploitation, Freedom, and Justice

David Gordon

In this sustained critique, Gordon analyzes the Analytical Marxists' reformulation of the Marxian notion of exploitation, the implication of their rejection of the labor theory of value, their differences over what rights people have, and their arguments for the compatibility of markets with socialism.

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war, he gives the impression that the military was almost solely responsible for the war's prosecution, while one of the main obstacles to the success of that endeavor was "the White House hawks" who were constantly trying to "outgeneral the generals." Schwarzkopf curses these civilian hawks frequently—but also claims not to know their names, since his only channel to Washington, he says, was Colin Powell. One has to turn to *Storm Command*, the memoir of the commander of the British forces, Sir Peter de la Billière, to read that Bush's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, was Schwarzkopf's main unnamed antagonist.

Scowcroft was, in fact, a key figure in supporting Bush's determination to go to war if necessary, while Colin Powell (and perhaps Schwarzkopf) preferred a strategy of containment—defending Saudi Arabia while using sanctions to try to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Indeed, if matters had been left to Powell and Schwarzkopf, U.S. forces might well be in the Saudi desert still. (According to de la Billière, Britain's Air Chief Marshal left one meeting in Washington "much concerned" that Powell seemed "prepared to wait two years, if necessary, for Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.") And if war *had* occurred under those circumstances, it would likely have been less decisive than the one that was actually fought.

He and Powell, Schwarzkopf explains, sought to avoid a ground war because they believed it would produce significant casualties. But the

> contingent of hawks in Washington . . . did not want to stop until we'd punished Saddam. We'd been bombing Iraq for more than a month, but that wasn't good enough.

Such statements may reflect Schwarzkopf's apprehensions at the time, but they are incomprehensible now, when we know that the ground war did *not* produce significant casualties, and that it was an important military victory.

The problem here is not that Schwarzkopf misjudged the issue; misjudgments were inevitable. The problem is that he still does not seem to understand that on the major issue he was wrong, and the civilian "hawks" were right.

Not surprisingly, Schwarzkopf also fails to acknowledge his own military mistakes, which loomed especially large at war's end. For example, telling the world "the gate's closed" when U.S. forces had one more day to fight was no small slip, and Schwarzkopf then failed to make up for it by insisting to Powell that he needed the extra day.

The growing pressure to end the war could easily have been accommodated had the Americans proposed a mutual instead of a unilateral cease-fire: in the time it would have taken Baghdad to reply, U.S. forces could have finished the job. But this raises again the question of why the cease-fire was so hasty. True, there were the widely-televised images of a "highway of death," but according to Schwarzkopf, he and Powell knew that this did not represent the carnage of Iraqi forces that it seemed. Nor does Schwarzkopf, or for that matter de la Billière, mention hearing of any pressure on the part of the Arab coalition partners to end the war. To this day a good explanation of why it ended so quickly remains elusive.

Another mistake: Powell, in informing Schwarzkopf that hostilities would soon cease, also told him that he would be meeting Iraqi representatives in 48 hours to set the terms for the temporary cease-fire. No one had prepared for that. Centcom hurriedly wrote its own instructions, faxing them for approval to Washington. Receiving no timely response, Schwarzkopf concluded, "If need be, I would . . . wing it." This was an extraordinarily flippant attitude to take for such a critical occasion—which, in the event, Schwarzkopf mishandled.

In a move typical of his sense of his own historical importance, Schwarzkopf wanted to meet the Iraqis aboard the battleship *Missouri*, where Douglas MacArthur had accepted the Japanese surrender in 1945; for a variety of reasons that proposal was scrapped, and the conference was held in Safwan, Iraq. There, Schwarzkopf determined that he and Saudi Prince Khalid, commander of the Arab forces, would be the only coalition representatives at the table. All other senior commanders would be observers. Additionally, Schwarzkopf had no aide at his elbow, but placed himself alone, front and center.

One blunder that followed concerned the 5,000 civilians whom the Iraqis had taken hostage as they left Kuwait. Khalid's brief was to secure their return. The Iraqis fudged the issue, however, and Schwarzkopf let it pass. Today, some 700 Kuwaitis remain unaccounted for, the per-capita equivalent of 175,000 Americans. De la Billière reflects:

> We should have taken a tougher line [at Safwan] and been more demanding. . . . After all, we were in complete control and had nothing to lose.

Schwarzkopf makes no such concession.

The only mistake the general acknowledges is one he has admitted previously—letting Iraq continue to fly its helicopters. "Given that the Iraqis had agreed to all our requests," he explains lamely, "I didn't feel it was unreasonable to grant one of theirs." In fact, as the case of the Kuwaiti hostages proves, the Iraqis had not agreed to all our requests; their "gall," de la Billière writes, "was astonishing." But at least Schwarzkopf's account here is more honest than his earlier statements. In March 1991, he claimed that he had responded to Iraq's request to fly its helicopters by stipulating, "not over our forces." But as the transcript of the talks would subsequently reveal, he did allow such flights, asking only that "If they must fly over the areas we are located in, I prefer that they not be gunships, armed helos." But no prudent commander would allow enemy helicopters of any kind, armed or unarmed, to fly over his troops.

Finally, in his blow-by-blow account of events as they appeared at the time, Schwarzkopf uses facts and figures that have since proved inaccurate. Thus, he boasts about

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the early destruction of Iraqi Scud launchers, both mobile and fixed, but it is now believed that *no* mobile launchers were destroyed by aerial bombing, and as for the fixed launchers, little more than concrete platforms, the Iraqis did not use them. (Anyway, it was almost meaningless for us to attack them because they could easily be rebuilt, as in fact they have been.) Then, too, Schwarzkopf writes that there were 545,000 Iraqi troops in the Kuwaiti theater when the war began, but the true figure may have been closer to 350,000 and was even lower at the start of the ground war.

SCHWARZKOPF deserves much credit for his role in executing a necessary war with minimal casualties. But he has, in fact, received that credit: both he and the other military leaders of the war have been treated with kid gloves in the (usually hostile) American media, while the civilian leaders have been criticized for the war's shortcomings. Yet the misjudgments of individuals like Schwarzkopf and Powell deserve at least as much attention.

One of the war's important lessons, obscured in this book, is that America's military leadership is far too cautious. The JCS chairman did not want to fight a war which, in the event, America won easily. Now, the success of that campaign has had the effect of enhancing the prestige of our military leadership while doing little or nothing to change its underlying attitude to fighting. Thus, today and tomorrow it may feel even less inhibited in opposing the use of force than it did before the Gulf war.

We have seen signs of this already. After the war's end, very modest proposals were put forward to help the Iraqi population overthrow Saddam. The JCS, fearing a quagmire, protested. Schwarzkopf opposed the creation of a safe haven for dissidents in southern Iraq like the one created in the north; the JCS opposed both ideas. And more recently, in another part of the world, Colin Powell openly voiced opposition to imposing a no-fly zone in Bosnia to staunch the bloodshed there.

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In the coming years, America's civilian authorities are going to have to deal with a military leadership whose authority has grown with the Gulf war, but whose formative experience remains the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, this book offers little help in the necessary task, now before us, of shaping a consensus on what constitutes the appropriate use of force in the post-cold-war era.

The Nostalgist

EVELYN WAUGH: THE LATER YEARS, 1939-1966. By MARTIN STANNARD. *Norton. 523 pp. $29.95.*

Reviewed by EVELYN TOYNTON

THE novelist Evelyn Waugh would present a formidable challenge to any biographer. For one thing, his personality was hardly the sort that finds favor nowadays. Far from being "warm, open, and caring," as the personal ads would have it, he was a master of the savage put-down—a man who not only mocked his acquaintances unmercifully behind their backs (and sometimes in his novels) but who, when invited to dinner, was likely to get drunk and abuse his host. In this Age of the Common Man, as he derisively called it, he refused to regard most of his fellow humans as equals; despite his own middle-class origins, he remained to the end a virulent advocate of the old aristocratic order that everyone else in postwar England was busily trying to dismantle.

Even more daunting is the thought of how Waugh might have felt about any account of his life. He would certainly have considered it presumptuous for a biographer to delve into his psyche, perhaps even to assume he had a psyche in the first place. If he were to be analyzed in any terms, he would expect them to be moral ones—the terms in which he presents the characters in his novels. Not only as a fervent convert to Catholicism but as a man haunted in general by a sense of his own and the world's evil, he might have expected to be judged harshly, but only in terms he could respect.

Finally, considering the dazzling precision with which Waugh used the English language—the clarity and economy of his prose, coupled with his ferocious wit, make his novels perhaps the most purely enjoyable high art that has been produced in this century—his biographer would have to take great pains to avoid clumsiness, jargon, clichés, fuzziness, and other linguistic sins.

Yet one gets no sense that Martin Stannard, who teaches English at the University of Leicester, felt unduly humble at the prospect of composing this biography, or indeed, that he gave much thought to how Waugh might have regarded it. Otherwise, how explain his frequent wishy-washy psychoanalyzing of his subject's "fears of inadequacy," his often turgid prose, his painful *lack* of economy (the book under review is the second of two volumes, which together take over 1,000 pages to relate the story of Waugh's 62 years on earth)?

Like many another academic biographer, Stannard seems to feel that inclusiveness is the hallmark of a good biography. Thus, he devotes most of the first 150 pages here to a tediously detailed account of Waugh's military service in World War II, which was notably devoid of real incident. Waugh had enlisted out of old-fashioned chivalry and in the hope of commanding men in battle. But he was constantly being shuffled to the fringes of the action, it having become clear even to the various influential friends he kept lobbying to help him that his anarchic streak, notorious lack of diplomatic skills, and general physical incompetence made it impossible for him to win either the trust of the enlisted men or the favor of his superiors.

Waugh's experiences in the war, and particularly his observation of what he regarded as the betrayal of the Yugoslavian Catholics by his own government, seem significant only insofar as they confirmed his sense that England had lost its honor. This view was to become a sort of obsession with him in the years that followed, as he began the process of retreating from "this so-called 20th century."

Shortly before the war, Waugh had married a shy young Catholic aristocrat, Laura Herbert. (His first marriage had ended in humiliation, his wife having deserted him for a man he regarded as a despicable lightweight. This experience was reflected in perhaps his most perfect novel, *A Handful of Dust*, 1934, in which the archaic code of honor of the aristocratic Tony Last is no match for the rapaciousness of either the fashionable savages of London society or those in the Brazilian jungle he flees to after his wife has betrayed him.) After a young manhood spent largely among the fleshpots of London and various exotic foreign locales, Waugh bought a country estate in Somerset, where he holed up with the long-suffering Laura, whom he seems to have bullied and adored in equal measure, and his rapidly expanding brood (the Waughs had seven children, one of whom died at birth). Here he devoted himself to Catholic causes and to his writing—in the years covered by this volume he produced fifteen books, including an autobiography covering his early years and *Sword of Honour*, a trilogy of war novels.

THE fierce nostalgia for some Edenic past age of England that suffuses Waugh's books translated, in his life, into an elaborately conceived pose: he filled his house with lugubrious and grotesque artifacts of Victoriana, refused to talk on the telephone, and increasingly immersed himself in his self-parodying role as 19th-century country squire. As the years passed, he found less and less pleasure in the world outside his gates, although in the decade right after the war he continued to head for London and his drinking cronies whenever Laura was about to give birth or his children were too much in evidence.

With the publication of the enormously successful *Brideshead Revisited* in 1945, Waugh became once again the celebrity he had been in his youth, when his chron-

EVELYN TOYNTON *reviewed* The Volcano Lover *by Susan Sontag in our November 1992 issue.*

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icles of the Bright Young Things in London had made him the ultimate fashionable novelist. *Brideshead*, while still containing elements of the mordant social satire of his earlier novels, is chiefly concerned with tracing the mysterious workings of divine grace in the lives of an aristocratic and tragic English Catholic family. Such former champions of Waugh's work as the American critic Edmund Wilson—whom Waugh had insulted on Wilson's visit to London in the 30's—lamented the "beglamored snobbery" of the novel, and others pointed to an evident confusion in Waugh's mind between aristocratic grace and the divine variety. Nevertheless, *Brideshead* was to become a best-seller in both England and America, thereby assuring Waugh a fat income for many years.

Later in the decade, a trip to Hollywood to discuss the movie rights for *Brideshead* became the inspiration for his last great satiric novel. *The Loved One* (1948) takes place in a California pet cemetery, for Waugh a perfect symbol of the fatuity and madness of modern life. Amazingly, its preposterous characters take on a certain tragic resonance as exiles from God, meaning, and history. Their pitiful hopes of happiness, centering as they do around a hollow belief in human progress and the consolations of materialism, are as doomed as their attempts to cheat mortality by embalming dead pets in "life-like" postures. To Waugh's surprise, *The Loved One*, too, was a success in America as well as in England.

STANNARD dutifully reports all these developments—he provides a veritable catalogue of the extravagant objects Waugh acquired with his American earnings and gives us a blow-by-blow account of Waugh's problems with the tax man—while evincing toward his subject the sort of tolerant, "secular-humanist" attitudes that Waugh himself vehemently eschewed. Thus, ignoring certain problematic evidence to the contrary, Stannard assures us that Waugh was not the snobbish monster of legend but a generous and kindly man. Yet the objects of Waugh's acts of kindness seem to have been two sorts of people only: aristocrats—among whom he numbered most of his friends—and Catholics (sometimes aristocratic Catholics).

Waugh's distaste for the middle classes extended even to his own family. He alternately neglected, mocked, and snubbed his fond parents and heroically loyal brother, and his treatment of his children—especially his oldest son Auberon, for whom he seems never to have felt much enthusiasm—could be equally unkind. When Auberon suffered a near-fatal wound during his stint in the army, Waugh not only left it to Laura to fly to Cyprus and tend to their son, he could barely be bothered to write him (ironically, the project he refused to abandon for Auberon's sake was an act of pure *pietas*—a biography of his recently deceased friend, the Catholic theologian Ronald Knox).

While all the children evidently adored their outrageous papa and strove to please him, only one ever succeeded wholly. The most touching parts of this book—the only ones in which we get some sense of the "human" Waugh who Stannard keeps telling us existed—are the tender, teasing, passionately condoling letters to his beloved daughter Meg.

In the 1960's, distressed alike by the loss he felt when Meg married and the Catholic Church's defection from orthodoxy—he never recovered from either the abandonment of the Latin Mass or the humanistic ecumenism of Vatican II—Waugh sank deeper and deeper into melancholy, with traces of the persecution mania he had made into burlesque in *The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold* (1957).

"It was fun thirty-five years ago," he noted in his diary,

> to travel far and in great discomfort to meet people whose entire conception of life and manner of expression were alien. Now one has only to leave one's gates. All fates are "worse than death."

When he died suddenly of a heart

Is America on the Way Down?

In March 1992, *Commentary* published a debate between the noted political analyst Edward N. Luttwak and Robert L. Bartley, the Editor of the *Wall Street Journal*. Their topic: Is America in decline?

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attack on Easter Sunday 1966, Meg herself advised a friend not to grieve:

> He wanted so badly to die, and he died as he would have chosen, after Easter Mass, with a priest in the house.

ALL these facts and facets of Waugh's life, however, have already emerged with the publication of his diaries and letters, both of which Stannard quotes generously, and both of which are more entertaining and revealing than Stannard generally manages to be. Any truly *necessary* biography of Waugh would have to go beyond what we already know, and this Stannard fails to do. One waits in vain for him to place his subject in some moral context, the sort in which Waugh views his own fictional characters: to acknowledge, perhaps, that Waugh's violent distaste for the modern world was not merely a psychological tic or a symptom of his "terror of babel," but at least in part an honorable response to a dishonorable age; or that his frequent lack of compassion, however unpalatable, was in some sense related to the ruthless perfectionism that bore such fruit in his work. But no grand design emerges here, as it does in Waugh's own books. What Waugh might finally have found most objectionable in this biography is its lack of any definitive shape or clarity, failings he regarded as the aesthetic equivalent of mortal sins.

In Decline

GRAND ILLUSION: CRITICS AND CHAMPIONS OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY. By JOHN B. JUDIS. *Farrar Straus Giroux. 344 pp. $25.00.*

Reviewed by SAM TANENHAUS

NOSTALGIA haunts this chronicle of 20th-century American politics. John B. Judis, a contributing editor of the *New Republic* and the author of an excellent biography of William F. Buckley, Jr., begins by evoking a golden age: it occurred in the first two decades of the century, when leaders and policy-makers realized the nation could no longer go it alone as an agrarian Eden cut off from the rest of the world. This was a sobering discovery, but one that Americans met resourcefully. They

> grasped, if imperfectly, the novelty of their situation and attempted to come to terms with it, participating in social movements and electing individuals of superior understanding to the presidency.

In those days, Judis writes, the preeminent social movement was progressivism, whose meliorative doctrines were set forth emphatically by Herbert Croly—author of *The Promise of American Life* (1909), founding editor (in 1914) of the *New Republic*, and advocate of a strong, centralized state. Croly believed, says Judis,

> that a good society—one that exhibited brotherhood, justice, happiness, and virtue—could be created only by concerted social and government action toward those ends.

Two Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson ("individuals of superior understanding"), were captivated by Croly's vision, premised as it was on faith in government and progress.

In our own day this faith is conspicuously lacking. "Where," Judis asks, are the "vibrant new political and social movements? Where is the spirit of experimentation? And where are the new political leaders?" He himself sees only decline. The title of his book echoes the film *La Grande Illusion* (1937), Jean Renoir's bittersweet farewell to Europe's haute bourgeoisie and its departed graces. In his final paragraph Judis warns that "our nation's descent" will continue as long as we remain maladapted "to an economically interdependent world in which America's military power is increasingly irrelevant."

The better part of *Grand Illusion* tries to explain how this lamentable state of affairs came to be. Judis places most of the blame on the "evangelical" policies of the cold war. These, grounded in an exaggerated fear of the Soviet Union, resulted in an overinvestment of American capital, political and economic, in a 40-year effort to defeat world Communism. It was an effort largely wasted, says Judis, for the Soviet regime began to disintegrate as early as the 1950's and "finally collapsed under the weight of its own internal problems." At the same time, American well-being was seriously impaired by setbacks at home—a sagging economy, widening class and race divisions—and by the failure of the nation's leaders to counter the "predatory trade tactics" of Japan. The trouble, in sum, is that the second half of the "American Century" has been defined not by progressivism but by conservatism, and Judis is hard-pressed to find any virtues in conservative policies.

This is hardly a balanced argument. Judis neglects to mention that the "internal problems" of the Soviet Union were greatly magnified, and in some instances created, by the pressure of American opposition. And he scants major gains on the home front: the triumphs of the civil-rights movement in the 1950's and 60's; the economic boom of the 1980's.

Judis is old-fashioned in his approach to history; in the manner of Plutarch, he interprets sweeping developments through the words and deeds of individual men. This leads to an overexuberance of praise and blame. The figures he admires—Teddy Roosevelt, Croly, the journalist Walter Lippmann, Senator J. William Fulbright—emerge as high-minded paragons, while those he deplores—Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush—are caricatured as villains or buffoons.

A chapter on the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger begins with Nixon creeping onstage as "the former witch hunter," a reputed hardliner "who would stop at nothing to destroy world Communism." In fact, Nixon hunted only one "witch," Alger Hiss, and he prosecuted his case scrupulously. Later, as Vice President, Nixon helped de-claw Senator Joseph McCarthy. Judis does, at least, pay fair tribute to Nixon's bold *Realpolitik*. He concedes nothing, however, to another

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SAM TANENHAUS *is working on a biography of Whittaker Chambers.*

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skilled internationalist, George Bush, who, says Judis, gained his expertise "unconsciously—the way a boy learns to ride a bicycle."

What, then, does Judis make of those other, outsize cases of arrested adolescence, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson? It is impossible to say. *Grand Illusion* includes scattered commentary on several Democratic Presidents but offers sustained analysis of none—even though it was a Democratic President, Harry Truman, who initiated the cold-war policies Judis abhors and another, Kennedy, who led us to the brink of war with the Soviet Union. Judis treats at length only two Democrats, both disappointed in bids for higher office: Henry Wallace, who in 1948 mounted a disastrous third-party bid for the presidency, and Fulbright, whom Kennedy passed over in 1960 for the job of Secretary of State. *Grand Illusion* gives the impression that "our nation's descent" has been wholly a Republican free-fall.

THE book is strongest when Judis leaves off his analysis of political actors and takes up the writings of political thinkers. His chapters on Croly, Lippmann, and the diplomat George F. Kennan are comprehensive and animated. And Judis writes with remarkable sympathy about two ex-Communists who became leaders of the postwar conservative movement, Whittaker Chambers and James Burnham.

The chapter on Chambers is one of the handful of really illuminating writings on this difficult subject. In it, Judis looks beyond the shopworn iconography of the Hiss case and instead explores Chambers the political intellectual, whose views had a far wider gauge than is commonly supposed. This Chambers is best seen through the series of letters he wrote in his last years to William F. Buckley, Jr. (who later published them in the volume *Odyssey of a Friend*). They have been celebrated for their world-weary sonorities and wry *pensées*, but Judis has detected in them something else.

Toward the end of his life Chambers began to revise the claustrophobic vision of a future suspended between Communist damnation and Christian salvation that had informed his classic memoir, *Witness* (1952). It was a vision essentially alien, says Judis, to the American political temper, long characterized by moderation, not extremism. Chambers himself saw this and adjusted his sight lines. Unlike many on the Right, he backed President Eisenhower's overtures to Nikita Khrushchev in 1959; upheld Hiss's right to a passport upon his release from prison; favored price supports for American farmers. Above all, says Judis, Chambers tried to show that the proper "role of conservatives" was "not to try to block or revoke" the changes wrought by modernity, but rather "to shape them according to conservative ideas and principles."

JAMES BURNHAM was an academic of "encyclopedic powers" and, like a number of his fellow Trotskyists, a contributor in the 1930's to *Partisan Review*. At the outset of World War II he detached himself from the political Left and drifted steadily rightward without ever abandoning the Trotskyist theory of the Soviet Union as a permanently revolutionary state. When the Communists consolidated an Eastern bloc after the war, Burnham, now intensely anti-Communist, addressed the threat in a number of monitory books, among them *The Struggle for the World* and *Suicide of the West*.

Burnham argued that Soviet Communism, implacable enemy of the West, should not simply be "contained," as prevailing wisdom held, but directly challenged—militarily, if need be. Thus was born the "rollback" doctrine. But Burnham grasped the difference between belief and action, ends and means, and even at his most apocalyptic, says Judis, he dispensed "tactical advice to the Right" that

> was almost unfailingly based upon concrete and realistic assessments of the American and world situation, framed in terms of what was historically possible rather than transcendentally ideal.

CHAMBERS and Burnham are both presented in *Grand Illusion* as thinkers at odds with themselves, torn between "realistic" and "evangelical" outlooks. But the borders between "realism" and "evangelism" are not fixed, subject as they are to changes in the political climate. In the wake of the events that have transformed Russia and the nations of Eastern Europe, a generation of post-Communist "realists" has arisen who sound remarkably like the American anti-Communist "evangelists" of the 1950's. Chambers's "crackpot" notions in *Witness*, much derided in their day, anticipate arguments advanced in the essays of Vaclav Havel—models, it has been said, of intellectual clarity and skeptical wisdom. And the massive exhumation of Russian archives authorized by Boris Yeltsin has sought to confirm, in effect, the accuracy of Burnham's dark picture of the Soviet Union as fomenter of global revolution.

Judis, for his part, sometimes evangelically overstates his case for realism and so can seem more judgmental than analytical. But

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

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even at his most disapproving, he examines conservatism seriously, something few others on the Left can claim to have done.

Left Eclecticism

THE CRITICS BEAR IT AWAY: AMERICAN FICTION AND THE ACADEMY. By FREDERICK CREWS. *Random House. 213 pp. $20.00.*

Reviewed by PETER SHAW

THE undermining of traditional intellectual values in universities over the past two decades has taken its inspiration from successive waves of French and Marxist-derived theory. Most sensible observers, understandably repelled by the jargon-ridden, nihilistic, and anti-humanitarian tendencies of this imported theory, have avoided the necessary task of refuting it. Among the few to have assumed the distasteful burden in the area of literary studies are John Searle, John Ellis, David Hirsch, Richard Levin, and Frederick Crews.

In a previous collection of essays, *Skeptical Engagements* (1986), Crews exposed the hollow tendentiousness of, among others, Georg Lukács, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Geoffrey Hartman, Stanley Fish, and Frederic Jameson. In that book Crews coined the term "Left Eclecticism," wittily capturing the seemingly diverse array of new theory—"not just orthodox Marxist but also structuralist, deconstructionist, feminist, gay, Lacanian, Foucauldian"—all of which boiled down to a familiar political radicalism. Now in *The Critics Bear It Away*, largely a collection of essay-reviews, Crews pursues Left Eclecticism's seepage into the academic study of American literature.

Surveying recent criticism of Mark Twain, Hemingway, Faulkner, and to a lesser extent Flannery O'Connor and John Updike, Crews here undertakes a painstaking, even tortuously objective, account of the critical schools under review. In each case he follows his account with an exposure of inner contradictions and inconsistencies among the school's critics, and then enters an often surprisingly devastating summary evaluation.

In "Whose American Renaissance?," for example, a discussion of recent books on 19th-century American literature, Crews shows that the Left-politicizing critics he calls the "New Americanists" betray "an abrupt shift of theoretical posture" whenever it suits their political aims. Thus, when attacking the "canonical" works of a master like Nathaniel Hawthorne, many will take a deconstructionist tack, hoping to disprove the traditional understanding of Hawthorne's work by claiming that it is impossible to know what an author intended. But when it comes to minor works by women and others, whom the same critics want to introduce into the canon for political reasons, they treat the authors' intentions—which they usually see as attempting to advance a feminist or radical cause—as something that can very reliably be known and specified.

By the time Crews comes to summarize this and other "liabilities of the New Americanist enterprise," his indictment is overwhelming. Among the movement's sins he lists its

> self-righteousness, its tendency to conceive of American history only as a highlight film of outrages, its impatience with artistic purposes other than "redefining the social order," and its choice of critical positions according to the partisan cause at hand.

BUT there is a problem here. As he manfully embarks on each of his surveys, Crews is well aware that the examples of Left Eclecticism he is about to unearth and analyze will prove to be as spurious as all those that went before. Yet not only does he treat each new critic with unwearying respect, he invariably—and rather astoundingly—comes to the conclusion that, however heinous the offenses of the latest critical attitudes, they are really no worse than those committed in the traditional criticism they have displaced.

In a discussion of nine books on Faulkner, for example, Crews duly faults the newer critics for whom "Faulkner's works must yield distinctly liberating implications, not just neutral or sympathetic ones," and he demonstrates the "crudity" with which they impose their politics on Faulkner. Yet he also expresses sympathy with these same "ideologically aware academics" for rejecting older, "formalist" interpretations that attempted to rationalize away Faulkner's "occasionally reactionary attitudes." And in comparing the older and newer criticism, he concludes that, "ideological fashions aside, there is nothing to choose between strip-mining Faulkner's words for wholesome communities and for incipiently revolutionary ones."

But is there really nothing to choose? In the first place, there were critics as far back as the 1930's whose accounts of Faulkner did not fail to deal with his shortcomings, as Crews himself points out. In contrast, none of the newer critics in Crews's account succeeds in rendering a comparably balanced picture. And in the second place, whatever errors the older criticism committed arose from the shortcomings of individual critics or else from an as-yet immature evaluation of the work of a very difficult author. The errors of the newer critics, on the other hand, derive from what Crews elsewhere calls "apriorism": essentially fake interpretation based on rigid, preconceived political categories.

THE difference between old and new, in short, is highly significant, and Crews has done as much as anyone to demonstrate why. Yet he now declares the two morally equivalent—and on the whole unimportant. Both the radical critics and those who have opposed their politicizing, he writes,

> are convinced that the ideals and textual operations of literature professors greatly matter to the structure and future direction of society at large. On this last point, however, they are surely mistaken. Whether on the Left or Right, literary indoctri-

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nation today stops absolutely at the university's gate.

What can Crews be thinking of? The university "gate" has for some time now been open to activists from the outside, even as students from the inside stream outward, embodying and acting upon the attitudes and beliefs they have learned in school. Since the 1960's, indeed, developments at universities have led to major social and political change in the West. Even more importantly, the leftist ideas hatched in universities, and most especially in literature departments, have had national and international political ramificatons. It should hardly be necessary to argue this point in 1993. Yet Frederick Crews, who has done so much to damage the authority of Left Eclecticism, persists in urging the contrary. It will be interesting to see how much longer he continues to trivialize his own efforts by calling the issues he engages inconsequential.

Public Choice

BETTER THAN PLOWING, AND OTHER PERSONAL ESSAYS. By JAMES M. BUCHANAN. *University of Chicago Press. 194 pp. $23.95.*

Reviewed by KENNETH SILBER

IN MUCH economic theory, politicians and government bureaucrats are exempted from the general rule that humans seek to maximize their own interests; instead, government is assumed to be a sort of benignly neutral referee, capable of acting in the broad public interest. But James M. Buchanan, winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics, has long disputed this assumption. Since the early 1960's, he has led a small but growing band of academics in the development of "public-choice" theory, a school of thought that applies economic analysis to the behavior of governments. In particular, public-choice theorists have stripped away the idealized conception of the state that many economists have tended to present as a real alternative to market practices, and have focused instead on the limitations of government action.

The dust jacket of *Better Than Plowing*, a collection of autobiographical essays, describes Buchanan's work as "the theoretical inspiration for much of the Reagan era's economic philosophy." This is an overstatement. In fact, public choice was but one of several intellectual schools that influenced U.S. economic policy in the 1980's, along with supply-side theory and monetarism. True, the perspective offered by public-choice analysis was compatible with the Reagan administration's efforts to scale back the government's role in the economy. But the implications of public-choice theory are that achieving such a goal would require institutional change, as opposed to mere policy adjustments.

Thus, although the Reagan administration provided tax and regulatory relief, and constrained the growth of public expenditure, the mechanisms of economic policy-making remained much the same in 1988 as they had been in 1980. There had been little change in the budgetary process, or in other institutional arrangements conducive to the expansion of government. The way was thus clear for a swift reversal of Reagan's economic policies during the succeeding administration, which is indeed what happened.

It is unfortunate that public-choice theory did not make a greater impact on the Reagan era. Yet interest in institutional reform appears to have grown stronger during the past several years, as evidenced by efforts to impose term limits on Congress and to mandate a balanced federal budget. Although not every proposal for institutional change can be traced directly to public-choice theory, this school of thought does appear to be congruent with a current mood. In academic circles, meanwhile, public choice continues slowly but steadily to gain acceptance.

Now in his seventies, Buchanan looks back on a long and contentious career. In a manner that is consistent with his self-conscious status as an intellectual outsider, *Better Than Plowing* is an unorthodox book, its twelve chapters shifting frequently among times and places and mixing autobiography, intellectual history, and social commentary. Although Buchanan occasionally veers into the jargon of the social scientist, in general he treats both personal and intellectual matters with lucidity, interweaving a persuasive argument for the public-choice perspective with thought-provoking observations of his life and times.

The book's title is borrowed from the economist Frank H. Knight, one of Buchanan's intellectual mentors, who used the phrase to describe his own attitude toward his academic career. It has special resonance for Buchanan, who grew up in poverty in the 1920's and 1930's in rural Tennessee. In *Better Than Plowing* he describes years of hard work on the farm and an education at rural schools and a local teachers' college. An early suspicion of established institutions was nurtured by reading about the late-19th-century career of his grandfather, John P. Buchanan, a populist politician and one-term governor of Tennessee. This mistrust was magnified by the younger Buchanan's experience in the Navy during World War II, in which he encountered discrimination favoring Ivy League graduates in the distribution of assignments.

When he arrived at the University of Chicago to pursue graduate studies after the war, Buchanan was, by his own later description, a "libertarian socialist." But his socialism did not survive a course in price theory taught by Frank Knight, and his thinking was further shaped by reading the work of Knut Wicksell, a relatively obscure theorist who advised economists to set aside assumptions of government benevolence when offering policy advice. Questions about the functioning of the state preoccupied Buchanan as he set out on his academic career. During a year spent in Italy on a Fulbright grant in the mid-1950's, he was influenced by the emphasis placed by

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Italian theorists of public finance on the political institutions in which policy-makers operate.

At the University of Virginia, where he was then teaching, Buchanan's output of books and papers began to rise rapidly. In 1962, he and his chief collaborator, Gordon Tullock, published *The Calculus of Consent*, a book that marked the emergence of public-choice theory as a definable subdiscipline within economics. Soon Buchanan and others began to apply their analytical perspective to a growing range of economic and political phenomena. Before long, however, he ran afoul of the University of Virginia's administration, which conducted an investigation into the ideological attitudes of the public-choice theorists on its faculty. This experience led Buchanan, exercising what he refers to as the "academic-exit" option, to relocate to the University of California at Los Angeles; but then, repelled by the turmoil of UCLA's campus in 1968, he exited yet again, this time to Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

THE unrest of the 1960's, combined with the rapid expansion of the U.S. government during that decade, inspired Buchanan to direct his attention to more fundamental questions of political philosophy than had been addressed in the early years of public-choice theory. This new line of research led to his 1975 book, *The Limits of Liberty*, which offers a defense of limited government against the twin alternatives of statism and anarchism.

Buchanan remained at Virginia Polytechnic Institute until 1983, subsequently moving to George Mason University, where he currently directs the Center for the Study of Public Choice. He also spends time on a remote tract he owns in the mountains of southwestern Virginia; this property, a 90-acre, nonproducing farm, figures prominently in his essays as a place of refuge from the turbulence of his academic career and from some of the less welcome consequences of the recognition that has come with the winning of the Nobel Prize.

Such inconveniences, however, are overshadowed by Buchanan's success. From unlikely origins, he emerged to change the nature of economic theory, and to exert an as-yet-unconsummated influence on public policy.

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